Malware Spotlight: Akira Ransomware

Report

Malware Spotlight: Akira Ransomware

Nov 13, 2024

Arete Analysis

Cyber Threats

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Executive Summary

Since April 2023, Arete’s Incident Response (IR) team has responded to more than one hundred incidents attributed to the Akira ransomware group. Akira is a prolific threat and quickly established itself as one of the most active ransomware groups alongside ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit in 2023. In 2024, Akira benefited from law enforcement actions that disrupted LockBit and ALPHV/BlackCat’s operations and has continued to be one of the most active threat actor groups.

This spotlight explores the ransomware group’s observed behavior, background information on the threat actor, and statistics from Incident Response engagements, along with a technical analysis of Akira’s ransomware executable. Finally, we discuss security recommendations to better defend against this evolving cyber threat and mitigate the risk of financial and reputational losses.

Incident Response Data on the Akira Ransomware Group

The information below is based on engagements involving Akira ransomware 
investigated by Arete since April 2023. Our IR, Threat Intelligence, and 
Data Analytics teams work together to analyze key data points during every 
ransomware engagement and form real-time threat actor (TA) insights.
 
- Targeted sectors include healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, public and 
  financial services, and professional services.

- The median initial demand is $500,000.

- The median ransom payment facilitated is $150,000.

- Tools observed during investigations include SystemBC, Cobalt Strike, Rclone,
  Filezilla, WinSCP, AnyDesk, PuTTY, SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan), 
  Advanced IP Scanner, and Angry IP Scanner.

- Over the last six months, 43% of engagements involved data exfiltration.

- Depending on the variant, Akira encrypts and appends an “.akira”, “.powerranges”, 
  or “.akiranew” extension to encrypted files.

- The ransom note file name is commonly “akira_readme.txt” or “powerranges.txt” and 
  includes a password-protected Tor site for negotiations and communication with 
  victims.

- The group operates a data leak site (DLS) self-proclaimed as “AKIRA” and commonly 
  threatens victims with releasing stolen data as a pressure tactic if a payment is 
  not made.

- Akira will delete Windows Shadow Volume Copies using Powershell and utilize 
  Windows’ Restart Manager to exit processes and services that could potentially 
  prevent encryption

The information below is based on engagements involving Akira ransomware 
investigated by Arete since April 2023. Our IR, Threat Intelligence, and 
Data Analytics teams work together to analyze key data points during every 
ransomware engagement and form real-time threat actor (TA) insights.
 
- Targeted sectors include healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, public and 
  financial services, and professional services.

- The median initial demand is $500,000.

- The median ransom payment facilitated is $150,000.

- Tools observed during investigations include SystemBC, Cobalt Strike, Rclone,
  Filezilla, WinSCP, AnyDesk, PuTTY, SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan), 
  Advanced IP Scanner, and Angry IP Scanner.

- Over the last six months, 43% of engagements involved data exfiltration.

- Depending on the variant, Akira encrypts and appends an “.akira”, “.powerranges”, 
  or “.akiranew” extension to encrypted files.

- The ransom note file name is commonly “akira_readme.txt” or “powerranges.txt” and 
  includes a password-protected Tor site for negotiations and communication with 
  victims.

- The group operates a data leak site (DLS) self-proclaimed as “AKIRA” and commonly 
  threatens victims with releasing stolen data as a pressure tactic if a payment is 
  not made.

- Akira will delete Windows Shadow Volume Copies using Powershell and utilize 
  Windows’ Restart Manager to exit processes and services that could potentially 
  prevent encryption

The information below is based on engagements involving Akira ransomware 
investigated by Arete since April 2023. Our IR, Threat Intelligence, and 
Data Analytics teams work together to analyze key data points during every 
ransomware engagement and form real-time threat actor (TA) insights.
 
- Targeted sectors include healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, public and 
  financial services, and professional services.

- The median initial demand is $500,000.

- The median ransom payment facilitated is $150,000.

- Tools observed during investigations include SystemBC, Cobalt Strike, Rclone,
  Filezilla, WinSCP, AnyDesk, PuTTY, SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan), 
  Advanced IP Scanner, and Angry IP Scanner.

