Malware Spotlight: Akira Ransomware

Report

Malware Spotlight: Akira Ransomware

Nov 13, 2024

Arete Analysis

Cyber Threats

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Executive Summary

Since April 2023, Arete’s Incident Response (IR) team has responded to more than one hundred incidents attributed to the Akira ransomware group. Akira is a prolific threat and quickly established itself as one of the most active ransomware groups alongside ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit in 2023. In 2024, Akira benefited from law enforcement actions that disrupted LockBit and ALPHV/BlackCat’s operations and has continued to be one of the most active threat actor groups.

This spotlight explores the ransomware group’s observed behavior, background information on the threat actor, and statistics from Incident Response engagements, along with a technical analysis of Akira’s ransomware executable. Finally, we discuss security recommendations to better defend against this evolving cyber threat and mitigate the risk of financial and reputational losses.

Incident Response Data on the Akira Ransomware Group

The information below is based on engagements involving Akira ransomware 
investigated by Arete since April 2023. Our IR, Threat Intelligence, and 
Data Analytics teams work together to analyze key data points during every 
ransomware engagement and form real-time threat actor (TA) insights.
 
- Targeted sectors include healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, public and 
  financial services, and professional services.

- The median initial demand is $500,000.

- The median ransom payment facilitated is $150,000.

- Tools observed during investigations include SystemBC, Cobalt Strike, Rclone,
  Filezilla, WinSCP, AnyDesk, PuTTY, SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan), 
  Advanced IP Scanner, and Angry IP Scanner.

- Over the last six months, 43% of engagements involved data exfiltration.

- Depending on the variant, Akira encrypts and appends an “.akira”, “.powerranges”, 
  or “.akiranew” extension to encrypted files.

- The ransom note file name is commonly “akira_readme.txt” or “powerranges.txt” and 
  includes a password-protected Tor site for negotiations and communication with 
  victims.

- The group operates a data leak site (DLS) self-proclaimed as “AKIRA” and commonly 
  threatens victims with releasing stolen data as a pressure tactic if a payment is 
  not made.

- Akira will delete Windows Shadow Volume Copies using Powershell and utilize 
  Windows’ Restart Manager to exit processes and services that could potentially 
  prevent encryption

The information below is based on engagements involving Akira ransomware 
investigated by Arete since April 2023. Our IR, Threat Intelligence, and 
Data Analytics teams work together to analyze key data points during every 
ransomware engagement and form real-time threat actor (TA) insights.
 
- Targeted sectors include healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, public and 
  financial services, and professional services.

- The median initial demand is $500,000.

- The median ransom payment facilitated is $150,000.

- Tools observed during investigations include SystemBC, Cobalt Strike, Rclone,
  Filezilla, WinSCP, AnyDesk, PuTTY, SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan), 
  Advanced IP Scanner, and Angry IP Scanner.

- Over the last six months, 43% of engagements involved data exfiltration.

- Depending on the variant, Akira encrypts and appends an “.akira”, “.powerranges”, 
  or “.akiranew” extension to encrypted files.

- The ransom note file name is commonly “akira_readme.txt” or “powerranges.txt” and 
  includes a password-protected Tor site for negotiations and communication with 
  victims.

- The group operates a data leak site (DLS) self-proclaimed as “AKIRA” and commonly 
  threatens victims with releasing stolen data as a pressure tactic if a payment is 
  not made.

- Akira will delete Windows Shadow Volume Copies using Powershell and utilize 
  Windows’ Restart Manager to exit processes and services that could potentially 
  prevent encryption

The information below is based on engagements involving Akira ransomware 
investigated by Arete since April 2023. Our IR, Threat Intelligence, and 
Data Analytics teams work together to analyze key data points during every 
ransomware engagement and form real-time threat actor (TA) insights.
 
- Targeted sectors include healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, public and 
  financial services, and professional services.

- The median initial demand is $500,000.

- The median ransom payment facilitated is $150,000.

- Tools observed during investigations include SystemBC, Cobalt Strike, Rclone,
  Filezilla, WinSCP, AnyDesk, PuTTY, SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan), 
  Advanced IP Scanner, and Angry IP Scanner.

