Report
Malware Spotlight: Akira Ransomware
Arete Analysis
Cyber Threats

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Executive Summary
Since April 2023, Arete’s Incident Response (IR) team has responded to more than one hundred incidents attributed to the Akira ransomware group. Akira is a prolific threat and quickly established itself as one of the most active ransomware groups alongside ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit in 2023. In 2024, Akira benefited from law enforcement actions that disrupted LockBit and ALPHV/BlackCat’s operations and has continued to be one of the most active threat actor groups.
This spotlight explores the ransomware group’s observed behavior, background information on the threat actor, and statistics from Incident Response engagements, along with a technical analysis of Akira’s ransomware executable. Finally, we discuss security recommendations to better defend against this evolving cyber threat and mitigate the risk of financial and reputational losses.
Incident Response Data on the Akira Ransomware Group
Background
Akira has evolved into a notable ransomware operation and was among the top variants observed by Arete in the first half of 2024.

Source: Arete's H1 2024 Crimeware Report
Akira targets a broad range of organizations throughout North America, including Canada, and swiftly lists victims on its data leak site. Targeted sectors include healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, public and financial services, and professional services. The group maintains Windows and Linux versions of its ransomware and uses virtual private network (VPN) appliances as an initial access vector in 50% of attacks.
Megazord, a variant of Akira, demonstrates the evolution of the group’s ransomware. Introduced around August 2023, this variant is unique due to its Rust-based code, which is a departure from the C++ code of the original Akira ransomware. The Megazord variant also includes different command line arguments and encrypts files with a “.powerranges” extension, which are differentiating attributes.
Technical Analysis
Malware analysis of one of the Windows-based variants revealed that Akira ransomware:
Supports multiple command-line arguments.
Encrypts files on the system and mounted shares.
Adds the following extension to encrypted files (variant dependent): .akira (e.g., file.docx.akira).
Creates a ransom note with the following filename (variant dependent): akira_readme.txt.
References a data leak site in the ransom note that, when accessed, self-identifies the group as AKIRA.
Kills a list of processes and services.
Maintains a list of whitelisted files and directories to ensure it will not render the system unusable, preventing recovery when running a decryptor.
Attempts to prevent system recovery by deleting the system’s volume shadow copies.
Creates a log file with a name based on the date and time: Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S (e.g., Log-19-09-2024-09-21-20.txt).
Execution Pattern/Arguments
Akira ransomware does not need a command line argument to execute and encrypt files in the system. However, Akira supports the following command line arguments:
Command line argument | Description |
|---|---|
-p / –encryption_path | Specify a target directory to encrypt. If not provided, the payload will encrypt the local and mounted shared drives by default. |
-s / –share_file | Encrypt shared volumes/directory files. |
-n / –encryption_percent | Number that represents the percentage of the file that will be encrypted. |
-localonly | Encrypt only local volumes. |
-e/ –exclude | Meant to exclude directories but does not seem to be fully functional. |
Megazord variant:
Command line argument | Description |
|---|---|
–path | Path to encrypt. If not provided, the payload will encrypt the local and mounted shared drives by default. |
–id | Unique token to execute the ransomware. |
–threads | Number of threads (1-1000). |
–h (–help) | Displays help options. |
-log | Logging options with multiple logs supported (info, error, debug). Not displayed by default. |
Examples of how the supported arguments are used:
Akira.exe -p=C:\Users\%USERNAME%\Desktop\MyFiles |
Akira.exe –encryption_percent=10 |

Figure 1. Code in the ransomware written to read command line arguments
Stop Services and Processes
Before file encryption, the ransomware terminates a pre-determined list of processes and services to encrypt as many files as possible. Akira ransomware contains a list of processes it will exclude during process termination, listed below:
Process names:
explorer.exe, sihost.exe, spoolsv.exe, dwm.exe, LogonUI.exe, fontdrvhost.exe, cmd.exe, csrss.exe, smss.exe, SearchUI.exe, lsass.exe, conhost.exe, System, winlogon.exe, services.exe, wininit.exe, Registry, Memory Compression, System Idle Process, Secure System | ||
|---|---|---|
File and Directory Exclusions
The ransomware excludes system-related files and folders, ransomware-related files, and whitelisted extensions during encryption.
Excluded file extensions:
.exe, .dll, .sys, .msi, .lnk, .akira, akira_readme.txt |
Excluded directories:
tmp, temp, winnt, $Recycle.Bin, thumb, System Volume Information, $RECYCLE.BIN, Windows, ProgramData, Trend Micro, ProgramData, Boot |
Inhibit System Recovery
Windows operating systems contain features that can help fix corrupted system files, including shadow copies, which are backups of files created by the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS). By deleting shadow copies, the ransomware can prevent victims from restoring files from backups, making it more difficult for them to recover their data without paying the ransom.
The ransomware deletes volume shadow copies before file encryption by starting the following Powershell process and executing the command:
powershell.exe -Command “Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | Remove-WmiObject” |
Network Share Discovery
Akira ransomware can enumerate network-mounted shares by scanning the network interfaces. If any are found, it will attempt to encrypt them, as shown below.

