Report
Malware Spotlight: RansomHub Ransomware
Jan 8, 2025
Arete Analysis

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Executive Summary
In 2024, Arete’s Incident Response (IR) team responded to dozens of incidents attributed to the RansomHub threat actor group. Engagements attributed to RansomHub increased rapidly since Arete first observed them in May 2024, and the group quickly established itself as one of the top three threat actor groups since
July 2024.
RansomHub has impacted multiple sectors across Arete engagements, including professional services, public services, healthcare, high technology, financial services, and manufacturing. The group has targeted several high-profile targets since its emergence, including telecom giant Frontier and British auction house Christie’s. RansomHub also claimed to possess data stolen from Change Healthcare, which was the victim of an ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware attack in February 2024. RansomHub announced the sale of Change’s data after leaking some of the alleged data a day beforehand.
Advertisements for the RansomHub Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) appeared on cybercriminal forums on February 2, 2024, highlighting an encryptor developed using the C++ and Go programming languages. The use of Go makes it easier for ransomware groups to target a wide variety of operating systems without needing to rewrite significant portions of the malware, as Go allows developers to compile executables for Windows, Linux, and macOS platforms from a single codebase. These advertisements were accompanied by
a new data leak site (DLS) under the RansomHub branding on the dark web.
RansomHub is suspected to be a re-brand of the “Knight” ransomware group, whose source code was listed for sale on the underground RAMP forum on February 18, 2024. From research, Arete can confirm various similarities between RansomHub and Knight’s encryptors.
This spotlight explores the ransomware group’s observed behavior, background information on the threat actor, and statistics from Incident Response engagements, along with a technical analysis of RansomHub’s ransomware executable. Finally, we discuss security recommendations to better defend against this evolving cyber threat and mitigate the risk of financial and reputational losses.
Incident Response Data on the RansomHub Ransomware Group
Background
RansomHub became a notable ransomware operation in 2024, and, alongside Akira, represented a verysignificant percentage of Arete Incident Response engagements in Q3 of 2024.

Source: Arete's Q3 2024 Crimeware Report
The group utilizes both Windows and Linux variants of encryptors, which increases its operational capability to target a wide range of victims of various sectors and sizes. RansomHub operates under a double extortion model, which involves exfiltrating sensitive data and encrypting the victims’ systems to coerce a payment for
a decryptor and data deletion.
Technical Analysis
Malware analysis revealed that RansomHub ransomware:
Supports multiple command-line arguments.
Requires a password to properly execute and encrypt files.
Encrypts files on the system and mounted shares.
Creates a ransom note with the following filename: .README_.txt
Self-identifies the group as RansomHub in the ransom note.
References a data leak site in the ransom note that, when accessed, self-identifies the group as RansomHub.
Kills a list of processes and services.
Maintains a list of whitelisted files and directories to make sure it will not render the system unusable, preventing recovery when running a decryptor.
Attempts to prevent system recovery by deleting the system’s volume shadow copies.
Clears the Windows event logs.
Creates a desktop wallpaper image in the “%temp%\” directory and later modifies a registry key to change desktop wallpaper.
Execution Pattern/Arguments
The RansomHub ransomware needs command line arguments to execute and encrypt files in the system.
Command line arguments supported:
Command line arguments | Description |
|---|---|
-cmd | CMD to be executed before encryption. |
-disable-net | Disable network before running. |
-fast value | Fast encryption mode. |
-file value | Only process file inside defined files. For example, -file C://1.txt, -file D://2.txt. |
-host value | Only process net share inside defined hosts. -host 10.10.10.10 -host 10.10.10.11. |
-only-local | Only encrypt local disks. |
-pass [SHA256 string] | Password needed to execute the ransomware. A 64-character string. |
-path value | Only process files inside defined paths. -path C:// -path D:// -path //10.10.10.10/d/ |
-safeboot | Reboot in Safe Mode before running. |
-safeboot-instance | Run as Safe Mode instance. |
-skip-vm value | Skip shutting down VMs. Example: -skip-vm “Ubuntu 22.04 LTS”, -skip-vm “Windows Server 2012”. |
-sleep [integer value] | Sleep for a period of time to run (minute). |
-verbose | Log to console. |
Ransomware execution with the command line argument –help:

Figure 1. Command line arguments supported by the ransomware
The ransomware will not execute in the system without the “-pass” argument followed by a SHA-256 value that is unique in each engagement. Execution of ransomware to encrypt files:
RansomHub.exe -pass [SHA-256] Example: 7ac8cd689f5d9f4c1ddca14ec84965ed42b17343ebe086076ba0e7a46a80f81f |
|---|
Once the SHA-256 password value is provided, the ransomware will decrypt a JSON based ransomware configuration at the run time.

