Article
Threat Actors Leveraging Gemini AI for All Attack Stages
Arete Analysis

State-backed threat actors are leveraging Google’s Gemini AI as a force multiplier to support all stages of the cyberattack lifecycle, from reconnaissance to post-compromise operations. According to the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), threat actors linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, North Korea, and other unattributed groups have misused Gemini to accelerate target profiling, synthesize open-source intelligence, identify official email addresses, map organizational structures, generate tailored phishing lures, translate content, conduct vulnerability testing, support coding tasks, and troubleshoot malware development. Cybercriminals are increasingly exploring AI-enabled tools and services to scale malicious activities, including social engineering campaigns such as ClickFix, demonstrating how generative AI is being integrated into both espionage and financially motivated threat operations.
What’s Notable and Unique
Threat actors are leveraging Gemini beyond basic reconnaissance, using it to generate polished, culturally nuanced phishing lures and sustain convincing multi-turn social engineering conversations that minimize traditional red flags.
In addition, threat actors rely on Gemini for vulnerability research, malware debugging, code generation, command-and-control development, and technical troubleshooting, with PRC groups emphasizing automation and vulnerability analysis, Iranian actors focusing on social engineering and malware development, and North Korean actors prioritizing high-fidelity target profiling.
Beyond direct operational support, adversaries have abused public generative AI platforms to host deceptive ClickFix instructions, tricking users into pasting malicious commands that deliver macOS variants of ATOMIC Stealer.
AI is also being integrated directly into malware development workflows, as seen with CoinBait’s AI-assisted phishing kit capabilities and HonestCue’s use of the Gemini API to dynamically generate and execute in-memory C# payloads.
Underground forums show strong demand for AI-powered offensive tools, with offerings like Xanthorox falsely marketed as custom AI but actually built on third-party commercial models integrated through open-source frameworks such as Crush, Hexstrike AI, LibreChat-AI, and Open WebUI, including Gemini.
Analyst Comments
The increasing misuse of generative AI platforms like Gemini highlights a rapidly evolving threat landscape in which state-backed and financially motivated actors leverage AI as a force multiplier for reconnaissance, phishing, malware development, and post-compromise operations. At the same time, large-scale model extraction attempts and API abuse demonstrate emerging risks to AI service integrity, intellectual property, and the broader AI-as-a-Service ecosystem. While these developments underscore the scalability and sophistication of AI-enabled threats, continued enforcement actions, strengthened safeguards, and proactive security testing by providers reflect ongoing efforts to mitigate abuse and adapt defenses in response to increasingly AI-driven adversaries.
Sources
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Article
CMS Vulnerability Leads to ClickFix Campaign
Threat actors compromised at least 700 education and technology websites in a recent ClickFix campaign by exploiting a critical SQL injection flaw (CVE-2026-26980) in the Ghost content management system (CMS). Adversaries combined the vulnerability with the ClickFix social engineering tactic to steal admin keys and inject a malicious JavaScript that delivers a fake Cloudflare or CAPTCHA verification pop-up, tricking victims into copying and pasting a malicious command into their systems.
What’s Notable and Unique
Rather than targeting the end user first, this campaign is unique in its initial exploitation of the system, followed by social engineering attempts. This hybrid attack style is likely being leveraged to bypass traditional defenses.
This recent campaign also highlights how trusted web properties can be weaponized at scale and coupled with unpatched CMS vulnerabilities. Rather than using the CMS compromise to perpetrate a single attack, threat actors turned it into a supply-chain attack that ultimately affected over 700 trusted websites.
Analyst Comments
As network defenders and their tools enhance threat detection capabilities, adversaries increasingly seek methods to bypass these defenses. By combining vulnerability exploitation, social engineering techniques, and staging for ancillary attacks, this campaign successfully bypassed traditional defenses and inflicted significant impact. Defending against hybrid cyberattacks requires comprehensive security controls beyond simply patching vulnerabilities. Organizations should focus on limiting movement within the environment, detecting abuse of trusted applications, and preventing end-user manipulation.
Sources
700+ education and tech websites hijacked in huge ClickFix malware campaign
Under the engineering hood: Why Malwarebytes chose WordPress as its CMS
Think before you Click(Fix): Analyzing the ClickFix social engineering technique
Ghost CMS Vulnerability Exploited to Infect 700 Sites With ClickFix Malware
Article
Threat Actors Leverage Fake JPEG Files for Initial Access
In a recent campaign, researchers observed threat actors using fake JPEG image files as a delivery mechanism to initiate the deployment of additional malicious components. The false JPEG files are typically distributed via phishing emails or other social engineering-based lures, and are actually PowerShell-based malware that deploys a trojanized version of ConnectWise ScreenConnect to establish and maintain persistence in the compromised environment.
