Article
Law Enforcement Actions Leave ALPHV/BlackCat Scrambling to Salvage Operations
Cyber Threats
Threat Actors
Combating Ransomware

Through a coordinated law enforcement effort spearheaded by the FBI, ALPHV/BlackCat infrastructure was disrupted on December 7, 2023, in an operation publicly announced on December 19, 2023. After terrorizing businesses and organizations for over two years, the notorious ransomware group may have finally met its match.
What happened to BlackCat’s Infrastructure?
On December 7, 2023, the data leak website for ALPHV/BlackCat went offline and remained offline for more than 30 hours. This is one of the most prolonged disruptions the group has faced, as it previously only experienced periodic outages due to technical hosting issues. The BlackCat data leak site came back online with all data from previous victims removed before apparently being taken down for good on December 19, 2023, when existing BlackCat branding was replaced by an FBI banner including a TOR-based tip line for information on BlackCat and its affiliates.

Figure 1: Law Enforcement Seizure Banner Displayed on Known ALPHV/BlackCat Data Leak Sites on December 19, 2023
The BlackCat Decryptor
Prior to the takedown of BlackCat’s infrastructure, law enforcement maintained access to the threat actor’s environment for months and was able to obtain victim-specific decryption keys to BlackCat’s ransomware executable by monitoring the environment. The FBI used these decryption keys to offer decryption to 500 BlackCat victims as the FBI neared publicizing the takedown. The FBI estimated they were able to save organizations a total of $68 million in ransom demands.
However, based on Arete data, this is likely a conservative number. With an average initial ransom demand of $2.28 million in 2023, BlackCat demands observed by Arete are significantly higher than the demands calculated by law enforcement. While ransom payments are often significantly discounted from the original $2.28 million demand following a negotiation process, it is possible that this action taken by law enforcement could have saved victim organizations as much as five times as what was assessed by the FBI. Alternatively, the gap between Arete and the FBI’s estimated ransom payments may indicate how many organizations had either already paid a ransom before the decryption keys were available or were able to recover without paying the ransom.
The After-Action Report
While the initial data leak site (DLS) disruption nearly two weeks ago caused BlackCat’s operations to decrease significantly, three new victims were posted to the DLS between when the site came back online and when it was finally seized by the FBI. In one of those postings, BlackCat claimed to have reported a new victim to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In the intervening period, Arete also responded to a BlackCat engagement in which the threat actors utilized an old BlackCat encryptor. Therefore, while the infrastructure takedown certainly disrupted the scale and speed of BlackCat operations, it did not stop the operations of all affiliates.
Shortly after the FBI announced the website seizure on December 19, 2023, ALPHV/BlackCat’s operators stood up a new data leak site and claimed their website was “unseized.” Security researchers assess that BlackCat operators maintained access to the keys used to sign the original data leak site but lost access to their original servers. After standing up the new data leak site, BlackCat made a new post about a victim and stated they will no longer give victims additional time to conduct negotiations. The operators also stated they will harass executive teams and their children, report companies to the SEC and US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and release a clearnet (regular internet) link to data on victims.

Figure 2 ALPHV/BlackCat Post Excerpt Uploaded December 19, 2023
With a lack of trust in their own infrastructure, BlackCat affiliates began communicating with victims directly via email rather than relying on typical communication methods. While attempting to continue operations to the best of their ability, BlackCat operators reportedly later discovered that law enforcement gained access to a compromised domain controller and issued a concerning statement to their affiliates, giving them permission to “take the gloves off” in future operations.
The statement shared that all previously observed rules, minus the inability to target CIS* countries, no longer apply to BlackCat affiliates, and an increased percentage of ransom payments, now 90%, will go to affiliates. Additionally, several targets that were reportedly previously forbidden, such as hospitals and nuclear power plants, are now fair game for affiliates to target with the BlackCat encryptor. Finally, BlackCat stated they will no longer accept discounts from the original ransom demand. With an average negotiated discount of 63% off the original ransom demand observed by Arete, the inability to negotiate could cost BlackCat victims millions of dollars if they choose to make ransom payments.
Who is ALPHV/BlackCat?
ALPHV/BlackCat is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group that first emerged in November 2021. The group operates by providing ransomware software and infrastructure to other cybercriminals, who then use it to launch attacks on various targets. The group takes a cut of the ransom payments and leaks the stolen data of its victims on its Dark Web site. The group is also known for its unique extortion methods, which include reporting its victims to the SEC and creating false domains to impersonate victims and leak data.
Since its inception, ALPHV/BlackCat listed over 650 companies on its data leak site, making it one of the most prolific and dangerous ransomware groups active today. Throughout 2023, BlackCat was the most frequently observed ransomware group in Arete’s industry data. Among 56 different ransomware and extortion groups observed in 2023, BlackCat accounted for nearly a quarter of Arete’s overall engagements.