- Over the last six months, 43% of engagements involved data exfiltration.

- Depending on the variant, Akira encrypts and appends an “.akira”, “.powerranges”, 
  or “.akiranew” extension to encrypted files.

- The ransom note file name is commonly “akira_readme.txt” or “powerranges.txt” and 
  includes a password-protected Tor site for negotiations and communication with 
  victims.

- The group operates a data leak site (DLS) self-proclaimed as “AKIRA” and commonly 
  threatens victims with releasing stolen data as a pressure tactic if a payment is 
  not made.

- Akira will delete Windows Shadow Volume Copies using Powershell and utilize 
  Windows’ Restart Manager to exit processes and services that could potentially 
  prevent encryption

Background

Akira has evolved into a notable ransomware operation and was among the top variants observed by Arete in the first half of 2024.

Source: Arete's H1 2024 Crimeware Report

Akira targets a broad range of organizations throughout North America, including Canada, and swiftly lists victims on its data leak site. Targeted sectors include healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, public and financial services, and professional services. The group maintains Windows and Linux versions of its ransomware and uses virtual private network (VPN) appliances as an initial access vector in 50% of attacks.

Megazord, a variant of Akira, demonstrates the evolution of the group’s ransomware. Introduced around August 2023, this variant is unique due to its Rust-based code, which is a departure from the C++ code of the original Akira ransomware. The Megazord variant also includes different command line arguments and encrypts files with a “.powerranges” extension, which are differentiating attributes.

Technical Analysis

Malware analysis of one of the Windows-based variants revealed that Akira ransomware:

Supports multiple command-line arguments.
Encrypts files on the system and mounted shares.
Adds the following extension to encrypted files (variant dependent): .akira (e.g., file.docx.akira).
Creates a ransom note with the following filename (variant dependent): akira_readme.txt.
References a data leak site in the ransom note that, when accessed, self-identifies the group as AKIRA.
Kills a list of processes and services.
Maintains a list of whitelisted files and directories to ensure it will not render the system unusable, preventing recovery when running a decryptor.
Attempts to prevent system recovery by deleting the system’s volume shadow copies.
Creates a log file with a name based on the date and time: Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S (e.g., Log-19-09-2024-09-21-20.txt).

Execution Pattern/Arguments

Akira ransomware does not need a command line argument to execute and encrypt files in the system. However, Akira supports the following command line arguments:

Command line argument	Description
-p / –encryption_path	Specify a target directory to encrypt. If not provided, the payload will encrypt the local and mounted shared drives by default.
-s / –share_file	Encrypt shared volumes/directory files.
-n / –encryption_percent	Number that represents the percentage of the file that will be encrypted.
-localonly	Encrypt only local volumes.
-e/ –exclude	Meant to exclude directories but does not seem to be fully functional.

Megazord variant:

Command line argument	Description
–path	Path to encrypt. If not provided, the payload will encrypt the local and mounted shared drives by default.
–id	Unique token to execute the ransomware.
–threads	Number of threads (1-1000).
–h (–help)	Displays help options.
-log	Logging options with multiple logs supported (info, error, debug). Not displayed by default.

Examples of how the supported arguments are used:

Akira.exe -p=C:\Users\%USERNAME%\Desktop\MyFiles

Akira.exe –encryption_percent=10

Figure 1. Code in the ransomware written to read command line arguments

Stop Services and Processes

Before file encryption, the ransomware terminates a pre-determined list of processes and services to encrypt as many files as possible. Akira ransomware contains a list of processes it will exclude during process termination, listed below:

Process names:

explorer.exe, sihost.exe, spoolsv.exe, dwm.exe, LogonUI.exe, fontdrvhost.exe, cmd.exe, csrss.exe, smss.exe, SearchUI.exe, lsass.exe, conhost.exe, System, winlogon.exe, services.exe, wininit.exe, Registry, Memory Compression, System Idle Process, Secure System

File and Directory Exclusions

The ransomware excludes system-related files and folders, ransomware-related files, and whitelisted extensions during encryption.