Decrypted JSON field name and descriptions:
Name | Description |
|---|---|
master_public_key | Curve25519 public key used in the file encryption process. |
extension | Extension added to encrypted files. |
note_file_name | Ransom note file name, default value is .README<encrypted_file_extension>.txt |
note_full_text | Ransom note content. |
settings | Ransomware operation setting. |
credentials | Contains common or locally stolen credentials which are used for propagation and further infection. |
kill_services | Terminates list of services. |
kill_processes | Terminates list of processes. |
white_folders | Excludes listed directories. |
white_files | Excludes listed files. |
white_hosts | Excludes listed hosts. |
Stop Services and Processes
Before file encryption, the ransomware terminates a pre-determined list of processes and services to encrypt as many files as possible.
Process names:
“agntsvc.exe”, “dbeng50.exe”, “dbsnmp.exe”, “encsvc.exe”, “excel.exe”, “firefox.exe”, “infopath.exe”, “isqlplussvc.exe”, | ||
|---|---|---|
Services names:
“mepocs”, “memtas”, “veeam”, “svc$”, “backup”, “sql”, “vss”, “sql$”, “mysql”, “mysql$”, “sophos”, “MSExchange”, | ||
|---|---|---|
The ransomware also tries to list and stop VMs by executing the following PowerShell command.
powershell.exe -Command PowerShell -Command “{ Get-VM | Stop-VM -Force }” | ||
powershell.exe Get-VM | Stop-VM -Force -inputFormat xml -outputFormat text |
File and Directory Exclusions
The ransomware excludes system-related files and folders, ransomware-related files, and whitelisted extensions during encryption.
Excluded file and extensions:
“NTUSER.DAT”, “autorun.inf”, “boot.ini”, “desktop.ini”, “thumbs.db”, “*.deskthemepack”, “*.themepack”, “*.theme”, | ||
|---|---|---|
Excluded directories:
“*\\$windows.~ws*”, “*\\$windows.~bt*”, “*\\windows\\*”, “*\\windows.old*”, “*\\system volume information*”, | ||
|---|---|---|
Inhibit System Recovery
Windows operating systems contain features that can help fix corrupted system files, including shadow copies, which are backups of files created by the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS). By deleting shadow copies, the ransomware can prevent victims from restoring files from backups, making it more difficult for them to recover their data without paying the ransom.
The ransomware deletes volume shadow copies before file encryption by starting the following process:
powershell.exe -Command PowerShell -Command “\”Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy | Remove-CimInstance\”” | ||
|---|---|---|
System Network Connections Discovery
The ransomware can enumerate network-mounted shares by scanning the network interfaces.
Data Encrypted for Impact
The ransomware initially finds available drives, then loads the files one by one using the Windows API “FindFirstFileW“ and “FindNextFileW”. The ransomware generates random keys to encrypt the files, and after encrypting them, the keys are encrypted using a public key. To encrypt files, the ransomware uses a combination of a decrypted Curve 25519 public key and AES algorithms.
The default extension value is the first six characters of the Curve 25519 public key.

Figure 2. Extension added to the encrypted files
Files smaller than 0x100000 bytes are completely encrypted. If the file size is larger than 0x100000 bytes, the ransomware encrypts the file in 0x100000 bytes blocks and skips every 0x200000 bytes of data in between encrypted chunks.

