Article
Managed File Transfer Exploits: Here to Stay?
Arete Analysis
Cybersecurity Trends
Threat Actors

Cybercriminals are actively exploiting recently disclosed vulnerabilities in two prominent Managed File Transfer (MFT) products. Initially discovered by cybersecurity researchers, CVE-2025-11371 is an unauthenticated Local File Inclusion vulnerability in Gladinet’s MFT product, CentreStack. This vulnerability ultimately enables an exploit chain allowing remote code execution (RCE) that was patched by Gladinet earlier this year (CVE-2025-30406).
Meanwhile, Fortra confirmed the targeting of a vulnerability, CVE-2025-10035, in its GoAnywhere MFT product. Although the extent of this latest campaign is unknown, researchers have observed ongoing exploitation of the vulnerability by a threat group known for deploying Medusa ransomware. The vulnerability also results in RCE due to improper deserialization.
Both vendors have patched these vulnerabilities in their product’s latest version.
What’s Notable and Unique
The recent attacks against Gladinet CentreStack are the second concerted effort this year to exploit vulnerabilities in this product. This speaks to threat actors’ perceived value of the source and the associated data. Given the access to sensitive data and broad reach within the network that generally accompany MFT systems, it’s easy to see why cybercriminals continue to return to this product.
Although patches for both CentreStack and GoAnywhere MFT have been released, Arete recommends that organizations continue to proactively hunt for any suspicious activity involving these products. In recent years, cybercriminals have heavily targeted and leveraged MFT software in their operations. Arete does not foresee any near-term deviation in this trend.
Analyst Comments
The activity described in this article is far from novel and in no way isolated. This summer, security researchers warned of notable surges in scanning activity targeting the well-known (and previously exploited) MFT software, MOVEit. CrushFTP and Cleo’s LexiCom, VLTransfer, and Harmony products have also received attention from threat actors this year. Although MFT products are powerful tools for a business, they also present an enticing target for cybercriminals and should be evaluated and deployed with care and closely monitored. Arete has responded to several incidents in which MFT software was utilized by the threat actor. Cybercriminals view these platforms not only as a way to access sensitive data, but also as an ideal vector for initial entry into a network, making continued exploitation likely for the foreseeable future.
Sources
Active Exploitation of Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox Local File Inclusion Flaw (CVE-2025-11371)
Investigating active exploitation of CVE-2025-10035 GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer vulnerability
Fortra cops to exploitation of GoAnywhere file-transfer service defect
Deserialization Vulnerability in GoAnywhere MFT’s License Servlet
Threat Advisory: Oh No Cleo! Cleo Software Actively Being Exploited in the Wild
MOVEit Transfer Faces Increased Threats as Scanning Surges and CVE Flaws Are Targeted
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CMS Vulnerability Leads to ClickFix Campaign
Threat actors compromised at least 700 education and technology websites in a recent ClickFix campaign by exploiting a critical SQL injection flaw (CVE-2026-26980) in the Ghost content management system (CMS). Adversaries combined the vulnerability with the ClickFix social engineering tactic to steal admin keys and inject a malicious JavaScript that delivers a fake Cloudflare or CAPTCHA verification pop-up, tricking victims into copying and pasting a malicious command into their systems.
What’s Notable and Unique
Rather than targeting the end user first, this campaign is unique in its initial exploitation of the system, followed by social engineering attempts. This hybrid attack style is likely being leveraged to bypass traditional defenses.
This recent campaign also highlights how trusted web properties can be weaponized at scale and coupled with unpatched CMS vulnerabilities. Rather than using the CMS compromise to perpetrate a single attack, threat actors turned it into a supply-chain attack that ultimately affected over 700 trusted websites.
Analyst Comments
As network defenders and their tools enhance threat detection capabilities, adversaries increasingly seek methods to bypass these defenses. By combining vulnerability exploitation, social engineering techniques, and staging for ancillary attacks, this campaign successfully bypassed traditional defenses and inflicted significant impact. Defending against hybrid cyberattacks requires comprehensive security controls beyond simply patching vulnerabilities. Organizations should focus on limiting movement within the environment, detecting abuse of trusted applications, and preventing end-user manipulation.
Sources
700+ education and tech websites hijacked in huge ClickFix malware campaign
Under the engineering hood: Why Malwarebytes chose WordPress as its CMS
Think before you Click(Fix): Analyzing the ClickFix social engineering technique
Ghost CMS Vulnerability Exploited to Infect 700 Sites With ClickFix Malware
Article
Threat Actors Leverage Fake JPEG Files for Initial Access
In a recent campaign, researchers observed threat actors using fake JPEG image files as a delivery mechanism to initiate the deployment of additional malicious components. The false JPEG files are typically distributed via phishing emails or other social engineering-based lures, and are actually PowerShell-based malware that deploys a trojanized version of ConnectWise ScreenConnect to establish and maintain persistence in the compromised environment.
What’s Notable and Unique
This campaign leverages JPEG images as the initial lure, where the images are not merely decoys but part of the infection workflow. Victims are typically led to download or open an image that triggers hidden execution logic or redirects them to a payload-delivery sequence that initiates later stages of the intrusion chain.
The attack chain is designed to blend into legitimate environments, making detection more difficult. Execution typically relies on scripted or native Windows components, often including PowerShell or other living-off-the-land binaries, enabling fileless or near-fileless execution and reducing forensic artifacts on disk.
The multistage design ensures that the initial JPEG does not directly contain the full payload but instead triggers retrieval or decryption steps that progressively assemble the final malicious components in memory.
Analyst Comments
This campaign illustrates how threat actors continue to blur the line between legitimate file handling and malicious execution chains, indicating potential overlap with remote management or administrative tooling. The use of JPEG-based staging combined with script-based execution reflects a broader evolution toward a stealth-first intrusion design, in which file formats serve as triggers rather than payload containers.
Sources
OPERATION SILENTCANVAS : JPEG BASED MULTISTAGE POWERSHELL INTRUSION
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