- Over the last six months, 43% of engagements involved data exfiltration.

- Depending on the variant, Akira encrypts and appends an “.akira”, “.powerranges”, 
  or “.akiranew” extension to encrypted files.

- The ransom note file name is commonly “akira_readme.txt” or “powerranges.txt” and 
  includes a password-protected Tor site for negotiations and communication with 
  victims.

- The group operates a data leak site (DLS) self-proclaimed as “AKIRA” and commonly 
  threatens victims with releasing stolen data as a pressure tactic if a payment is 
  not made.

- Akira will delete Windows Shadow Volume Copies using Powershell and utilize 
  Windows’ Restart Manager to exit processes and services that could potentially 
  prevent encryption

Background

Akira has evolved into a notable ransomware operation and was among the top variants observed by Arete in the first half of 2024.

Source: Arete's H1 2024 Crimeware Report

Akira targets a broad range of organizations throughout North America, including Canada, and swiftly lists victims on its data leak site. Targeted sectors include healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, public and financial services, and professional services. The group maintains Windows and Linux versions of its ransomware and uses virtual private network (VPN) appliances as an initial access vector in 50% of attacks.

Megazord, a variant of Akira, demonstrates the evolution of the group’s ransomware. Introduced around August 2023, this variant is unique due to its Rust-based code, which is a departure from the C++ code of the original Akira ransomware. The Megazord variant also includes different command line arguments and encrypts files with a “.powerranges” extension, which are differentiating attributes.

Technical Analysis

Malware analysis of one of the Windows-based variants revealed that Akira ransomware:

Supports multiple command-line arguments.
Encrypts files on the system and mounted shares.
Adds the following extension to encrypted files (variant dependent): .akira (e.g., file.docx.akira).
Creates a ransom note with the following filename (variant dependent): akira_readme.txt.
References a data leak site in the ransom note that, when accessed, self-identifies the group as AKIRA.
Kills a list of processes and services.
Maintains a list of whitelisted files and directories to ensure it will not render the system unusable, preventing recovery when running a decryptor.
Attempts to prevent system recovery by deleting the system’s volume shadow copies.
Creates a log file with a name based on the date and time: Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S (e.g., Log-19-09-2024-09-21-20.txt).

Execution Pattern/Arguments

Akira ransomware does not need a command line argument to execute and encrypt files in the system. However, Akira supports the following command line arguments:

Command line argument	Description
-p / –encryption_path	Specify a target directory to encrypt. If not provided, the payload will encrypt the local and mounted shared drives by default.
-s / –share_file	Encrypt shared volumes/directory files.
-n / –encryption_percent	Number that represents the percentage of the file that will be encrypted.
-localonly	Encrypt only local volumes.
-e/ –exclude	Meant to exclude directories but does not seem to be fully functional.

Megazord variant:

Command line argument	Description
–path	Path to encrypt. If not provided, the payload will encrypt the local and mounted shared drives by default.
–id	Unique token to execute the ransomware.
–threads	Number of threads (1-1000).
–h (–help)	Displays help options.
-log	Logging options with multiple logs supported (info, error, debug). Not displayed by default.

Examples of how the supported arguments are used:

Akira.exe -p=C:\Users\%USERNAME%\Desktop\MyFiles

Akira.exe –encryption_percent=10

Figure 1. Code in the ransomware written to read command line arguments

Stop Services and Processes

Before file encryption, the ransomware terminates a pre-determined list of processes and services to encrypt as many files as possible. Akira ransomware contains a list of processes it will exclude during process termination, listed below:

Process names:

explorer.exe, sihost.exe, spoolsv.exe, dwm.exe, LogonUI.exe, fontdrvhost.exe, cmd.exe, csrss.exe, smss.exe, SearchUI.exe, lsass.exe, conhost.exe, System, winlogon.exe, services.exe, wininit.exe, Registry, Memory Compression, System Idle Process, Secure System

File and Directory Exclusions

The ransomware excludes system-related files and folders, ransomware-related files, and whitelisted extensions during encryption.