What’s Notable and Unique
This campaign leverages JPEG images as the initial lure, where the images are not merely decoys but part of the infection workflow. Victims are typically led to download or open an image that triggers hidden execution logic or redirects them to a payload-delivery sequence that initiates later stages of the intrusion chain.
The attack chain is designed to blend into legitimate environments, making detection more difficult. Execution typically relies on scripted or native Windows components, often including PowerShell or other living-off-the-land binaries, enabling fileless or near-fileless execution and reducing forensic artifacts on disk.
The multistage design ensures that the initial JPEG does not directly contain the full payload but instead triggers retrieval or decryption steps that progressively assemble the final malicious components in memory.
Analyst Comments
This campaign illustrates how threat actors continue to blur the line between legitimate file handling and malicious execution chains, indicating potential overlap with remote management or administrative tooling. The use of JPEG-based staging combined with script-based execution reflects a broader evolution toward a stealth-first intrusion design, in which file formats serve as triggers rather than payload containers.
Sources
OPERATION SILENTCANVAS : JPEG BASED MULTISTAGE POWERSHELL INTRUSION
Podcast
Cyber Risk and Insurance for Law Firms
In this episode of Bytes of Insight, host Vinny Sakore is joined by Laura Zaroski, Managing Director of the Law Firms Group at Gallagher, as they discuss the evolution of cyber risk for law firms. Tune in for firsthand insights on how to select the right cyber policy, the incident response process, and the nuances of ransom payments and sensitive data.
Article
Canvas Platform Compromised by ShinyHunters
In early May, the ShinyHunters threat group claimed responsibility for a large-scale cyberattack on the Canvas learning management platform, affecting almost 9,000 educational institutions worldwide. Instructure, the education technology company that owns Canvas, confirmed the intrusion and, on May 11th, announced that a settlement was reached with the threat actor. According to the statement, the settlement included return of the stolen data to Instructure, assurance of destruction of any copies of the data, and assurance that no Canvas users would be extorted for additional ransom payments.
Unauthorized activity was first detected in Canvas on April 29th and was reportedly the result of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Leveraging the same vulnerability, the threat actor conducted a follow-up attack on May 7th, replacing the login screens of Canvas users at hundreds of institutions with a message from ShinyHunters, claiming responsibility for the attack and displaying a list of impacted schools and the threat actor’s contact information.
By May 8th, neither Canvas nor Instructure was posted on ShinyHunter’s data leak site (DLS), and instead a vague “Press Statement” indicated that the group would not comment on the incident. On May 9th, Instructure shared another update, indicating that Canvas was “fully back online and available for use,” along with updates to the company’s FAQ page.

Figure 1. Press statement on ShinyHunters DLS (Source: Arete)
ShinyHunters: Not Just For Pokémon Anymore
ShinyHunters is a predominantly English-speaking cybercriminal group first observed in 2020 that focuses on data exfiltration and extortion. During its early operational phase, the group carried out a series of data breaches targeting organizations, including Tokopedia, Wattpad, and Nitro PDF, establishing a reputation for compromising and monetizing large datasets. Over this period, ShinyHunters remained heavily centered on a “pay or leak” model, leveraging stolen data to pressure victims into ransom payments or selling the information on underground forums when demands were not met.
As the group matured, it evolved beyond opportunistic database theft into a more sophisticated threat actor capable of executing complex, large-scale intrusion campaigns. ShinyHunters has since demonstrated an ability to target higher‑profile industries, including telecommunications, aviation, and enterprise software-as-a-service (SaaS) platforms, by leveraging advanced tactics such as social engineering, SaaS abuse, and supply chain compromise.
The group went as far as to partner with two other threat groups to form the Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters (SLH) collective in early 2025. Playing to each group’s strengths, SLH leveraged compromised OAuth tokens from the Salesloft Drift integration in an advanced supply-chain attack that led to the exfiltration of data across hundreds of Salesforce instances. Despite multiple law enforcement actions and arrests linked to its members, the group has remained operational under the same branding for several years. This persistence highlights the group’s resilience and adaptability, suggesting an operational model that can evolve in response to external pressures.
Analyst Comments
Given the group’s track record, ShinyHunters is likely to continue conducting large-scale data theft and extortion operations while further engraining itself within the broader cybercriminal ecosystem. This recent incident highlights the disproportionate impact of cyberattacks against supply chain vendors like SaaS platforms, open-source ecosystems, MSPs, and cloud integrations, where a breach on one platform can affect thousands of organizations. Any organizations impacted by the recent Canvas incident should not attempt any communication with the threat actor and should continue to follow any future guidance posted on Instructure’s Incident Update & FAQ page.
Sources
Security Incident Update & FAQs
Canvas login portals hacked in mass ShinyHunters extortion campaign
ShinyHunters: A Threat Profile
ShinyHunters
Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters: Anatomy of a Federated Cybercriminal Brand
FBI warns of UNC6040, UNC6395 hackers stealing Salesforce data