Figure 2. Share drive encrypted
Data Encrypted for Impact
The ransomware initially finds available drives and then loads the files one by one using the Windows API FindFirstFileW and FindNextFileW. The ransomware generates random AES keys to encrypt the files, and after encrypting them, the keys are encrypted using a public RSA key. The resulting key is again encrypted and placed at the end of the file.

Figure 3. Data encryption code

Figure 4. Extension added to the encrypted files

Figure 5. Encrypted files
During execution, the ransomware creates a log file in the working directory where the file is executed from. The log file is named based on the date and time of execution using the following string format: Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S. For example, during execution, the following log file with the name was created: Log-19-09-2024-09-21-20.txt.

Figure 6. Log file created by Akira

Figure 7. Portion of the log file

Figure 8. Log file name string format in the code
Upon successful execution, the ransomware creates ransom notes with the file name akira_readme.txt. The Megazord variant creates ransom notes with the same content, but the file name is powerranges.txt.

Figure 9. Akira ransom note
Ransom note content:
Hi friends,
| ||
|---|---|---|
Modify Registry
The Windows registry is a database that stores configuration settings and values for the Windows operating system. It manages user preferences, installed software, system configurations, and more. Malware abuses the Windows registry to maintain persistence, hide its presence, disable security settings, and launch malicious scripts. Akira did not perform any registry key modification.
Mutex
The mutex is the fundamental tool for managing shared resources between multiple threads or processes. Typically, ransomware uses a mutex to avoid reinfecting the victim system and causing multiple layers of encryption. The ransomware did not create a mutex during execution.
Network Activity
The ransomware did not try to communicate with a remote server other than encrypting data from mounted shares.
Indicators of Compromise
Indicator | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
9f873c29a38dd265decb6517a2a1f3b5d4f90ccd42e-b61039086ea0b5e74827e | SHA256 hash | Akira ransomware |
2b00a02196b87445633cabde506b4387979504cf60955f0b-40cf2e4da4f0fd23 | SHA256 hash | Akira ransomware |
237d3c744fd5fc5d7e7a55e4385dff51045a1c6d8ee-7346a270a688ab3791d49 | SHA256 hash | Akira ransomware |
akira_readme.txt, powerranges.txt | File name | Akiraransom notes |
.akira, .powerranges, .akiranew | Extension | Encrypted files extension |
powershell.exe -Command “Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | Remove-WmiObject” | Process | Volume Shadow Copy deletion |
Log-19-09-2024-09-21-20.txt | File name | Example log file name created by Akira |
https://akirai2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kolIpj5z3z636bad[.]onion | URL | TA data leak site (DLS) |
Data Leak Site
The ransom note contains a data leak site (DLS) that, when accessed, displayed the following page, self-identifying the group as Akira:

Figure 10. Tor DLS
Tor Chat Site
The ransom note contains a Tor chat site and a unique code used to log into the chat. The Tor chat site displayed the following page:

Figure 11. Tor chat site
Detection Mechanisms
Custom Detections and Blocking with Arete’s Arsenal
SentinelOne S1QL 1.0 query syntax (STAR rule):
Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
Akira Ransomware
Note: These threat hunting queries may need to be tuned for your specific network environment.
Yara
Recommended Mitigations
Utilize an endpoint detection and response (EDR) solution with the capability to halt detected processes and isolate systems on the network based on identified conditions.
Block any known attacker C2s in the firewall.
Implement multi-factor authentication on RDP and VPN to restrict access to critical network resources.
Eliminate unnecessary RDP ports exposed to the internet.
Block a high number of SMB connection attempts from one system to others in the network over a short period of time.
Perform periodic dark web monitoring to verify if data is available for sale on the black market.
Perform penetration tests.
Periodically patch systems and update tools.
Monitor connections to the network from suspicious locations.
Monitor downloads and uploads of files to file-sharing services outside standard work hours.
Monitor file uploads from domain controllers to the internet.
Monitor network scans from uncommon servers (e.g., RDP server).
Organizations can find the full list of US government-recommended ransomware prevention and mitigation
guidance here: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide.
Arete provides data-driven cybersecurity solutions to transform your response to emerging cyber threats.
Click here to learn more.
References
At Arete, we envision a world without cyber extortion, where people, businesses, and governments can thrive. We are taking all that we know from over 9,000 engagements to inform our solutions and strengthen powerful tools to better prevent, detect, and respond to the cyber extortion threats of tomorrow. Our elite team of experts provides unparalleled capabilities to address the entire cyber threat lifecycle, from incident response and restoration to advisory and managed security services. To learn more about our solutions, visit www.areteir.com. | ||
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Article
Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: February 2026
After a slight lull in January, Akira and Qilin returned to dominating ransomware activity in February, collectively accounting for almost half of all engagements that month. The rest of the threat landscape remained relatively diverse, with a mix of persistent threats like INC and PLAY, older groups like Cl0p and LockBit, and newer groups like BravoX and Payouts King. Given current trends, the first quarter of 2026 will likely remain relatively predictable, with the top groups from the second half of 2025 continuing to operate at fairly consistent levels month to month.