Excluded file extensions:

.exe, .dll, .sys, .msi, .lnk, .akira, akira_readme.txt

Excluded directories:

tmp, temp, winnt, $Recycle.Bin, thumb, System Volume Information, $RECYCLE.BIN, Windows, ProgramData, Trend Micro, ProgramData, Boot

Inhibit System Recovery

Windows operating systems contain features that can help fix corrupted system files, including shadow copies, which are backups of files created by the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS). By deleting shadow copies, the ransomware can prevent victims from restoring files from backups, making it more difficult for them to recover their data without paying the ransom.

The ransomware deletes volume shadow copies before file encryption by starting the following Powershell process and executing the command:

powershell.exe -Command “Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | Remove-WmiObject”

Network Share Discovery

Akira ransomware can enumerate network-mounted shares by scanning the network interfaces. If any are found, it will attempt to encrypt them, as shown below.

Figure 2. Share drive encrypted

Data Encrypted for Impact

The ransomware initially finds available drives and then loads the files one by one using the Windows API FindFirstFileW and FindNextFileW. The ransomware generates random AES keys to encrypt the files, and after encrypting them, the keys are encrypted using a public RSA key. The resulting key is again encrypted and placed at the end of the file.

Figure 3. Data encryption code

Figure 4. Extension added to the encrypted files

Figure 5. Encrypted files

During execution, the ransomware creates a log file in the working directory where the file is executed from. The log file is named based on the date and time of execution using the following string format: Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S. For example, during execution, the following log file with the name was created: Log-19-09-2024-09-21-20.txt.

Figure 6. Log file created by Akira

Figure 7. Portion of the log file

Figure 8. Log file name string format in the code

Upon successful execution, the ransomware creates ransom notes with the file name akira_readme.txt. The Megazord variant creates ransom notes with the same content, but the file name is powerranges.txt.

Figure 9. Akira ransom note

Ransom note content:

Hi friends,

Whatever who you are and what your title is if you’re reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups – virtual, physical – everything that we managed to reach – are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption.

Well, for now let’s keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We’re fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know:

Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal.
Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them – in this case we won’t be able to help.
The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we’ve managed to detect and used in order to get into, identify backup solutions and upload your data.
As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes – generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket – to multiple threat actors at ones. Then all of this will be published in our blog – https://akiraI2iz6a7qgd3ayp3I6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kolIpj5z3z636bad[.]onion
We’re more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us.

If you’re indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:

Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room – https://www.torproject.org/download/.
Paste this link – <ONION_LINK>
Use this code – <UNIQUE_CODE> – to log into our chat.

Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.

Modify Registry

The Windows registry is a database that stores configuration settings and values for the Windows operating system. It manages user preferences, installed software, system configurations, and more. Malware abuses the Windows registry to maintain persistence, hide its presence, disable security settings, and launch malicious scripts. Akira did not perform any registry key modification.

Mutex

The mutex is the fundamental tool for managing shared resources between multiple threads or processes. Typically, ransomware uses a mutex to avoid reinfecting the victim system and causing multiple layers of encryption. The ransomware did not create a mutex during execution.

Network Activity

The ransomware did not try to communicate with a remote server other than encrypting data from mounted shares.

Indicators of Compromise

Indicator	Type	Context
9f873c29a38dd265decb6517a2a1f3b5d4f90ccd42e-b61039086ea0b5e74827e	SHA256 hash	Akira ransomware
2b00a02196b87445633cabde506b4387979504cf60955f0b-40cf2e4da4f0fd23	SHA256 hash	Akira ransomware
237d3c744fd5fc5d7e7a55e4385dff51045a1c6d8ee-7346a270a688ab3791d49	SHA256 hash	Akira ransomware
akira_readme.txt, powerranges.txt	File name	Akiraransom notes
.akira, .powerranges, .akiranew	Extension	Encrypted files extension
powershell.exe -Command “Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy \| Remove-WmiObject”	Process	Volume Shadow Copy deletion
Log-19-09-2024-09-21-20.txt	File name	Example log file name created by Akira
https://akirai2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kolIpj5z3z636bad[.]onion	URL	TA data leak site (DLS)

