Article
Don’t Drink from That! Gootloader Watering Hole Leads to REvil Attack
Arete Analysis
Threat Actors

REvil, more commonly referred to as Sodinokibi, is one of the most prolific ransomware threat groups currently active in the cyber extortion space. In the past year alone, Arete has responded to countless incidents where REvil has facilitated cyberattacks against client sites.
From our investigations, we have curated and documented threat intelligence to better understand the group’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Based on incident analysis, the threat group primarily leverages three main vectors to gain initial access to targeted environments:
They exploit externally facing and unsecured Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).
They leverage access to a compromised remote management platform, such as ScreenConnect/ConnectWise or NinjaRMM.
Or, they leverage compromised VPN appliances.
Other entry and deployment methodologies have been employed previously by the REvil group, such as the WinRAR Italia distributor supply chain attack in June of 2019. However, based off of the numerous REvil attacks we have responded to since the group’s inception, the above methodologies are those most commonly leveraged by the REvil threat group.
During a recent incident, however, we noted an interesting change in the group’s initial access tactics, whereby they leveraged a successful Cobalt Strike compromise, which was initially introduced into the victim environment by way of the execution of Gootloader that was downloaded from a fraudulent messaging forum.

Arete Analysis
During our investigation, we identified the root cause of this incident as a successful watering hole attack that had impacted an employee workstation.
While conducting an online search for legal contract agreements specific to septic systems, the employee selected a site that a Google search had returned. Unbeknownst to the employee, threat actors had compromised the site, configuring it to display a malicious web page designed to look like an active messaging forum.
As shown below, the forum’s first post appeared to come from a user — display name “Emma Hill” — who had requested the same type of legal contract agreement that the employee had been searching for. The web page also made it seem that another user — display name “Admin” — had replied to the initial post, providing a direct download link to the requested document.

Figure 1: Malicious web page that appears to show a legitimate messaging forum
In this case, the hyperlinked text reached out to an external domain, one that was hosting a PHP script named down.php. When clicked, this link fetched a request to this PHP script, which then automatically downloaded a ZIP archive that contained a highly obfuscated JavaScript file. This JavaScript file had the same name as the ZIP archive. The content of this JavaScript file is below:

Figure 2: JavaScript file
Based on our analysis and the fact that we observed Cobalt Strike indicators on the endpoint less than an hour later, this JavaScript file was attributed to the Gootkit Remote Access Trojan (RAT), which was then further leveraged to introduce a secondary payload, Cobalt Strike, into the victim environment. A REvil threat actor leveraged this initial compromise to gain access into this organization’s environment and, approximately eight (8) days later, deployed the REvil ransomware.
Another interesting observation from the analysis of this web page was that, after visiting the site from the same IP address in a short amount of time, the page redirected the end user to a different web page, one with a title page indicative of the legal contract the user was searching for. Unfortunately, this web page was simply a veil designed to shroud the site’s compromise and suppress any user suspicions.

Figure 3: Web page after initial site visitation
Indicators
Based on analysis performed during this engagement, Arete has compiled a list of indicators for public use and incorporation into security infrastructure.
Zip Archive Containing JavaScript Payload
MD5: E435D74D8A4009C955635C11DA1D3AFC
SHA1: F7C620AD560CDA2A9BA90B3E17C6D43A5FB91B44
SHA256: 2D6AB5C855F86032C4B2213B7FC5E53F0A772B4F709AE85299B8D33C1867845C
JavaScript Payload
MD5: 31C8B072C6FF386645DB60A4D9E121BB
SHA1: F6D85FFE4CA1A77F0DF7FE2379D6BB2103B6EE15
SHA256: 71C838EAC60AFBFE39728887240781AA5A10E0E563FB4AC259F965BFCD1FD5EA
Domains Serving Zip Archive
https[:]//www[.]vacanzenelmediterraneo[.]com/down.php
IPv4: 89.46.108[.]30
https[:]//www[.]thursdaybram[.]com/down.php
IPv4: 104.131.158[.]83
https[:]//yukata-sienne[.]jp/down.php
IPv4: 183.181.97[.]13
https[:]//www[.]frerecapucinbenin[.]org/down.php
IPv4: 94.177.165[.]14
https[:]//www[.]willkommen[.]org[.]rs/down.php
IPv4: 46.151.128[.]3
Watering Hole Communication Strings
Hi, I am looking to*A friend of mine told me he had seen it on your forum. I will appreciate any help here.
Here is a direct download link,
Thank you so much for your response! This is exactly what Ive been looking for
Thank you, Admin
Issue resolved. The ticket can be closed.
Fraudulent Forum – Full

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Article
Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: July 2026
INC Ransom was the most active threat group in July, while activity remained relatively distributed among multiple threat groups, with 19 unique groups observed throughout the month. Alongside INC Ransom, Qilin, Global Secret Group, Anubis, and DragonForce rounded out the five most active threat groups observed in July. Several emerging threat actors were also observed during the month, including Booba Team, Settra, and Global Secret Group.