Figure 3: Visual from Arete’s Q3 2023 Crimeware Report
Affiliates of ALPHV/BlackCat include Scattered Spider, the ransomware group behind the brazen cyberattacks against MGM Resorts, Caesars, and more. The FBI and CISA issued a joint advisory about Scattered Spider in November 2023, warning of their use of ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware.
What are the implications of this takedown?
While the full implications of this takedown are currently unknown, it could have significant implications for the ransomware landscape. The takedown may disrupt the activities of many affiliates relying on ALPHV/BlackCat’s ransomware encryptor and infrastructure, likely forcing existing affiliates to move on to other ransomware programs or develop their own. Notably, LockBit ransomware quickly seized the opportunity to advertise that BlackCat affiliates could continue their current operations under LockBit’s RaaS operation. Additionally, this could lead to the emergence of new ransomware variants and groups, with affiliates bringing experience from previous programs. This happened before when law enforcement actions against other ransomware groups, such as DarkSide and REvil, resulted in the formation of new groups, like BlackMatter and Haron. Even before the FBI takedown, Arete observed a splintering of BlackCat affiliates, with groups like Scattered Spider conducting solo operations alongside operations using the BlackCat encryptor.
While the takedown of ALPHV/BlackCat’s websites is a positive development in the fight against ransomware, it is not a definitive victory. Ransomware remains a persistent and evolving threat that requires constant vigilance and collaboration from all stakeholders, including governments, businesses, and individuals.
BlackCat has been a widely impactful ransomware group, in part because it relied on affiliates with diverse means of compromising victims. Arete observed a wide variety of initial access measures in engagements involving ALPHV/BlackCat affiliates, including a sophisticated capability to exploit software and hardware vulnerabilities. Preventing BlackCat attacks and future ransomware attacks from affiliates that escape law enforcement requires a strong patch management program that prioritizes vulnerabilities with publicly released exploit code. Additionally, managing remote management tools in an environment is critical in preventing similar attacks. Arete identified third-party remote access tools as the initial intrusion method in more than eight percent of ALPHV/BlackCat engagements, but analysis of the full lifecycle of an ALPHV/BlackCat engagement showed those tools being used throughout the attacks to enable attacker operations. Neither method is unique to BlackCat operators and remains an important focus for defenders.
Footnotes
*The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a regional intergovernmental organization formed following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Armenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan.
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Top 9 Security Controls for SMBs
In today’s complex cyber threat landscape, small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) should implement a layered, multi-pronged approach to security. Here are some proven, effective controls to consider:
1. Implement MFA for All Users
Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is an effective and accessible way to protect sensitive data, comply with regulatory standards, and prevent unauthorized access to critical systems. By ensuring that users not only use a password but also a secure token, an organization can significantly reduce phishing attempts, credential stuffing attacks, and ransomware incidents. MFA should be enabled for email, VPN, and critical system access.
2. Update Patch Management Programs
A modern patching program should include policies and mechanisms to manage software updates in a timely manner. Patching efforts should address not just operating system updates, but also commonly utilized software within the environment. An active patching plan aims to reduce the mean time to patch and provide metrics on existing patch efforts. In the event of a high-severity vulnerability, a mature patching program should also be able to identify the risks and exposure for a given set of systems based on the average time to patch. This helps stakeholders make informed decisions when a new exploit is released.
3. Leverage a Properly Managed Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Tool
With real-time threat detection and advanced visibility, endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions can enhance an organization’s ability to detect and investigate potential malicious activity, including ransomware, lateral movement, fileless attacks, and more. Effective management of EDR should include proper configuration, regular agent updates, and established procedures for responding to alerts.
4. Enhance EDR with Frontline Incident Intelligence
While EDR solutions are an important component of a security program, threat actors are continually adapting their techniques to evade detection, and as a result, standard detection methods may not always identify emerging threats or novel attack behaviors. To strengthen protection, organizations can supplement EDR tools with custom detection rules informed by incident response data. These rules can help identify indicators of compromise observed during cyber incidents, providing an additional layer of visibility beyond traditional detections.
Arete Bloktd℠ illustrates this approach by transforming threat intelligence and malware analysis into curated detection rules for EDR tools. Applying frontline intelligence to security tools can result in earlier detection, less investigative burden, and a more confident response.
5. Create and Continuously Test an Incident Response (IR) Plan
An incident response plan can help an organization effectively identify, respond to, and recover from a cybersecurity incident while minimizing disruption and downtime. An IR plan defines clear roles, escalation paths, communication strategies, and decision frameworks for both internal and external teams. To be effective, these plans should be regularly tested with post-incident reviews or tabletop exercises involving key stakeholders.
6. Maintain Encrypted and Tested Data Backups
In the case of a cyberattack, backups can help organizations maintain business continuity, support ransom negotiations with threat actors, and contribute to a timely and successful recovery. Encrypting backups makes it more difficult for threat actors to access or alter them, and regular testing ensures they remain accessible during a security incident.
7. Conduct Employee Security Awareness Training
Human error is a leading cause of cybersecurity incidents, and an organization’s employees are its first line of defense against cyber threats. Security awareness training reinforces the importance of data confidentiality, supports regulatory compliance, and helps employees recognize and understand red flags such as suspicious emails, malicious links, and social engineering attempts.
8. Assess and Address Existing Risk and Vulnerabilities
To maintain a proactive approach to risk management and improve resilience, organizations should regularly assess existing vulnerabilities through expert-led Vulnerability Assessments, Penetration Testing, and Threat Hunting Assessments. These exercises can help identify security gaps, support regulatory compliance, and prevent potential incidents. During remediation, prioritize high-impact vulnerabilities and make a plan for periodic assessments.
9. Apply Least-Privilege Access Controls
Employees should have access only to the systems, applications, and data necessary to perform their jobs. By removing unnecessary administrative privileges and regularly reviewing user permissions, organizations can reduce the risk of unauthorized access and limit the damage caused by compromised accounts or insider threats.
Organizations should regularly review their cybersecurity programs, stay informed about emerging threats, and evaluate whether their security controls are adapting to the evolving threat landscape.
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Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: August 2026
Although INC Ransom was the most active ransomware threat group observed in August 2026, overall activity remained relatively distributed across the threat landscape, with approximately 30 unique ransomware and extortion groups, including both established and newly emerged actors, observed during the month. Alongside INC Ransom, Storm, DragonForce, Qilin, and The Gentlemen were among the top five most active threat groups, underscoring the continued diversity and competitiveness of the ransomware ecosystem.