Excluded file extensions:

.exe, .dll, .sys, .msi, .lnk, .akira, akira_readme.txt

Excluded directories:

tmp, temp, winnt, $Recycle.Bin, thumb, System Volume Information, $RECYCLE.BIN, Windows, ProgramData, Trend Micro, ProgramData, Boot

Inhibit System Recovery

Windows operating systems contain features that can help fix corrupted system files, including shadow copies, which are backups of files created by the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS). By deleting shadow copies, the ransomware can prevent victims from restoring files from backups, making it more difficult for them to recover their data without paying the ransom.

The ransomware deletes volume shadow copies before file encryption by starting the following Powershell process and executing the command:

powershell.exe -Command “Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | Remove-WmiObject”

Network Share Discovery

Akira ransomware can enumerate network-mounted shares by scanning the network interfaces. If any are found, it will attempt to encrypt them, as shown below.

Figure 2. Share drive encrypted

Data Encrypted for Impact

The ransomware initially finds available drives and then loads the files one by one using the Windows API FindFirstFileW and FindNextFileW. The ransomware generates random AES keys to encrypt the files, and after encrypting them, the keys are encrypted using a public RSA key. The resulting key is again encrypted and placed at the end of the file.

Figure 3. Data encryption code

Figure 4. Extension added to the encrypted files

Figure 5. Encrypted files

During execution, the ransomware creates a log file in the working directory where the file is executed from. The log file is named based on the date and time of execution using the following string format: Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S. For example, during execution, the following log file with the name was created: Log-19-09-2024-09-21-20.txt.

Figure 6. Log file created by Akira

Figure 7. Portion of the log file

Figure 8. Log file name string format in the code

Upon successful execution, the ransomware creates ransom notes with the file name akira_readme.txt. The Megazord variant creates ransom notes with the same content, but the file name is powerranges.txt.

Figure 9. Akira ransom note

Ransom note content:

Hi friends,

Whatever who you are and what your title is if you’re reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups – virtual, physical – everything that we managed to reach – are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption.

Well, for now let’s keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We’re fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know:

Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal.
Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them – in this case we won’t be able to help.
The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we’ve managed to detect and used in order to get into, identify backup solutions and upload your data.
As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes – generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket – to multiple threat actors at ones. Then all of this will be published in our blog – https://akiraI2iz6a7qgd3ayp3I6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kolIpj5z3z636bad[.]onion
We’re more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us.

If you’re indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:

Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room – https://www.torproject.org/download/.
Paste this link – <ONION_LINK>
Use this code – <UNIQUE_CODE> – to log into our chat.

Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.

Modify Registry

The Windows registry is a database that stores configuration settings and values for the Windows operating system. It manages user preferences, installed software, system configurations, and more. Malware abuses the Windows registry to maintain persistence, hide its presence, disable security settings, and launch malicious scripts. Akira did not perform any registry key modification.

Mutex

The mutex is the fundamental tool for managing shared resources between multiple threads or processes. Typically, ransomware uses a mutex to avoid reinfecting the victim system and causing multiple layers of encryption. The ransomware did not create a mutex during execution.

Network Activity

The ransomware did not try to communicate with a remote server other than encrypting data from mounted shares.

Indicators of Compromise

Indicator	Type	Context
9f873c29a38dd265decb6517a2a1f3b5d4f90ccd42e-b61039086ea0b5e74827e	SHA256 hash	Akira ransomware
2b00a02196b87445633cabde506b4387979504cf60955f0b-40cf2e4da4f0fd23	SHA256 hash	Akira ransomware
237d3c744fd5fc5d7e7a55e4385dff51045a1c6d8ee-7346a270a688ab3791d49	SHA256 hash	Akira ransomware
akira_readme.txt, powerranges.txt	File name	Akiraransom notes
.akira, .powerranges, .akiranew	Extension	Encrypted files extension
powershell.exe -Command “Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy \| Remove-WmiObject”	Process	Volume Shadow Copy deletion
Log-19-09-2024-09-21-20.txt	File name	Example log file name created by Akira
https://akirai2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kolIpj5z3z636bad[.]onion	URL	TA data leak site (DLS)

