Article
Threat Actor Leverages AI to Breach FortiGate Devices
Arete Analysis
Amazon Threat Intelligence recently reported that between January 11th and February 18th, a threat actor leveraged commercially available generative AI services to conduct a large-scale campaign against FortiGate firewalls, compromising more than 600 devices in over 55 countries.
Interestingly, the campaign did not rely on zero-day exploits; rather, it targeted internet-exposed management interfaces, gaining access through weak or reused credentials protected only by single-factor authentication. After gaining initial entry, the threat actor extracted full device configurations, exposing VPN credentials, admin accounts, and network topology details. Stolen credentials also enabled lateral movement into other internal environments. Specifically, the attacker conducted reconnaissance and escalated privileges within networks, compromising Active Directory domains and credential databases and targeting backup systems. Most notably, the operation heavily leveraged commercial generative AI tools to plan, automate, and scale attacks.
What’s Notable and Unique
Scale Achieved Without Advanced Exploitation: The campaign succeeded without zero-day vulnerabilities or complex exploit chains. Instead, the actor relied on exposed management interfaces and weak credentials, demonstrating that basic security gaps can be exploited on a global scale through automation.
Extensive Use of AI Across the Attack Lifecycle: The threat actor used several commercial generative AI services to plan attacks, develop tools, and make operational decisions. AI was not just an add-on; it was part of nearly every phase of reconnaissance and post-compromise activity.
AI-Generated Tooling with Limited Technical Depth: Custom reconnaissance and automation scripts displayed clear signs of AI-assisted development. While they worked for routine tasks, the tools lacked strength and often failed in more complex or unusual environments.
Opportunistic Targeting with Pre-Ransomware Indicators: The observed activity seemed random and driven by volume rather than focused on specific sectors. However, the targeting of Active Directory credential stores and backup infrastructure suggests preparation for possible ransomware deployment.
Mitigation for Companies Using FortiGate
In this specific campaign against FortiGate devices, organizations using the appliances should ensure that management interfaces are not directly exposed to the public internet or at least limit access to trusted IP addresses. As an added precaution, all administrative and VPN passwords should be changed. Further, organizations should require multi-factor authentication for all management and VPN access, review configurations for unauthorized accounts or policy changes, and monitor for unusual VPN authentication traffic and unexpected Active Directory replication access.
Analyst Comments
AI augmentation in this campaign significantly lowered the technical barrier to performing large-scale intrusions. While this threat actor was proficient in automation, they lacked innovation, as demonstrated by low expertise in exploit development. For example, the actor had difficulty moving in environments where patches were applied as well as in environments where access controls were properly enforced. Commercial AI tools enabled the threat actor to quickly create scripts, workflows, and structured attack plans, allowing them to perform attacks at a scale that would normally require a larger group effort. This campaign highlights that AI is a tool that can improve efficiency at scale, but is not a replacement for technical exploitative skills. As the use of AI increases, high-volume intrusion attempts will likely become more common, underscoring the need for best-in-practice security measures such as patch management, least-privileged access, and multi-factor authentication.
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Article
CMS Vulnerability Leads to ClickFix Campaign
Threat actors compromised at least 700 education and technology websites in a recent ClickFix campaign by exploiting a critical SQL injection flaw (CVE-2026-26980) in the Ghost content management system (CMS). Adversaries combined the vulnerability with the ClickFix social engineering tactic to steal admin keys and inject a malicious JavaScript that delivers a fake Cloudflare or CAPTCHA verification pop-up, tricking victims into copying and pasting a malicious command into their systems.
What’s Notable and Unique
Rather than targeting the end user first, this campaign is unique in its initial exploitation of the system, followed by social engineering attempts. This hybrid attack style is likely being leveraged to bypass traditional defenses.
This recent campaign also highlights how trusted web properties can be weaponized at scale and coupled with unpatched CMS vulnerabilities. Rather than using the CMS compromise to perpetrate a single attack, threat actors turned it into a supply-chain attack that ultimately affected over 700 trusted websites.
Analyst Comments
As network defenders and their tools enhance threat detection capabilities, adversaries increasingly seek methods to bypass these defenses. By combining vulnerability exploitation, social engineering techniques, and staging for ancillary attacks, this campaign successfully bypassed traditional defenses and inflicted significant impact. Defending against hybrid cyberattacks requires comprehensive security controls beyond simply patching vulnerabilities. Organizations should focus on limiting movement within the environment, detecting abuse of trusted applications, and preventing end-user manipulation.
Sources
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Threat Actors Leverage Fake JPEG Files for Initial Access
In a recent campaign, researchers observed threat actors using fake JPEG image files as a delivery mechanism to initiate the deployment of additional malicious components. The false JPEG files are typically distributed via phishing emails or other social engineering-based lures, and are actually PowerShell-based malware that deploys a trojanized version of ConnectWise ScreenConnect to establish and maintain persistence in the compromised environment.