Data Leak Site

The ransom note contains a data leak site (DLS) that, when accessed, displayed the following page, self-identifying the group as Akira:

Figure 10. Tor DLS

Tor Chat Site

The ransom note contains a Tor chat site and a unique code used to log into the chat. The Tor chat site displayed the following page:

Figure 11. Tor chat site

Detection Mechanisms

Custom Detections and Blocking with Arete Bloktd℠

SentinelOne S1QL 1.0 query syntax (STAR rule):
Volume Shadow Copy Deletion

Akira Ransomware

EndpointOS = "windows" AND ((ObjectType = "process" AND CmdLine In Contains Anycase (
".\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", ":\programdata\lck.exe", 
":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe")) 
OR (ObjectType = "file" AND (EventType In ("File Creation", "File Scan") AND 
(TgtFilePath In Contains Anycase (":\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", 
":\programdata\lck.exe", ":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe", 
":\akira_readme.txt", ":\powerranges.txt", "akiranew.txt") OR TgtFilePath RegExp 
"\\Log-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-20[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}\.

EndpointOS = "windows" AND ((ObjectType = "process" AND CmdLine In Contains Anycase (
".\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", ":\programdata\lck.exe", 
":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe")) 
OR (ObjectType = "file" AND (EventType In ("File Creation", "File Scan") AND 
(TgtFilePath In Contains Anycase (":\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", 
":\programdata\lck.exe", ":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe", 
":\akira_readme.txt", ":\powerranges.txt", "akiranew.txt") OR TgtFilePath RegExp 
"\\Log-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-20[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}\.

EndpointOS = "windows" AND ((ObjectType = "process" AND CmdLine In Contains Anycase (
".\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", ":\programdata\lck.exe", 
":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe")) 
OR (ObjectType = "file" AND (EventType In ("File Creation", "File Scan") AND 
(TgtFilePath In Contains Anycase (":\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", 
":\programdata\lck.exe", ":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe", 
":\akira_readme.txt", ":\powerranges.txt", "akiranew.txt") OR TgtFilePath RegExp 
"\\Log-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-20[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}\.

Note: These threat hunting queries may need to be tuned for your specific network environment.

Yara

rule Akira_ransomware_executable
{
    meta:
        author = "areteir.com"
        description = "Detects the Akira ransomware executable"
        target = "Windows systems"
        file_type = "exe"
        copyright = "Copyright © 2024 by Arete Advisors, LLC."
        distribution = "No re-distribution without Arete Advisors, LLC consent."

    strings:
        $ns1 = "Shadowcopy" ascii wide nocase
        $ns2 = "Remove-WmiObject" ascii wide nocase
        $ns3 = "write_encrypt_info" ascii wide nocase
        $ns4 = "Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S" ascii wide nocase
        $as1 = "--encryption_path" ascii wide nocase
        $as2 = "--share_file" ascii wide nocase
        $as3 = "--encryption_percent" ascii wide nocase
        $as4 = "-localonly" ascii wide nocase
        $ms1 = "megazord\\src\\main.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms2 = "megazord::windowsmegazord\\src\\windows.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms3 = "megazord::path_findermegazord\\src\\path_finder.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms4 = "megazord\\src\\lock.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb1 = ":\\rust\\megazord" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb2 = "\\release\\deps\\megazord.pdb" ascii wide nocase
        $dls = "akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad" ascii wide nocase

condition:
((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550)) and
( ( (2 of ($ns*)) and (3 of ($as*)) ) or ( all of ($ms*) ) or ( all of ($pdb*) ) or ($dls) )
}

rule Akira_ransomware_executable
{
    meta:
        author = "areteir.com"
        description = "Detects the Akira ransomware executable"
        target = "Windows systems"
        file_type = "exe"
        copyright = "Copyright © 2024 by Arete Advisors, LLC."
        distribution = "No re-distribution without Arete Advisors, LLC consent."