Data Leak Site

The ransom note contains a data leak site (DLS) that, when accessed, displayed the following page, self-identifying the group as Akira:

Figure 10. Tor DLS

Tor Chat Site

The ransom note contains a Tor chat site and a unique code used to log into the chat. The Tor chat site displayed the following page:

Figure 11. Tor chat site

Detection Mechanisms

Custom Detections and Blocking with Arete Bloktd℠

SentinelOne S1QL 1.0 query syntax (STAR rule):
Volume Shadow Copy Deletion

Akira Ransomware

EndpointOS = "windows" AND ((ObjectType = "process" AND CmdLine In Contains Anycase (
".\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", ":\programdata\lck.exe", 
":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe")) 
OR (ObjectType = "file" AND (EventType In ("File Creation", "File Scan") AND 
(TgtFilePath In Contains Anycase (":\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", 
":\programdata\lck.exe", ":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe", 
":\akira_readme.txt", ":\powerranges.txt", "akiranew.txt") OR TgtFilePath RegExp 
"\\Log-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-20[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}\.

EndpointOS = "windows" AND ((ObjectType = "process" AND CmdLine In Contains Anycase (
".\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", ":\programdata\lck.exe", 
":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe")) 
OR (ObjectType = "file" AND (EventType In ("File Creation", "File Scan") AND 
(TgtFilePath In Contains Anycase (":\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", 
":\programdata\lck.exe", ":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe", 
":\akira_readme.txt", ":\powerranges.txt", "akiranew.txt") OR TgtFilePath RegExp 
"\\Log-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-20[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}\.

EndpointOS = "windows" AND ((ObjectType = "process" AND CmdLine In Contains Anycase (
".\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", ":\programdata\lck.exe", 
":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe")) 
OR (ObjectType = "file" AND (EventType In ("File Creation", "File Scan") AND 
(TgtFilePath In Contains Anycase (":\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", 
":\programdata\lck.exe", ":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe", 
":\akira_readme.txt", ":\powerranges.txt", "akiranew.txt") OR TgtFilePath RegExp 
"\\Log-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-20[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}\.

Note: These threat hunting queries may need to be tuned for your specific network environment.

Yara

rule Akira_ransomware_executable
{
    meta:
        author = "areteir.com"
        description = "Detects the Akira ransomware executable"
        target = "Windows systems"
        file_type = "exe"
        copyright = "Copyright © 2024 by Arete Advisors, LLC."
        distribution = "No re-distribution without Arete Advisors, LLC consent."

    strings:
        $ns1 = "Shadowcopy" ascii wide nocase
        $ns2 = "Remove-WmiObject" ascii wide nocase
        $ns3 = "write_encrypt_info" ascii wide nocase
        $ns4 = "Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S" ascii wide nocase
        $as1 = "--encryption_path" ascii wide nocase
        $as2 = "--share_file" ascii wide nocase
        $as3 = "--encryption_percent" ascii wide nocase
        $as4 = "-localonly" ascii wide nocase
        $ms1 = "megazord\\src\\main.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms2 = "megazord::windowsmegazord\\src\\windows.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms3 = "megazord::path_findermegazord\\src\\path_finder.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms4 = "megazord\\src\\lock.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb1 = ":\\rust\\megazord" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb2 = "\\release\\deps\\megazord.pdb" ascii wide nocase
        $dls = "akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad" ascii wide nocase

condition:
((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550)) and
( ( (2 of ($ns*)) and (3 of ($as*)) ) or ( all of ($ms*) ) or ( all of ($pdb*) ) or ($dls) )
}

rule Akira_ransomware_executable
{
    meta:
        author = "areteir.com"
        description = "Detects the Akira ransomware executable"
        target = "Windows systems"
        file_type = "exe"
        copyright = "Copyright © 2024 by Arete Advisors, LLC."
        distribution = "No re-distribution without Arete Advisors, LLC consent."