What’s Notable and Unique
This campaign leverages JPEG images as the initial lure, where the images are not merely decoys but part of the infection workflow. Victims are typically led to download or open an image that triggers hidden execution logic or redirects them to a payload-delivery sequence that initiates later stages of the intrusion chain.
The attack chain is designed to blend into legitimate environments, making detection more difficult. Execution typically relies on scripted or native Windows components, often including PowerShell or other living-off-the-land binaries, enabling fileless or near-fileless execution and reducing forensic artifacts on disk.
The multistage design ensures that the initial JPEG does not directly contain the full payload but instead triggers retrieval or decryption steps that progressively assemble the final malicious components in memory.
Analyst Comments
This campaign illustrates how threat actors continue to blur the line between legitimate file handling and malicious execution chains, indicating potential overlap with remote management or administrative tooling. The use of JPEG-based staging combined with script-based execution reflects a broader evolution toward a stealth-first intrusion design, in which file formats serve as triggers rather than payload containers.
Sources
OPERATION SILENTCANVAS : JPEG BASED MULTISTAGE POWERSHELL INTRUSION
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Canvas Platform Compromised by ShinyHunters
In early May, the ShinyHunters threat group claimed responsibility for a large-scale cyberattack on the Canvas learning management platform, affecting almost 9,000 educational institutions worldwide. Instructure, the education technology company that owns Canvas, confirmed the intrusion and, on May 11th, announced that a settlement was reached with the threat actor. According to the statement, the settlement included return of the stolen data to Instructure, assurance of destruction of any copies of the data, and assurance that no Canvas users would be extorted for additional ransom payments.
Unauthorized activity was first detected in Canvas on April 29th and was reportedly the result of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Leveraging the same vulnerability, the threat actor conducted a follow-up attack on May 7th, replacing the login screens of Canvas users at hundreds of institutions with a message from ShinyHunters, claiming responsibility for the attack and displaying a list of impacted schools and the threat actor’s contact information.
By May 8th, neither Canvas nor Instructure was posted on ShinyHunter’s data leak site (DLS), and instead a vague “Press Statement” indicated that the group would not comment on the incident. On May 9th, Instructure shared another update, indicating that Canvas was “fully back online and available for use,” along with updates to the company’s FAQ page.
Figure 1. Press statement on ShinyHunters DLS (Source: Arete)
ShinyHunters: Not Just For Pokémon Anymore
ShinyHunters is a predominantly English-speaking cybercriminal group first observed in 2020 that focuses on data exfiltration and extortion. During its early operational phase, the group carried out a series of data breaches targeting organizations, including Tokopedia, Wattpad, and Nitro PDF, establishing a reputation for compromising and monetizing large datasets. Over this period, ShinyHunters remained heavily centered on a “pay or leak” model, leveraging stolen data to pressure victims into ransom payments or selling the information on underground forums when demands were not met.
As the group matured, it evolved beyond opportunistic database theft into a more sophisticated threat actor capable of executing complex, large-scale intrusion campaigns. ShinyHunters has since demonstrated an ability to target higher‑profile industries, including telecommunications, aviation, and enterprise software-as-a-service (SaaS) platforms, by leveraging advanced tactics such as social engineering, SaaS abuse, and supply chain compromise.
The group went as far as to partner with two other threat groups to form the Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters (SLH) collective in early 2025. Playing to each group’s strengths, SLH leveraged compromised OAuth tokens from the Salesloft Drift integration in an advanced supply-chain attack that led to the exfiltration of data across hundreds of Salesforce instances. Despite multiple law enforcement actions and arrests linked to its members, the group has remained operational under the same branding for several years. This persistence highlights the group’s resilience and adaptability, suggesting an operational model that can evolve in response to external pressures.
Analyst Comments
Given the group’s track record, ShinyHunters is likely to continue conducting large-scale data theft and extortion operations while further engraining itself within the broader cybercriminal ecosystem. This recent incident highlights the disproportionate impact of cyberattacks against supply chain vendors like SaaS platforms, open-source ecosystems, MSPs, and cloud integrations, where a breach on one platform can affect thousands of organizations. Any organizations impacted by the recent Canvas incident should not attempt any communication with the threat actor and should continue to follow any future guidance posted on Instructure’s Incident Update & FAQ page.
Sources
Security Incident Update & FAQs
Canvas login portals hacked in mass ShinyHunters extortion campaign
ShinyHunters: A Threat Profile
ShinyHunters
Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters: Anatomy of a Federated Cybercriminal Brand
FBI warns of UNC6040, UNC6395 hackers stealing Salesforce data