    strings:
        $ns1 = "Shadowcopy" ascii wide nocase
        $ns2 = "Remove-WmiObject" ascii wide nocase
        $ns3 = "write_encrypt_info" ascii wide nocase
        $ns4 = "Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S" ascii wide nocase
        $as1 = "--encryption_path" ascii wide nocase
        $as2 = "--share_file" ascii wide nocase
        $as3 = "--encryption_percent" ascii wide nocase
        $as4 = "-localonly" ascii wide nocase
        $ms1 = "megazord\\src\\main.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms2 = "megazord::windowsmegazord\\src\\windows.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms3 = "megazord::path_findermegazord\\src\\path_finder.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms4 = "megazord\\src\\lock.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb1 = ":\\rust\\megazord" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb2 = "\\release\\deps\\megazord.pdb" ascii wide nocase
        $dls = "akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad" ascii wide nocase

condition:
((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550)) and
( ( (2 of ($ns*)) and (3 of ($as*)) ) or ( all of ($ms*) ) or ( all of ($pdb*) ) or ($dls) )
}

rule Akira_ransomware_executable
{
    meta:
        author = "areteir.com"
        description = "Detects the Akira ransomware executable"
        target = "Windows systems"
        file_type = "exe"
        copyright = "Copyright © 2024 by Arete Advisors, LLC."
        distribution = "No re-distribution without Arete Advisors, LLC consent."

    strings:
        $ns1 = "Shadowcopy" ascii wide nocase
        $ns2 = "Remove-WmiObject" ascii wide nocase
        $ns3 = "write_encrypt_info" ascii wide nocase
        $ns4 = "Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S" ascii wide nocase
        $as1 = "--encryption_path" ascii wide nocase
        $as2 = "--share_file" ascii wide nocase
        $as3 = "--encryption_percent" ascii wide nocase
        $as4 = "-localonly" ascii wide nocase
        $ms1 = "megazord\\src\\main.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms2 = "megazord::windowsmegazord\\src\\windows.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms3 = "megazord::path_findermegazord\\src\\path_finder.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms4 = "megazord\\src\\lock.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb1 = ":\\rust\\megazord" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb2 = "\\release\\deps\\megazord.pdb" ascii wide nocase
        $dls = "akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad" ascii wide nocase

condition:
((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550)) and
( ( (2 of ($ns*)) and (3 of ($as*)) ) or ( all of ($ms*) ) or ( all of ($pdb*) ) or ($dls) )
}

Recommended Mitigations

Utilize an endpoint detection and response (EDR) solution with the capability to halt detected processes and isolate systems on the network based on identified conditions.
Block any known attacker C2s in the firewall.
Implement multi-factor authentication on RDP and VPN to restrict access to critical network resources.
Eliminate unnecessary RDP ports exposed to the internet.
Block a high number of SMB connection attempts from one system to others in the network over a short period of time.
Perform periodic dark web monitoring to verify if data is available for sale on the black market.
Perform penetration tests.
Periodically patch systems and update tools.
Monitor connections to the network from suspicious locations.
Monitor downloads and uploads of files to file-sharing services outside standard work hours.
Monitor file uploads from domain controllers to the internet.
Monitor network scans from uncommon servers (e.g., RDP server).

Organizations can find the full list of US government-recommended ransomware prevention and mitigation
guidance here: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide.

Arete provides data-driven cybersecurity solutions to transform your response to emerging cyber threats.
Click here to learn more.

References

At Arete, we envision a world without cyber extortion, where people, businesses, and governments can thrive. We are taking all that we know from over 9,000 engagements to inform our solutions and strengthen powerful tools to better prevent, detect, and respond to the cyber extortion threats of tomorrow. Our elite team of experts provides unparalleled capabilities to address the entire cyber threat lifecycle, from incident response and restoration to advisory and managed security services. To learn more about our solutions, visit www.areteir.com.

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Article

Oct 20, 2026

FortiBleed Campaign Remains Active

The FBI and Secret Service recently warned that the FortiBleed credential-harvesting campaign remains an active threat targeting internet-facing Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and secure socket layer (SSL) virtual private network (VPN) gateways. The agencies report that attackers continue to scan internet-exposed Fortinet firewalls using previously obtained credentials. This has reinforced assessments made by other security researchers, who have stated that “FortiBleed should be treated as an active access operation, not as a one-time credential leak.”