    strings:
        $ns1 = "Shadowcopy" ascii wide nocase
        $ns2 = "Remove-WmiObject" ascii wide nocase
        $ns3 = "write_encrypt_info" ascii wide nocase
        $ns4 = "Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S" ascii wide nocase
        $as1 = "--encryption_path" ascii wide nocase
        $as2 = "--share_file" ascii wide nocase
        $as3 = "--encryption_percent" ascii wide nocase
        $as4 = "-localonly" ascii wide nocase
        $ms1 = "megazord\\src\\main.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms2 = "megazord::windowsmegazord\\src\\windows.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms3 = "megazord::path_findermegazord\\src\\path_finder.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms4 = "megazord\\src\\lock.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb1 = ":\\rust\\megazord" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb2 = "\\release\\deps\\megazord.pdb" ascii wide nocase
        $dls = "akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad" ascii wide nocase

condition:
((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550)) and
( ( (2 of ($ns*)) and (3 of ($as*)) ) or ( all of ($ms*) ) or ( all of ($pdb*) ) or ($dls) )
}

rule Akira_ransomware_executable
{
    meta:
        author = "areteir.com"
        description = "Detects the Akira ransomware executable"
        target = "Windows systems"
        file_type = "exe"
        copyright = "Copyright © 2024 by Arete Advisors, LLC."
        distribution = "No re-distribution without Arete Advisors, LLC consent."

    strings:
        $ns1 = "Shadowcopy" ascii wide nocase
        $ns2 = "Remove-WmiObject" ascii wide nocase
        $ns3 = "write_encrypt_info" ascii wide nocase
        $ns4 = "Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S" ascii wide nocase
        $as1 = "--encryption_path" ascii wide nocase
        $as2 = "--share_file" ascii wide nocase
        $as3 = "--encryption_percent" ascii wide nocase
        $as4 = "-localonly" ascii wide nocase
        $ms1 = "megazord\\src\\main.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms2 = "megazord::windowsmegazord\\src\\windows.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms3 = "megazord::path_findermegazord\\src\\path_finder.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms4 = "megazord\\src\\lock.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb1 = ":\\rust\\megazord" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb2 = "\\release\\deps\\megazord.pdb" ascii wide nocase
        $dls = "akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad" ascii wide nocase

condition:
((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550)) and
( ( (2 of ($ns*)) and (3 of ($as*)) ) or ( all of ($ms*) ) or ( all of ($pdb*) ) or ($dls) )
}

Recommended Mitigations

Utilize an endpoint detection and response (EDR) solution with the capability to halt detected processes and isolate systems on the network based on identified conditions.
Block any known attacker C2s in the firewall.
Implement multi-factor authentication on RDP and VPN to restrict access to critical network resources.
Eliminate unnecessary RDP ports exposed to the internet.
Block a high number of SMB connection attempts from one system to others in the network over a short period of time.
Perform periodic dark web monitoring to verify if data is available for sale on the black market.
Perform penetration tests.
Periodically patch systems and update tools.
Monitor connections to the network from suspicious locations.
Monitor downloads and uploads of files to file-sharing services outside standard work hours.
Monitor file uploads from domain controllers to the internet.
Monitor network scans from uncommon servers (e.g., RDP server).

Organizations can find the full list of US government-recommended ransomware prevention and mitigation
guidance here: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide.

Arete provides data-driven cybersecurity solutions to transform your response to emerging cyber threats.
Click here to learn more.

References

At Arete, we envision a world without cyber extortion, where people, businesses, and governments can thrive. We are taking all that we know from over 9,000 engagements to inform our solutions and strengthen powerful tools to better prevent, detect, and respond to the cyber extortion threats of tomorrow. Our elite team of experts provides unparalleled capabilities to address the entire cyber threat lifecycle, from incident response and restoration to advisory and managed security services. To learn more about our solutions, visit www.areteir.com.