Figure 1. Activity from the top 3 threat groups in July 2026
Throughout the month, analysts at Arete identified several trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:
In July 2026, Global Secret Group emerged as a new threat actor, leveraging the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) source code. Although the group began operations in June 2026, it quickly accumulated a substantial number of victims on its data leak site (DLS). The group operates through TOR-based negotiation portals and qTox communications. Notably, its DLS provides step-by-step guidance on purchasing Bitcoin, including references to Coinbase and Binance, demonstrating a streamlined, victim-focused extortion process designed to simplify ransom payments.
Similar to Fulcrumsec, the recently emerged Settra ransomware group appears to leverage AI-driven analysis of stolen data, publishing detailed and highly structured victim reports on its DLS. Additionally, a potential EDR-disabling tool, edr_blind.exe, was identified in multiple cases, suggesting a focus on defense-evasion capabilities.
With the continuation of the FortiBleed campaign, researchers have now identified compromised FortiGate credentials being leveraged by both the INC and Lynx ransomware operations. Analysis revealed direct operational links between the groups, including shared ransomware infrastructure and overlap between FortiBleed victims and ransomware targets. The operators are also incorporating AI to enhance various stages of the attack lifecycle and increase operational efficiency and scale. Notably, Arete also observed an INC ransomware intrusion leveraging FortiBleed-derived access in July, reinforcing the campaign's role as a precursor to ransomware deployment.
Sources
Arete Internal
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Current: Misconfigured Server Reveals Multiple Phishing Campaigns
Researchers uncovered three Microsoft 365 phishing campaigns after discovering a misconfigured HTTP server that exposed a threat actor’s phishing tools, configurations, victim logs, and operational infrastructure. The investigation revealed two operators using custom Evilginx-based adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing frameworks to steal authentication sessions and bypass MFA protections. A third operator abused Microsoft’s OAuth Device Code flow by tricking victims into completing authentication through Microsoft’s legitimate login process, allowing attackers to obtain valid access and refresh tokens without stealing passwords. The largest campaign compromised at least 218 victims across 12 countries, primarily targeting corporate Microsoft 365 accounts, with refresh tokens enabling persistent access. Researchers also identified the use of remote management tools for maintaining access, AI-assisted development of phishing tooling, and links to broader Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) ecosystems, highlighting how commodity frameworks and automation are lowering the barrier for sophisticated identity-based attacks.
What’s Notable and Unique
The campaigns demonstrate the continued shift from traditional credential theft to identity- and token-based compromise, in which attackers target authentication sessions, cookies, and OAuth tokens rather than relying solely on password theft. By obtaining valid authentication artifacts, attackers can access Microsoft 365 environments while bypassing conventional MFA protections.
The use of Evilginx-based AiTM frameworks highlights how publicly available phishing tools have evolved into effective MFA-bypass platforms. These frameworks proxy legitimate login pages, capture authenticated sessions, and allow attackers to reuse valid sessions without requiring victims’ credentials again.
The OAuth Device Code flow abuse represents a different attack method, in which attackers leverage a legitimate Microsoft authentication mechanism to obtain tokens after victims approve the request. This approach bypasses password theft entirely by abusing trusted authentication workflows.
The exposed infrastructure provided insight into attacker operations, including phishing configurations, victim tracking data, remote administration tools, and evidence of AI-assisted development. The findings demonstrate how phishing ecosystems now provide reusable tooling and automation that reduce the technical expertise required to conduct large-scale identity attacks.
Analyst Comments
These Microsoft 365 phishing campaigns demonstrate the ongoing evolution of identity-focused attacks, as adversaries increasingly target authentication sessions, tokens, and legitimate cloud authorization mechanisms to bypass traditional security controls. The combination of AiTM phishing, OAuth abuse, remote management tools, and PhaaS infrastructure enables threat actors to maintain persistent access while blending into legitimate cloud activity.
The growing availability of phishing frameworks and AI-assisted attack development highlights the need for continuous identity security improvements beyond traditional phishing defenses. Arete recommends that organizations strengthen identity monitoring, adopt phishing-resistant MFA where possible, review OAuth application permissions, monitor token activity, and implement conditional access policies to detect and restrict suspicious Microsoft 365 authentication behavior. Security teams should also monitor post-compromise indicators such as abnormal mailbox access, suspicious application consent, unauthorized remote tools, and unusual sign-in activity.
Sources
One Misconfigured Server, Three Active Campaigns: Full exposure of three AiTM Phishing Operators
Misconfigured Server Reveals Three Evilginx Phishing Operations Targeting Microsoft 365
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