Figure 1. Activity from the top 5 threat groups in February 2026
Throughout the month of February, analysts at Arete identified several trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:
In February, Arete observed Qilin actively targeting WatchGuard Firebox devices, especially those vulnerable to CVE-2025-14733, to gain initial access to victim environments. CVE-2025-14733 is a critical vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS that allows a remote, unauthenticated threat actor to execute arbitrary code. In addition to upgrading WatchGuard devices to the latest Firebox OS version, which patches the bug, administrators are urged to rotate all shared secrets on affected devices that may have been compromised and may be used in future campaigns.
Reports from February suggest that threat actors are increasingly exploring AI-enabled tools and services to scale malicious activities, demonstrating how generative AI is being integrated into both espionage and financially motivated threat operations. The Google Threat Intelligence Group indicated that state-backed threat actors are leveraging Google’s Gemini AI as a force multiplier to support all stages of the cyberattack lifecycle, from reconnaissance to post-compromise operations. Separate reporting from Amazon Threat Intelligence identified a threat actor leveraging commercially available generative AI services to conduct a large-scale campaign against FortiGate firewalls, gaining access through weak or reused credentials protected only by single-factor authentication.
The Interlock ransomware group recently introduced a custom process-termination utility called “Hotta Killer,” designed to disable endpoint detection and response solutions during active intrusions. This tool exploits a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-61155) in a gaming anti-cheat driver, marking a significant adaptation in the group’s operations against security tools like FortiEDR. Arete is actively monitoring this activity, which highlights the growing trend of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks, in which threat actors exploit legitimate, signed drivers to bypass and disable endpoint security controls.
Sources
Arete Internal
Article
ClickFix Campaign Delivers Custom RAT
Security researchers identified a sophisticated evolution of the ClickFix campaign that aims to compromise legitimate websites before delivering a five-stage malware chain, culminating in the deployment of MIMICRAT. MIMICRAT is a custom remote access trojan (RAT) written in the C/C++ programming language that offers various capabilities early in the attack lifecycle. The attack begins with victims visiting compromised websites, where JavaScript plugins load a fake Cloudflare verification that tricks users into executing a malicious PowerShell script, further displaying the prominence and effectiveness of ClickFix and its user interaction techniques.
Not Your Average RAT
MIMICRAT displays above-average defense evasion and sophistication, including:
A five-stage PowerShell sequence beginning with Event Tracing for Windows and Anti-Malware Scan Interface bypasses, which are commonly used in red teaming for evading detection by EDR and AV toolsets.
The malware later uses a lightweight scripting language that is scripted into memory, allowing malicious actions without files that could easily be detected by an EDR tool.
MIMICRAT uses malleable Command and Control profiles, allowing for a constantly changing communication infrastructure.
The campaign uses legitimate compromised infrastructure, rather than attacker-owned tools, and is prepped to use 17 different languages, which increases global reach and defense evasion.
Analyst Comments
The ClickFix social engineering technique remains an effective means for threat actors to obtain compromised credentials and initial access to victim environments, enabling them to deploy first-stage malware. Coupled with the sophisticated MIMICRAT RAT, the effectiveness of this campaign could increase. Arete will continue monitoring for changes to the ClickFix techniques, the deployment of MIMICRAT in other campaigns, and other pertinent information relating to the ongoing campaign.
Sources
MIMICRAT: ClickFix Campaign Delivers Custom RAT via Compromised Legitimate Websites
Article
Threat Actors Leveraging Gemini AI for All Attack Stages
State-backed threat actors are leveraging Google’s Gemini AI as a force multiplier to support all stages of the cyberattack lifecycle, from reconnaissance to post-compromise operations. According to the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), threat actors linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, North Korea, and other unattributed groups have misused Gemini to accelerate target profiling, synthesize open-source intelligence, identify official email addresses, map organizational structures, generate tailored phishing lures, translate content, conduct vulnerability testing, support coding tasks, and troubleshoot malware development. Cybercriminals are increasingly exploring AI-enabled tools and services to scale malicious activities, including social engineering campaigns such as ClickFix, demonstrating how generative AI is being integrated into both espionage and financially motivated threat operations.