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Article

Nov 9, 2026

Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: October 2026

Although Akira once again emerged as the most active ransomware group in October, overall ransomware and extortion activity was not dominated by any single threat group and instead remained widely distributed among a variety of threat actors, continuing the trend that began around August. Arete identified 31 unique named threat groups in October, the most observed in a single month so far in 2026. In addition to Akira, Settra, and The Gentlemen were among the three most active groups. Several new threat actors also emerged, including BYOD, Kubera Team, QWCrypt, AoQin, Emperador, Osiris Team, and Cinder, with Cinder assessed as possibly part of a threat actor cluster affiliated with the former BlackFile group.

Figure 1. Activity from the top 10 threat groups in October 2026

Throughout the month, analysts at Arete identified several trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:

PHP2Shell emerged as one of the most significant threats in October, with increasing exploitation of the critical PHP vulnerabilities CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. Other notable vulnerabilities included CVE-2026-104286 affecting FortiMail, and CVE-2026-102255, a critical pre-authentication Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability affecting SonicWall SMA1000 appliances, highlighting continued threat actor interest in internet-facing enterprise infrastructure.

International law enforcement operations against cybercriminal groups continued to make headlines in October. German authorities announced the arrest of 28-year-old Russian national Vladimir K., suspected of being a senior operator within the Qilin Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group. Separately, the FBI arrested an individual with suspected links to ShinyHunters, adding to recent law enforcement activity targeting ransomware and extortion groups, including the disruption of KillSec. While Vladimir K.’s arrest has not yet had a notable impact on Qilin’s operational activity, it could provide law enforcement with greater insight into the group’s infrastructure and affiliate network, potentially supporting further disruption efforts.

In early October, “The Luna Moth Files” exposed several files containing alleged internal communications associated with Luna Moth, also known as Silent Ransom Group, revealing insights into the group’s social engineering, data extortion, and victim negotiation operations. However, several claims remain unverified, and the exposure has not notably disrupted the group’s activity thus far, as it was among the top threat actors Arete observed throughout the month.

Sources

Arete Internal

Article

Nov 2, 2026

PHP2Shell Exploitation Update

PHP2Shell exploitation activity continues to increase globally, with threat actors targeting the critical PHP remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. Researchers recently identified low-volume scanning targeting unpatched or partially mitigated hosts across multiple countries and sectors, and the activity is assessed with moderate confidence as linked to a Korean-speaking operator associated with the Lazarus Group ecosystem. While PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) has been patched in PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, and 8.2.35, the separately identified CVE-2026-115560 remains unpatched.

What’s Notable and Unique

PHP2Shell vulnerabilities can cause memory corruption due to improper error handling, potentially allowing threat actors to achieve remote code execution on vulnerable PHP servers.
Observed activity includes mass scanning, PHP environment fingerprinting, exploitation attempts, credential and secret theft attempts, and attempts to deliver second-stage payloads and malware.
Successful in-the-wild exploitation has also been reported against honeypots, resulting in shell command execution and the retrieval of additional payloads, demonstrating the potential for follow-on malicious activity.

Mitigations

Organizations should prioritize upgrading internet-facing PHP deployments to patched versions, migrating unsupported PHP versions, updating embedded and containerized PHP runtimes, and implementing available Web Application Firewall (WAF) protections as a temporary defense-in-depth measure.

Analyst Comments

PHP2Shell poses a significant security concern due to its potential to enable unauthenticated remote code execution on vulnerable PHP servers. The progression from mass scanning and exploitation attempts to reports of successful command execution demonstrates the potential for these vulnerabilities to support initial access and subsequent malicious activity. Arete has been closely monitoring PHP2Shell exploitation activity and regularly reviewing and updating related indicators to support detection and blocking efforts. Given the potential for remote exploitation and follow-on activity, PHP2Shell represents a high-priority initial-access risk, emphasizing the importance of timely patching and remediation of affected PHP environments.