What’s Notable and Unique

FortiBleed, active since February 2026, begins with widespread reconnaissance to identify internet-facing FortiGate firewalls and SSL-VPN services. Once potential targets are identified, operators attempt to gain initial access through credential stuffing, password spraying, and dictionary attacks using previously compromised credentials.
Following successful access, the attackers deploy the Go-based FortigateSniffer tool on compromised appliances. The tool leverages native FortiOS diagnostic functionality to passively intercept authentication traffic across 24 protocols, enabling the collection of cleartext credentials and password hashes passing through the device.
Successfully recovered credentials are reused to expand access, including Active Directory enumeration, Kerberos validation, SMB authentication, and network share discovery, enabling threat actors to move deeper into the victim environment.
Reporting indicates that initial access brokers (IABs) leveraging the FortiBleed attack chain have facilitated access for downstream ransomware operations, including the INC Ransom/Lynx and Payload ransomware groups. This aligns with Arete’s observations of ransomware groups, including INC, Qilin, and DragonForce, targeting Fortinet FortiGate and VPN infrastructure as an initial access vector.

Remediation

Organizations should restrict internet-facing FortiGate management interfaces, rotate administrative and VPN credentials, review local and privileged accounts, and enforce MFA for remote access. If a potential compromise is detected, organizations should isolate affected systems, conduct threat hunting to determine the scope and identify compromised accounts and devices, and preserve relevant logs and artifacts. Organizations should also report the incident to appropriate authorities and implement targeted eviction measures based on identified threat actor activity.

Analyst Comments

FortiBleed represents an ongoing access-enablement threat, rather than a one-time credential exposure. The campaign’s ability to harvest, validate, and reuse credentials can provide sustained access to victim environments and create opportunities for downstream ransomware activity. Organizations with suspected FortiGate exposure should treat the activity as a potential active compromise and investigate for persistent access, compromised accounts, and lateral movement.

Sources

FortiBleed Operations Continue Targeting Exposed Systems Leading to Reports of Lockouts

FBI Warns FortiBleed Remains Active After Amassing 86,644 Fortinet Device Credentials

Article

Oct 9, 2026

Threat Actors Exploiting Critical FortiMail Zero-Day Vulnerability

Fortinet has disclosed a critical vulnerability in FortiMail, tracked as CVE-2026-104286, that is currently being exploited as a zero-day in the wild. The flaw, which carries a Critical CVSS score of 9.8, affects the FortiMail management interface and can allow unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary files to affected systems, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution and full system compromise. Fortinet has confirmed active exploitation and urged customers to implement mitigations immediately while awaiting security updates.

What’s Notable and Unique

The vulnerability stems from improper restriction of file paths combined with improper neutralization of NULL byte characters. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit the flaw via specially crafted HTTP or HTTPS requests to write arbitrary files on the underlying operating system.
Organizations running FortiMail 7.2 can remediate the vulnerability by upgrading to 7.4 or newer. For customers using affected FortiMail 7.4, 7.6, and 8.0 versions, fixes have not yet been released. However, Fortinet has confirmed that the issue will be addressed in the upcoming 7.4.9, 7.6.7, and 8.0.2 releases.
Until the patched versions become available, Fortinet recommends mitigating risk by disabling the Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) feature. As an additional safeguard, administrators should restrict access to the FortiMail management interface, either by removing internet exposure altogether or limiting access to trusted internal networks only. The advisory also includes log entries that administrators can use to identify potentially compromised appliances.
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added CVE-2026-104286 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog and directed federal agencies to perform forensic triage and mitigation by October 4th.

Analyst Comments

Impacted organizations should review their FortiMail instances to ensure there are no unauthorized logins, examine device settings, evaluate all configurations as potentially compromised, and carry out the necessary recovery procedures. Defenders should immediately implement Fortinet's recommended mitigations, review systems for IOC matches, and prepare to deploy the forthcoming security updates as soon as they become available. It is strongly advised that all enterprises assess their setups to reduce risk, as protecting publicly accessible management interfaces is a fundamental security best practice.