Figure 1. Activity from the top 5 threat groups in August 2026
Throughout the month, analysts at Arete identified several trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:
August 2026 was a significant month for the emergence of new threat actors, with Arete identifying several previously untracked ransomware groups, including Storm, Dark Project, DireWolf, Morpheus, Orova, Spirals, Wallstreet Team, and Zawoo Team. This trend underscores the ongoing evolution of the threat landscape and the low barriers to entry for new cybercriminal operations.
Arete observed a continued use of AI-enabled capabilities across the ransomware ecosystem during August. Similar to Fulcrumsec and Setra, the newly emerged Zawoo Team appears to leverage AI-assisted analysis of stolen data, publishing highly structured and detailed victim assessments on its data leak site (DLS). Additionally, both the Aurora and Storm ransomware groups have been observed utilizing AI-driven or AI-assisted chat representatives during victim communications. These developments suggest that threat actors are increasingly incorporating AI to enhance data analysis, automate victim engagement, and improve the effectiveness and scalability of extortion operations.
In August, Arete also observed that despite sustained law enforcement disruption efforts, LockBit continues to demonstrate operational resilience, likely through the expansion of its affiliate ecosystem and the evolution of its tactics. Recent activity indicates an increased reliance on data theft and exfiltration-only operations, with observed victimology suggesting a notable focus on organizations within the financial sector.
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Arete Internal
Report
Arete's H1 2026 Crimeware Report
Explore intelligence and operational data from the frontlines of ransomware and extortion response as we detail the most significant trends and developments in the cyber threat landscape in the first half (H1) of 2026.
Article
WinRAR Path-Traversal Vulnerability Exploited in Ransomware Attacks
CISA has warned that CVE-2025-8088, a path-traversal vulnerability in WinRAR, is being exploited in ransomware attacks. The vulnerability allows attackers to use specially crafted archive files to place malicious executables in locations such as the Windows Startup folder, enabling code execution when the system restarts. WinRAR addressed this vulnerability in version 7.13, but exploitation has continued due to challenges in updating the software. CISA's updated KEV entry now specifically identifies the vulnerability as being used in ransomware attacks.
What’s Notable and Unique
The vulnerability was initially exploited as a zero-day by the Russia-linked RomCom group, enabling malware execution at user logon and supporting credential theft, cyberespionage, and ransomware-related activities.
CVE-2025-8088 continues to be actively exploited by both government-backed and financially motivated threat actors. Observed campaigns have been attributed to Russian- and Chinese-linked groups targeting several organizations.
Phishing campaigns leveraging weaponized RAR attachments exploited CVE-2025-8088 to silently place malicious payloads in autorun locations using directory traversal and Alternate Data Streams (ADS).
The widespread exploitation of CVE-2025-8088 highlights strong demand for effective WinRAR exploits, with multiple underground vendors previously supplying exploit capabilities to a diverse range of threat actors. One such vendor, zeroplayer, advertised a WinRAR exploit in July 2025.
Analyst Comments
Organizations should immediately upgrade WinRAR to version 7.13 or later and conduct an enterprise-wide inventory to identify unmanaged installations. Given that WinRAR lacks automatic updates, Group Policy support, and integration with common enterprise patch management platforms, manual verification and remediation may be required to ensure all vulnerable instances are addressed. Security teams should also enhance defenses against archive-based phishing attacks by blocking or scrutinizing unsolicited compressed files, monitoring for suspicious file creation in Windows Startup directories, and detecting abuse of ADS. With CISA now linking CVE-2025-8088 to ransomware activity, organizations should treat remediation as a high priority and actively monitor for indicators of WinRAR-based exploitation across their environments.
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CISA Adds Three Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog
WinRAR vulnerability being exploited in ransomware attacks, CISA warns



