Article
Chrome Extensions Used for Credential-Stealing and ClickFix Attacks
Arete Analysis
Recent research reveals two distinct but similar malicious Chrome browser extension campaigns that demonstrate how threat actors are increasingly abusing trusted browser extension ecosystems to gain initial access, steal sessions, and compromise enterprise environments.
What’s Notable and Unique
In mid-January 2026, cybersecurity researchers uncovered a coordinated cluster of five malicious Chrome extensions masquerading as enterprise productivity or access management tools for popular Human Resource and Enterprise Resource Planning platforms such as Workday, NetSuite, and SAP SuccessFactors.
Although published under different names, the extensions shared identical infrastructure, code patterns, and attack logic, indicating a single, well-organized operation. These extensions enabled session hijacking and full account takeover by abusing browser-level access.
In January, researchers also documented a separate campaign, dubbed “CrashFix,” which uses a different but equally effective browser extension-based attack vector. In this case, a malicious Chrome extension named NexShield impersonated the legitimate uBlock Origin Lite ad blocker and was distributed through malicious ads that redirected users to the official Chrome Web Store where they would be prompted to download the malicious version.
The technique mentioned above is yet another evolution of the ClickFix style social engineering that emerged in 2025, in which users are tricked into executing malicious commands themselves. In CrashFix attacks, following the instructions led to the execution of PowerShell commands that downloaded and installed ModeloRAT, a previously undocumented Python based remote access trojan.
Analyst Comments
Browser extensions are being weaponized as highly trusted initial access vectors, with attackers blending technical abuse (cookie theft, resource exhaustion) with social engineering (productivity branding, fake repair prompts). Together, these two recent findings demonstrate that malicious Chrome extensions pose a risk as a primary entry point for enterprise compromise, making browser extension governance, monitoring, and user education a critical defensive priority. Organizations should monitor for hidden PowerShell processes that are accessing browser cache folders and limit the use of PowerShell to privileged administrators. Organizations should also continue to promote and update their security awareness training, educating employees on newer social engineering techniques such as ClickFix.
Sources
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CMS Vulnerability Leads to ClickFix Campaign
Threat actors compromised at least 700 education and technology websites in a recent ClickFix campaign by exploiting a critical SQL injection flaw (CVE-2026-26980) in the Ghost content management system (CMS). Adversaries combined the vulnerability with the ClickFix social engineering tactic to steal admin keys and inject a malicious JavaScript that delivers a fake Cloudflare or CAPTCHA verification pop-up, tricking victims into copying and pasting a malicious command into their systems.
What’s Notable and Unique
Rather than targeting the end user first, this campaign is unique in its initial exploitation of the system, followed by social engineering attempts. This hybrid attack style is likely being leveraged to bypass traditional defenses.
This recent campaign also highlights how trusted web properties can be weaponized at scale and coupled with unpatched CMS vulnerabilities. Rather than using the CMS compromise to perpetrate a single attack, threat actors turned it into a supply-chain attack that ultimately affected over 700 trusted websites.
Analyst Comments
As network defenders and their tools enhance threat detection capabilities, adversaries increasingly seek methods to bypass these defenses. By combining vulnerability exploitation, social engineering techniques, and staging for ancillary attacks, this campaign successfully bypassed traditional defenses and inflicted significant impact. Defending against hybrid cyberattacks requires comprehensive security controls beyond simply patching vulnerabilities. Organizations should focus on limiting movement within the environment, detecting abuse of trusted applications, and preventing end-user manipulation.
Sources
700+ education and tech websites hijacked in huge ClickFix malware campaign
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Ghost CMS Vulnerability Exploited to Infect 700 Sites With ClickFix Malware
Article
Threat Actors Leverage Fake JPEG Files for Initial Access
In a recent campaign, researchers observed threat actors using fake JPEG image files as a delivery mechanism to initiate the deployment of additional malicious components. The false JPEG files are typically distributed via phishing emails or other social engineering-based lures, and are actually PowerShell-based malware that deploys a trojanized version of ConnectWise ScreenConnect to establish and maintain persistence in the compromised environment.
What’s Notable and Unique
This campaign leverages JPEG images as the initial lure, where the images are not merely decoys but part of the infection workflow. Victims are typically led to download or open an image that triggers hidden execution logic or redirects them to a payload-delivery sequence that initiates later stages of the intrusion chain.
The attack chain is designed to blend into legitimate environments, making detection more difficult. Execution typically relies on scripted or native Windows components, often including PowerShell or other living-off-the-land binaries, enabling fileless or near-fileless execution and reducing forensic artifacts on disk.
The multistage design ensures that the initial JPEG does not directly contain the full payload but instead triggers retrieval or decryption steps that progressively assemble the final malicious components in memory.
Analyst Comments
This campaign illustrates how threat actors continue to blur the line between legitimate file handling and malicious execution chains, indicating potential overlap with remote management or administrative tooling. The use of JPEG-based staging combined with script-based execution reflects a broader evolution toward a stealth-first intrusion design, in which file formats serve as triggers rather than payload containers.
Sources
OPERATION SILENTCANVAS : JPEG BASED MULTISTAGE POWERSHELL INTRUSION
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