Sources

Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory

Article

Oct 6, 2026

Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: September 2026

The Akira ransomware group re-emerged as the most active ransomware threat observed by Arete in September. Overall activity remained relatively distributed among multiple threat groups, with 29 unique groups observed throughout the month. Alongside Akira, INC Ransom and the relatively new Storm group were among the three most active threat actors observed in September. Several new threat groups also emerged during the month, including Hades Team, Shiba, and Vortex (which is suspected to be part of the cluster of threat actors affiliated with the former BlackFile group).

Throughout the month, analysts at Arete identified several trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:

In September 2026, the ShinyHunters threat group escalated its extortion activity by publicly targeting both the Clop ransomware group and the FBI. The group claimed to have breached and defaced Clop’s infrastructure, demanding an eight-figure ransom, while separately alleging the theft of sensitive FBI-related data and demanding the retraction of statements made in a prior public advisory. In both incidents, ShinyHunters employed similar pressure tactics, including website defacements, repeated public postings, and threats of data disclosure.
ClickFix attacks remained prevalent in September 2026, with ransomware groups including Qilin, Helix, and The Gentlemen leveraging ClickFix lures to facilitate PowerShell-based payload execution and initial access. The technique continues to evolve, combining social engineering with legitimate tools and services to enable compromise and evade detection.
September 2026 saw continued activity from the former BlackFile extortion ecosystem. BlackFile, a data theft and extortion operation active since at least October 2025, rebranded as Redact in May 2026, and since appears to have broken off into several affiliated brands, including Pink, Helix, Falcon, Cinder, and potentially Vortex. During September, some affiliates publicly disputed these associations and claimed to operate independently. However, the coordinated timing, messaging, and near-identical nature of these statements support the assessment that these groups remain part of a broader interconnected ecosystem operating under shared objectives or coordination.

Article

Sep 29, 2026

Attack Patterns in Settra Incidents

Recent Settra ransomware incidents demonstrate a consistent operational pattern involving compromised credentials, VPN access, and the deployment of ransomware executables tailored to victim environments. Researchers have observed Settra naming ransomware executables after the targeted organization's domain while following similar attack sequences across multiple intrusions. Arete has also identified overlapping tactics, techniques, and tools in Settra engagements observed from June to August, including the use of MeshAgent for remote access and Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) techniques to weaken endpoint security controls.

What’s Notable and Unique

Settra operators have been observed naming ransomware executables after the victim organization's domain, creating a direct association between the payload and the targeted environment.
Initial access vectors have included targeting exposed VPN infrastructure and the use of compromised credentials, reducing the need for traditional exploitation of vulnerabilities.
Arete observed MeshAgent in multiple Settra engagements, which provides threat actors with a mechanism for remote access and continued activity within compromised environments.
Settra engagements have also included Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) activity, which can be used to bypass or impair security controls by abusing legitimate but vulnerable drivers.

Analyst Comments

Recent Settra activity demonstrates how ransomware operators can combine credential-based access, remote management tooling, and security control evasion techniques to establish and maintain access before ransomware deployment. The repeated use of similar tools and operational patterns across incidents provides useful detection opportunities for defenders. Organizations should closely monitor VPN authentication activity, unusual use of compromised credentials, unexpected MeshAgent deployment, ransomware executables with victim-specific naming conventions, and suspicious driver activity associated with attempts to disable or bypass endpoint security controls.

Arete’s MDR practice detects Settra’s full attack chain, with special attention to the staging of BYOVD activity for defense evasion. However, for us to detect it, SentinelOne needs to be fully deployed across an environment. To support organizations with full deployment, Arete offers SentinelOne Deployment Assistance. This service is designed to ensure that SentinelOne is deployed across all eligible endpoints, eliminating coverage gaps that could otherwise expose the organization to ransomware, malware, credential theft, and other advanced threats. Through endpoint discovery, inventory reconciliation, and deployment assistance, Arete helps organizations achieve comprehensive protection and maximize the effectiveness of their SentinelOne investment. Contact clientcares@areteir.com to learn more.

Sources

Ready, Settra, Go: New Settra Ransomware Variant Deploys MeshAgent RMM