Figure 3. 0x100000 bytes encrypted file.
Upon successful execution, the ransomware creates ransom notes with the file name “README_[encrypted_file_extension].txt”

Figure 4. RansomHub ransom note
Ransom note content:
We are the RansomHub. Your company Servers are locked and Data has been taken to our servers. This is serious. | ||
|---|---|---|
Modify Registry
The ransomware performs a registry key modification to change the desktop wallpaper.
Registry key change:
Registry key | Value name | Value data |
|---|---|---|
Computer\HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\ CurrentVersion\Explorer\Wallpapers | BackgroundHistory | C:\Users\%USERNAME%\ |
Screenshot showing the registry key modification:

Wallpaper image content from the
C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Temp\MkgXoB.png file:

Mutex
The mutex is the fundamental tool for managing shared resources between multiple threads or processes. Typically, ransomware uses a mutex to avoid reinfecting the victim system and causing multiple layers of encryption. The ransomware did not create a mutex during execution.
Network Activity
The ransomware did not try to communicate with a remote server other than encrypting data from mounted shares.
Indicator Removal
The ransomware clears Windows Event Logs to hide its malicious activity. Windows Event Logs keep a record of a computer’s alerts and notifications. The ransomware runs the following commands to clear the logs:
cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl security | ||
|---|---|---|
File and Directory Permissions Modification
The ransomware uses the fsutil tool to redirect file system access to a different location after gaining access to a compromised network. The ransomware uses the following command line to redirect file system access, enabling remote to remote and remote to local symbolic links:
fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:1 | ||
|---|---|---|
Indicators of Compromise
Indicator | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
de7913504efe4584bdd9dd1ec13c4de4152a84df5e1cb-c31d0dd8fe70c88b5e0 | SHA256 hash | RansomHub ransomware |
README_<encrypted_file_extension>.txt | File name | RansomHub ransom note |
powershell.exe -Command PowerShell -Command “{ Get-VM | Stop-VM -Force }” | Process | Retrieve information about VMs and forces a shutdown |
powershell.exe -Command PowerShell -Command ” | Process | Volume Shadow Copy deletion |
cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl security | Process | Clearing Windows Event Logs |
cmd.exe /c “\\”fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:1\\”” | Process | Enable remote to remote and remote to local symbolic links |
Key: Computer\HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ | Registry | Desktop wallpaper modification |
ransomxifxwc5eteopdobynonjctkxxvap77yqifu2emfbecgbqdw6qd[.] | URL | TA data leak site (DLS) |
Ransomware Configuration
RansomHub decrypted configuration information extracted:
Data Leak Site
The RansomHub ransom note contains a data leak site (DLS) that displayed the following page, self-identifying the group as RansomHub:

Figure 5. TOR DLS
Similarities with Other Ransomware
During our analysis, we observed some similarities between RansomHub, ALPHV/BlackCat, and Knight ransomware executables.
The following table highlights some of the similarities:
Malware Family | Common Arguments | Password | JSON Configuration |
|---|---|---|---|
RansomHub | pass | SHA256 strings value | extension |
ALPHV/BlackCat | –access-token (similar to -pass in RansomHub and Knight) | SHA256 strings value | extension |
Knight | pass | SHA256 strings value | extension |
Detection Mechanisms
Custom Detections and Blocking with Arete’s Arsinal
Note: These threat hunting queries may need to be tuned for your specific network environment. | ||
|---|---|---|
Yara
rule RansomHub_ransomware_executable meta: author = “areteir.com” strings: $s1 = “json:\”local_disks\”” condition: ((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550)) and } | ||
|---|---|---|
Recommended Mitigations
Organizations can find the full list of US government-recommended ransomware prevention and mitigation guidance here: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide
Arete provides data-driven cybersecurity solutions to transform your response to emerging cyber threats.
References
At Arete, we envision a world without cyber extortion, where people, businesses, and governments can thrive. We are taking all that we know from over 9,000 engagements to inform our solutions and strengthen powerful tools to better prevent, detect, and respond to the cyber extortion threats of tomorrow. Our elite team of experts provides unparalleled capabilities to address the entire cyber threat lifecycle, from incident response and restoration to advisory and managed security services. To learn more about our solutions, visit www.areteir.com.
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Feb 20, 2026
Threat Actors Leveraging Gemini AI for All Attack Stages
State-backed threat actors are leveraging Google’s Gemini AI as a force multiplier to support all stages of the cyberattack lifecycle, from reconnaissance to post-compromise operations. According to the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), threat actors linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, North Korea, and other unattributed groups have misused Gemini to accelerate target profiling, synthesize open-source intelligence, identify official email addresses, map organizational structures, generate tailored phishing lures, translate content, conduct vulnerability testing, support coding tasks, and troubleshoot malware development. Cybercriminals are increasingly exploring AI-enabled tools and services to scale malicious activities, including social engineering campaigns such as ClickFix, demonstrating how generative AI is being integrated into both espionage and financially motivated threat operations.
What’s Notable and Unique
Threat actors are leveraging Gemini beyond basic reconnaissance, using it to generate polished, culturally nuanced phishing lures and sustain convincing multi-turn social engineering conversations that minimize traditional red flags.
In addition, threat actors rely on Gemini for vulnerability research, malware debugging, code generation, command-and-control development, and technical troubleshooting, with PRC groups emphasizing automation and vulnerability analysis, Iranian actors focusing on social engineering and malware development, and North Korean actors prioritizing high-fidelity target profiling.
Beyond direct operational support, adversaries have abused public generative AI platforms to host deceptive ClickFix instructions, tricking users into pasting malicious commands that deliver macOS variants of ATOMIC Stealer.
AI is also being integrated directly into malware development workflows, as seen with CoinBait’s AI-assisted phishing kit capabilities and HonestCue’s use of the Gemini API to dynamically generate and execute in-memory C# payloads.
Underground forums show strong demand for AI-powered offensive tools, with offerings like Xanthorox falsely marketed as custom AI but actually built on third-party commercial models integrated through open-source frameworks such as Crush, Hexstrike AI, LibreChat-AI, and Open WebUI, including Gemini.
Analyst Comments
The increasing misuse of generative AI platforms like Gemini highlights a rapidly evolving threat landscape in which state-backed and financially motivated actors leverage AI as a force multiplier for reconnaissance, phishing, malware development, and post-compromise operations. At the same time, large-scale model extraction attempts and API abuse demonstrate emerging risks to AI service integrity, intellectual property, and the broader AI-as-a-Service ecosystem. While these developments underscore the scalability and sophistication of AI-enabled threats, continued enforcement actions, strengthened safeguards, and proactive security testing by providers reflect ongoing efforts to mitigate abuse and adapt defenses in response to increasingly AI-driven adversaries.
Sources
GTIG AI Threat Tracker: Distillation, Experimentation, and (Continued) Integration of AI for Adversarial Use
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Feb 12, 2026
2025 VMware ESXi Vulnerability Exploited by Ransomware Groups
Ransomware groups are actively exploiting CVE‑2025‑22225, a VMware ESXi arbitrary write vulnerability that allows attackers to escape the VMX sandbox and gain kernel‑level access to the hypervisor. Although VMware (Broadcom) patched this flaw in March 2025, threat actors had already exploited it in the wild, and CISA recently confirmed that threat actors are exploiting CVE‑2025‑22225 in active campaigns.
What’s Notable and Unique
Chinese‑speaking threat actors abused this vulnerability at least a year before disclosure, via a compromised SonicWall VPN chain.
Threat researchers have observed sophisticated exploit toolkits, possibly developed well before public disclosure, that chain this bug with others to achieve full VM escape. Evidence points to targeted activity, including exploitation via compromised VPN appliances and automated orchestrators.
Attackers with VMX level privileges can trigger a kernel write, break out of the sandbox, and compromise the ESXi host. Intrusions observed in December 2025 showed lateral movement, domain admin abuse, firewall rule manipulation, and staging of data for exfiltration.
CISA has now added CVE-2025-22225 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, underscoring ongoing use by ransomware attackers.
Analyst Comments
Compromise of ESXi hypervisors significantly amplifies operational impact, allowing access to and potential encryption of dozens of VMs simultaneously. Organizations running ESXi 7.x and 8.x remain at high risk if patches and mitigations have not been applied. Therefore, clients are recommended to apply VMware patches from VMSA‑2025‑0004 across all ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion deployments. Enterprises are advised to assess their setups in order to reduce risk, as protecting publicly accessible management interfaces is a fundamental security best practice.
Sources
CVE-2025-22225 in VMware ESXi now used in active ransomware attacks
The Great VM Escape: ESXi Exploitation in the Wild
VMSA-205-004: VMware ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion updates address multiple vulnerabilities (CVE-205-22224, CVE-2025-22225, CVE-2025-22226)
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Feb 5, 2026
Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: January 2026
Although Akira was once again the most active ransomware group in January, the threat landscape was more evenly distributed than it was throughout most of 2025. In December 2025, the three most active threat groups accounted for 57% of all ransomware and extortion activity; in January, the top three accounted for just 34%. Akira’s dominance also decreased to levels more consistent with early 2025, as the group was responsible for almost a third of all attacks in December but just 17% in January.
The number of unique ransomware and extortion groups observed in January increased slightly, to 17, up from 14 in December. It is too early to assess whether this trend will be the new normal for 2026. It is also worth noting that overall activity in January was lower than in previous months, consistent with what Arete typically observes at the beginning of a new year.

