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Threat Actor Leverages AI to Breach FortiGate Devices

Arete Analysis


Amazon Threat Intelligence recently reported that between January 11th and February 18th, a threat actor leveraged commercially available generative AI services to conduct a large-scale campaign against FortiGate firewalls, compromising more than 600 devices in over 55 countries. 

Interestingly, the campaign did not rely on zero-day exploits; rather, it targeted internet-exposed management interfaces, gaining access through weak or reused credentials protected only by single-factor authentication. After gaining initial entry, the threat actor extracted full device configurations, exposing VPN credentials, admin accounts, and network topology details. Stolen credentials also enabled lateral movement into other internal environments. Specifically, the attacker conducted reconnaissance and escalated privileges within networks, compromising Active Directory domains and credential databases and targeting backup systems. Most notably, the operation heavily leveraged commercial generative AI tools to plan, automate, and scale attacks. 

What’s Notable and Unique 

  • Scale Achieved Without Advanced Exploitation: The campaign succeeded without zero-day vulnerabilities or complex exploit chains. Instead, the actor relied on exposed management interfaces and weak credentials, demonstrating that basic security gaps can be exploited on a global scale through automation. 

  • Extensive Use of AI Across the Attack Lifecycle: The threat actor used several commercial generative AI services to plan attacks, develop tools, and make operational decisions. AI was not just an add-on; it was part of nearly every phase of reconnaissance and post-compromise activity. 

  • AI-Generated Tooling with Limited Technical Depth: Custom reconnaissance and automation scripts displayed clear signs of AI-assisted development. While they worked for routine tasks, the tools lacked strength and often failed in more complex or unusual environments. 

  • Opportunistic Targeting with Pre-Ransomware Indicators: The observed activity seemed random and driven by volume rather than focused on specific sectors. However, the targeting of Active Directory credential stores and backup infrastructure suggests preparation for possible ransomware deployment. 

Mitigation for Companies Using FortiGate

In this specific campaign against FortiGate devices, organizations using the appliances should ensure that management interfaces are not directly exposed to the public internet or at least limit access to trusted IP addresses. As an added precaution, all administrative and VPN passwords should be changed. Further, organizations should require multi-factor authentication for all management and VPN access, review configurations for unauthorized accounts or policy changes, and monitor for unusual VPN authentication traffic and unexpected Active Directory replication access. 

Analyst Comments 

AI augmentation in this campaign significantly lowered the technical barrier to performing large-scale intrusions. While this threat actor was proficient in automation, they lacked innovation, as demonstrated by low expertise in exploit development. For example, the actor had difficulty moving in environments where patches were applied as well as in environments where access controls were properly enforced. Commercial AI tools enabled the threat actor to quickly create scripts, workflows, and structured attack plans, allowing them to perform attacks at a scale that would normally require a larger group effort. This campaign highlights that AI is a tool that can improve efficiency at scale, but is not a replacement for technical exploitative skills. As the use of AI increases, high-volume intrusion attempts will likely become more common, underscoring the need for best-in-practice security measures such as patch management, least-privileged access, and multi-factor authentication. 

Sources 

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Threat Actors Leverage AI for EDR Evasion

A threat actor has developed and deployed a ransomware attack toolkit enhanced with AI-assisted development workflows, enabling automated Active Directory (AD) discovery and improved EDR evasion capabilities. The toolkit leverages agent-based AI systems, such as Claude’s Opus and Cursor agents, for iterative malware development, testing, and refinement. 

What’s Notable and Unique 

  • Researchers have highlighted that this toolkit can not only generate ransomware code but also bypass sophisticated security defenses and identify AD networks for malware distribution. 

  • The framework incorporates multiple capabilities, including automated AD discovery and reconnaissance mechanisms, iterative EDR testing environments to refine evasion techniques, and a command-and-control (C2) infrastructure that leverages Telegram APIs and Cloudflare redirectors for stealth. 

  • Additionally, some agents were tasked with checking security research and technical posts for various bypass techniques. The agents recognized what was required for reproduction, extracted the techniques, mapped them to the MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base of adversary behaviors, set up a test lab, carried out the methodology, and reported the results. 

