Article
Major Password Managers Vulnerable to Unpatched Clickjacking Flaws
Arete Analysis
Cyber Threats
Security researchers recently published details on unpatched clickjacking vulnerabilities in popular password managers with tens of millions of users. These vulnerabilities allow threat actors to steal data stored in the password managers, including credit card numbers, two-factor authentication codes, and account credentials. The vulnerabilities arise from abuse of native auto-fill capabilities within most password managers. When a user visits a website vulnerable to cache poisoning, attackers overlay the password manager interface with invisible HTML elements that can lead to sensitive data being leaked.
What’s Notable and Unique
While abuse of autofill functionality in password managers is an established attack vector, the addition of overlay scripting to manipulate the user into enabling features represents a significant evolution. The primary method of attack is executing a script on a malicious or compromised website that masks the autofill dropdown menu of a browser-based password manager via overlays, opacity settings, or pointer-event techniques. In order to force the user to fill out forms with sensitive information, the attacker then overlays phony invasive components (such as popups, cookie banners, or CAPTCHA) so their clicks land on the concealed password manager controls.
Threat actors who successfully exploit the password managers may then be able to escalate privileges within the company’s linked cloud environment in an Exchange hybrid deployment if they first obtain administrator access to an on-premises Exchange server without leaving any easily identified or auditable evidence.
Eleven password managers were tested based on their popularity, and researchers discovered that each was susceptible to at least one attack technique. 1Password, Bitwarden, Enpass, iCloud Passwords, LastPass, and LogMeOnce were all vulnerable to multiple attack techniques.
Analyst Comments
Several impacted vendors initially rejected the security researchers’ claims and, therefore, did not apply patches for the activity when first notified in April 2025. The vendors claimed that the security researchers’ reports were about a general web risk. Many vendors have now reversed course and are working on applying patches. Those patches are not yet available at the time of this publication.
In the meantime, users are encouraged to disable autofill in their password managers. The use of autofill is typically not recommended by cybersecurity experts because threat actors can abuse it in a variety of ways to steal and monetize data. Enterprises can also invest in web application filtering capabilities to block disreputable, new, or other high-risk websites likely to be compromised in these types of attacks. Most defenses for clickjacking-based attacks rely on measures implemented on the website host’s side, so enterprises are best defended by preventing users from visiting less reputable websites.
Sources
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CMS Vulnerability Leads to ClickFix Campaign
Threat actors compromised at least 700 education and technology websites in a recent ClickFix campaign by exploiting a critical SQL injection flaw (CVE-2026-26980) in the Ghost content management system (CMS). Adversaries combined the vulnerability with the ClickFix social engineering tactic to steal admin keys and inject a malicious JavaScript that delivers a fake Cloudflare or CAPTCHA verification pop-up, tricking victims into copying and pasting a malicious command into their systems.
What’s Notable and Unique
Rather than targeting the end user first, this campaign is unique in its initial exploitation of the system, followed by social engineering attempts. This hybrid attack style is likely being leveraged to bypass traditional defenses.
This recent campaign also highlights how trusted web properties can be weaponized at scale and coupled with unpatched CMS vulnerabilities. Rather than using the CMS compromise to perpetrate a single attack, threat actors turned it into a supply-chain attack that ultimately affected over 700 trusted websites.
Analyst Comments
As network defenders and their tools enhance threat detection capabilities, adversaries increasingly seek methods to bypass these defenses. By combining vulnerability exploitation, social engineering techniques, and staging for ancillary attacks, this campaign successfully bypassed traditional defenses and inflicted significant impact. Defending against hybrid cyberattacks requires comprehensive security controls beyond simply patching vulnerabilities. Organizations should focus on limiting movement within the environment, detecting abuse of trusted applications, and preventing end-user manipulation.
Sources
700+ education and tech websites hijacked in huge ClickFix malware campaign
Under the engineering hood: Why Malwarebytes chose WordPress as its CMS
Think before you Click(Fix): Analyzing the ClickFix social engineering technique
Ghost CMS Vulnerability Exploited to Infect 700 Sites With ClickFix Malware
Article
Threat Actors Leverage Fake JPEG Files for Initial Access
In a recent campaign, researchers observed threat actors using fake JPEG image files as a delivery mechanism to initiate the deployment of additional malicious components. The false JPEG files are typically distributed via phishing emails or other social engineering-based lures, and are actually PowerShell-based malware that deploys a trojanized version of ConnectWise ScreenConnect to establish and maintain persistence in the compromised environment.
What’s Notable and Unique
This campaign leverages JPEG images as the initial lure, where the images are not merely decoys but part of the infection workflow. Victims are typically led to download or open an image that triggers hidden execution logic or redirects them to a payload-delivery sequence that initiates later stages of the intrusion chain.
The attack chain is designed to blend into legitimate environments, making detection more difficult. Execution typically relies on scripted or native Windows components, often including PowerShell or other living-off-the-land binaries, enabling fileless or near-fileless execution and reducing forensic artifacts on disk.
The multistage design ensures that the initial JPEG does not directly contain the full payload but instead triggers retrieval or decryption steps that progressively assemble the final malicious components in memory.
Analyst Comments
This campaign illustrates how threat actors continue to blur the line between legitimate file handling and malicious execution chains, indicating potential overlap with remote management or administrative tooling. The use of JPEG-based staging combined with script-based execution reflects a broader evolution toward a stealth-first intrusion design, in which file formats serve as triggers rather than payload containers.
Sources
OPERATION SILENTCANVAS : JPEG BASED MULTISTAGE POWERSHELL INTRUSION
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