Figure 1. Activity from all threat groups in January 2026
Throughout the month of January, analysts at Arete identified several distinct trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:
In January, Arete observed the reemergence of the LockBit Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group, which deployed an updated “LockBit 5.0” variant of its ransomware. LockBit first announced the 5.0 version on the RAMP dark web forum in early September 2025, coinciding with the group’s six-year anniversary. The latest LockBit 5.0 variant has both Windows and Linux versions, with notable improvements, including anti-analysis features and unique 16-character extensions added to each encrypted file. However, it remains to be seen whether LockBit will return to consistent activity levels in 2026.
The ClickFix social engineering technique, which leverages fake error dialog boxes to deceive users into manually executing malicious PowerShell commands, continued to evolve in unique ways in January. One campaign reported in January involved fake Blue Screen of Death (BSOD) messages manipulating users into pasting attacker-controlled code. During the month, researchers also documented a separate campaign, dubbed “CrashFix,” that uses a malicious Chrome browser extension-based attack vector. It crashes the web browser, displays a message stating the browser had "stopped abnormally," and then prompts the victim to click a button that executes malicious commands.
Also in January, Fortinet confirmed that a new critical authentication vulnerability affecting its FortiGate devices is being actively exploited. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-24858, allows attackers with a FortiCloud account to log in to devices registered to other account owners due to an authentication bypass flaw in devices using FortiCloud single sign-on (SSO). This recent activity follows the exploitation of two other Fortinet SSO authentication flaws, CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719, which were disclosed in December 2025.
Source
Arete Internal
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Feb 2, 2026
New FortiCloud SSO Vulnerability Exploited
Fortinet recently confirmed that its FortiGate devices are affected by a new critical authentication vulnerability that is being actively exploited. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-24858, allows attackers with a FortiCloud account to log in to devices registered to other account owners due to an authentication bypass flaw in devices using FortiCloud single sign-on (SSO). CISA added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue and gave federal agencies just three days to patch, which requires users to upgrade all devices running FortiOS, FortiManager, FortiAnalyzer, FortiProxy, and FortiWeb to fixed versions. This recent activity follows the exploitation of two other SSO authentication flaws, CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719, which were disclosed last month.
What’s Notable and Unique
There are strong indications that much of the recent exploitation activity was automated, with attackers moving from initial access to account creation within seconds.
As observed in December 2025, the attackers’ primary target appears to be firewall configuration files, which contain a trove of information that can be leveraged in future operations.
The threat actors in this campaign favor innocuous, IT-themed email and account names, with malicious login activity originating from cloud-init@mail[.]io and cloud-noc@mail[.]io, while account names such as ‘secadmin’, ‘itadmin’, ‘audit’, and others are created for persistence and subsequent activity.
Analyst Comments
This is an active campaign, and the investigation into these attacks is ongoing. Organizations relying on FortiGate devices should remain extremely vigilant, even after following patching guidance. With threat actors circumventing authentication, it’s crucial to monitor for and alert on anomalous behavior within your environment, such as the unauthorized creation of admin accounts, the creation or modification of access policies, logins outside normal working hours, and anything that deviates from your security baseline.
Sources
Administrative FortiCloud SSO authentication bypass
Multiple Fortinet Products’ FortiCloud SSO Login Authentication Bypass
Arctic Wolf Observes Malicious Configuration Changes On Fortinet FortiGate Devices via SSO Accounts
Arctic Wolf Observes Malicious SSO Logins on FortiGate Devices Following Disclosure of CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719
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