  • After a few repetitions, the modules seemed to avoid nearly all EDR solutions, despite the agent’s initial suggestion of a high failure rate. Although researchers found no evidence that AI was embedded in deployed malware or was operating independently in victim environments, the technology was still used to accelerate the iterative process of developing, testing, and refining payloads against security products, shortening the period between the publication of offensive security research and its practical implementation by threat actors. 

Analyst Comments 

AI-driven tools like this could accelerate the pace and sophistication of ransomware attacks, enabling even relatively inexperienced actors to launch high-impact campaigns. This development underscores the urgent need for security solutions to adapt to AI-assisted threats. Organizations must respond by strengthening detection engineering, improving visibility across environments, and maintaining robust security fundamentals.  

Sources 

  • AI-built ransomware toolkit automates EDR evasion, AD discovery  

  • Pointing a Cursor at evading detection

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Article

CMS Vulnerability Leads to ClickFix Campaign

Threat actors compromised at least 700 education and technology websites in a recent ClickFix campaign by exploiting a critical SQL injection flaw (CVE-2026-26980) in the Ghost content management system (CMS). Adversaries combined the vulnerability with the ClickFix social engineering tactic to steal admin keys and inject a malicious JavaScript that delivers a fake Cloudflare or CAPTCHA verification pop-up, tricking victims into copying and pasting a malicious command into their systems.

What’s Notable and Unique

  • Rather than targeting the end user first, this campaign is unique in its initial exploitation of the system, followed by social engineering attempts. This hybrid attack style is likely being leveraged to bypass traditional defenses.

  • This recent campaign also highlights how trusted web properties can be weaponized at scale and coupled with unpatched CMS vulnerabilities. Rather than using the CMS compromise to perpetrate a single attack, threat actors turned it into a supply-chain attack that ultimately affected over 700 trusted websites.

Analyst Comments

As network defenders and their tools enhance threat detection capabilities, adversaries increasingly seek methods to bypass these defenses. By combining vulnerability exploitation, social engineering techniques, and staging for ancillary attacks, this campaign successfully bypassed traditional defenses and inflicted significant impact. Defending against hybrid cyberattacks requires comprehensive security controls beyond simply patching vulnerabilities. Organizations should focus on limiting movement within the environment, detecting abuse of trusted applications, and preventing end-user manipulation.

Sources

  • 700+ education and tech websites hijacked in huge ClickFix malware campaign

  • Under the engineering hood: Why Malwarebytes chose WordPress as its CMS

  • Think before you Click(Fix): Analyzing the ClickFix social engineering technique

  • Ghost CMS Vulnerability Exploited to Infect 700 Sites With ClickFix Malware

Article

Threat Actors Leverage Fake JPEG Files for Initial Access

In a recent campaign, researchers observed threat actors using fake JPEG image files as a delivery mechanism to initiate the deployment of additional malicious components. The false JPEG files are typically distributed via phishing emails or other social engineering-based lures, and are actually PowerShell-based malware that deploys a trojanized version of ConnectWise ScreenConnect to establish and maintain persistence in the compromised environment. 

What’s Notable and Unique

  • This campaign leverages JPEG images as the initial lure, where the images are not merely decoys but part of the infection workflow. Victims are typically led to download or open an image that triggers hidden execution logic or redirects them to a payload-delivery sequence that initiates later stages of the intrusion chain. 

  • The attack chain is designed to blend into legitimate environments, making detection more difficult. Execution typically relies on scripted or native Windows components, often including PowerShell or other living-off-the-land binaries, enabling fileless or near-fileless execution and reducing forensic artifacts on disk.

  • The multistage design ensures that the initial JPEG does not directly contain the full payload but instead triggers retrieval or decryption steps that progressively assemble the final malicious components in memory.

Analyst Comments

This campaign illustrates how threat actors continue to blur the line between legitimate file handling and malicious execution chains, indicating potential overlap with remote management or administrative tooling. The use of JPEG-based staging combined with script-based execution reflects a broader evolution toward a stealth-first intrusion design, in which file formats serve as triggers rather than payload containers.

Sources

  • OPERATION SILENTCANVAS : JPEG BASED MULTISTAGE POWERSHELL INTRUSION