What’s Notable and Unique
Threat actors are leveraging Gemini beyond basic reconnaissance, using it to generate polished, culturally nuanced phishing lures and sustain convincing multi-turn social engineering conversations that minimize traditional red flags.
In addition, threat actors rely on Gemini for vulnerability research, malware debugging, code generation, command-and-control development, and technical troubleshooting, with PRC groups emphasizing automation and vulnerability analysis, Iranian actors focusing on social engineering and malware development, and North Korean actors prioritizing high-fidelity target profiling.
Beyond direct operational support, adversaries have abused public generative AI platforms to host deceptive ClickFix instructions, tricking users into pasting malicious commands that deliver macOS variants of ATOMIC Stealer.
AI is also being integrated directly into malware development workflows, as seen with CoinBait’s AI-assisted phishing kit capabilities and HonestCue’s use of the Gemini API to dynamically generate and execute in-memory C# payloads.
Underground forums show strong demand for AI-powered offensive tools, with offerings like Xanthorox falsely marketed as custom AI but actually built on third-party commercial models integrated through open-source frameworks such as Crush, Hexstrike AI, LibreChat-AI, and Open WebUI, including Gemini.
Analyst Comments
The increasing misuse of generative AI platforms like Gemini highlights a rapidly evolving threat landscape in which state-backed and financially motivated actors leverage AI as a force multiplier for reconnaissance, phishing, malware development, and post-compromise operations. At the same time, large-scale model extraction attempts and API abuse demonstrate emerging risks to AI service integrity, intellectual property, and the broader AI-as-a-Service ecosystem. While these developments underscore the scalability and sophistication of AI-enabled threats, continued enforcement actions, strengthened safeguards, and proactive security testing by providers reflect ongoing efforts to mitigate abuse and adapt defenses in response to increasingly AI-driven adversaries.
Sources
GTIG AI Threat Tracker: Distillation, Experimentation, and (Continued) Integration of AI for Adversarial Use
Article
2025 VMware ESXi Vulnerability Exploited by Ransomware Groups
Ransomware groups are actively exploiting CVE‑2025‑22225, a VMware ESXi arbitrary write vulnerability that allows attackers to escape the VMX sandbox and gain kernel‑level access to the hypervisor. Although VMware (Broadcom) patched this flaw in March 2025, threat actors had already exploited it in the wild, and CISA recently confirmed that threat actors are exploiting CVE‑2025‑22225 in active campaigns.
What’s Notable and Unique
Chinese‑speaking threat actors abused this vulnerability at least a year before disclosure, via a compromised SonicWall VPN chain.
Threat researchers have observed sophisticated exploit toolkits, possibly developed well before public disclosure, that chain this bug with others to achieve full VM escape. Evidence points to targeted activity, including exploitation via compromised VPN appliances and automated orchestrators.
Attackers with VMX level privileges can trigger a kernel write, break out of the sandbox, and compromise the ESXi host. Intrusions observed in December 2025 showed lateral movement, domain admin abuse, firewall rule manipulation, and staging of data for exfiltration.
CISA has now added CVE-2025-22225 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, underscoring ongoing use by ransomware attackers.
Analyst Comments
Compromise of ESXi hypervisors significantly amplifies operational impact, allowing access to and potential encryption of dozens of VMs simultaneously. Organizations running ESXi 7.x and 8.x remain at high risk if patches and mitigations have not been applied. Therefore, clients are recommended to apply VMware patches from VMSA‑2025‑0004 across all ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion deployments. Enterprises are advised to assess their setups in order to reduce risk, as protecting publicly accessible management interfaces is a fundamental security best practice.
Sources
CVE-2025-22225 in VMware ESXi now used in active ransomware attacks
The Great VM Escape: ESXi Exploitation in the Wild
VMSA-205-004: VMware ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion updates address multiple vulnerabilities (CVE-205-22224, CVE-2025-22225, CVE-2025-22226)