Sources

PHP shares mitigation for new RCE vulnerability with no patch
PHP2Shell Exploitation Attempts Continue Amid Suspected N. Korea Global Scanning Activity
PHP2Shell Exploit Attempts Hit Millions as Attackers Try to Deploy Mirai Malware
Advisory: PHP2Shell Vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619)

Article

Oct 30, 2026

LiteLLM Supply-Chain Compromise

A software supply-chain attack compromised the release pipeline of LiteLLM, a widely used open-source Python SDK and AI gateway. Attackers leveraged the compromised pipeline on October 21st to publish a malicious LiteLLM version through PyPI and associated Docker registries. The affected release, LiteLLM 1.107.0, contained malware designed to steal credentials, sensitive configuration data, private keys, browser information, and other secrets from compromised systems.

What’s Notable and Unique

The incident is particularly significant because LiteLLM provides a common API for applications to interact with AI models from multiple providers. It is reported that the project had approximately 61,800 GitHub stars and 92 million monthly PyPI downloads.
Rather than modifying the core LiteLLM application source code, the threat actors reportedly tampered with the installation package itself. The malware was designed for broad credential and information theft and encrypted the collected data before uploading it to the attacker's endpoint.
The compromise went beyond one-time credential theft. A malicious Python component launched a detached loader that checked a GitHub-hosted pointer every hour and could download Python code from an external server for execution on the compromised machine. This provided threat actors with a mechanism for subsequent remote code execution.

Analyst Comments

Although the malicious packages were subsequently removed, simply uninstalling or deleting the affected LiteLLM package may not be sufficient, because malicious Python startup files or the detached loader could remain on the host. All exposed information should be rotated immediately, and infected systems should be isolated and rebuilt from clean backups. The most recent clean release prior to the attack, LiteLLM 1.106.2, is currently the suggested recovery version.

Sources

LiteLLM release pipeline hacked to distribute info-stealer malware
LiteLLM 1.107.0 Compromised: Python Startup Hooks Steal Cloud, AI, and Proxy Credentials
The Collector Reaches Beyond Provider API Keys

Article

Oct 27, 2026

French Supermarket Cyberattack Highlights Risks in Exposed Refrigeration Controllers

Hundreds of French supermarkets were reportedly affected by a cyberattack in which threat actors compromised internet-connected refrigeration controllers and manipulated temperature and defrost settings, which caused refrigeration units to overheat, resulting in widespread food spoilage and significant financial loss. Impacted refrigeration systems were associated with Danfoss, Copeland, and Dixell, and demonstrated how vulnerabilities in industrial control systems (ICS) can disrupt physical operations without relying on conventional data theft or encryption. The attack also raised concerns about the wider exposure of similar devices, as thousands of refrigeration management interfaces remain accessible from the public internet. The incident highlights the growing risk posed by insecure operational technology (OT), particularly where legacy equipment and remote-management interfaces lack adequate security controls.

What’s Notable and Unique

Researchers identified approximately 2,765 internet-accessible Danfoss AK-SM 800A interfaces during assessment. This figure reflects the scope of that research and should not be interpreted as a current count of exposed devices. Publicly accessible management interfaces increase the opportunity for unauthorized access to industrial equipment.
Research also identified several security flaws in the Danfoss AK-SM 800A platform, including an authentication bypass command injection that could enable remote code execution and a weakness involving web-server configuration changes. Danfoss addressed these findings through firmware updates.
Authorities reported compromised Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC systems, alongside Copeland XWEB and Dixell XWEB monitoring platforms.

Analyst Comments

The incident demonstrates the business consequences of insufficiently secured industrial infrastructure and reinforces the need to integrate OT security into enterprise risk management. Organizations operating connected facility systems should establish clear ownership of industrial assets, enforce secure remote-access policies, and prioritize remediation based on exposure and operational criticality. The findings also highlight the importance of coordinating security teams with facilities and engineering personnel to ensure that protective measures do not compromise essential operations. A risk-based approach to OT security can help organizations reduce exposure while maintaining the availability and reliability of critical equipment.

Sources

France Supermarket Hacks Expose Risks of Internet-Facing Refrigeration Systems
Freeze the Controller, Defrost the Food: Uncovering Vulnerabilities in Danfoss Refrigeration Controllers
Attackers Heat French Supermarket Fridges Up to 50°C by Hijacking Danfoss Controllers