Report
Threat Actor Spotlight: BlackSuit Ransomware
Jul 2, 2024
Arete Analysis
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Executive Summary
Since May 2023, Arete’s Incident Response (IR) team has responded to multiple BlackSuit ransomware engagements against organizations in the healthcare, financial services, manufacturing, professional services, public service, entertainment, and retail sectors. This spotlight explores the ransomware behavior observed, statistics from IR engagements, and background information on the threat actor. Finally, we discuss security recommendations to better defend against this evolving cyber threat and mitigate the risk of financial and reputational losses arising from these incidents.
Incident Response Data on BlackSuit Ransomware
The information below is based on BlackSuit incidents investigated by Arete since May 2023. Our IR and teams work together to analyze key data points during every ransomware engagement and form real-time threat actor (TA) insights.
Arete has investigated dozens of engagements involving BlackSuit.
We have been extremely successful in negotiating discounted ransoms with this TA.
The highest observed ransom demand is around $18 million.
The average initial demand is around $2.5 million.
The average ransom payment facilitated is around $500,000.
Commonly observed methods of intrusions include remote desktop protocol (RDP), virtual private network (VPN), and firewall vulnerabilities.
Tools observed during the investigations include CobaltStrike, WinRAR, PUTTY, Rclone, Advanced IP Scanner, Network Scanner, Mimikatz, and GMER.
A commonly observed ransom note filename is readme.blacksuit.txt.
In some instances, backups were encrypted or deleted, while in others, backups were used for restoration.
Background
The information about the BlackSuit threat actor group in this section was shared in Arete’s 2024 Q1 Crimeware Report.
The most notable newcomer in Q1 was BlackSuit, the third most active group of Q1. Although Arete first observed BlackSuit ransomware operating in May 2023, it only accounted for less than a half percent of the total engagements in 2023. The group significantly increased its activity in Q1 2024, and there were more BlackSuit engagements in February 2024 alone than in all of 2023. BlackSuit operates as a private group without affiliates, targeting both Windows and Linux users and utilizing a double extortion method of stealing and encrypting sensitive data on a victim’s network.
BlackSuit: A Continuation of Royal Ransomware?
The BlackSuit ransomware payload has significant code overlap with Royal ransomware, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the FBI believe BlackSuit to likely be a rebranding or spinoff variant of Royal. While BlackSuit could be using the same developer or code with slight modifications, Arete also observed language used by BlackSuit in ransom negotiations identical to previous engagements with Royal, which lends to the assessment that the group might be a rebrand or offshoot. Regardless, BlackSuit’s emergence demonstrates that although names may change, threat actors will find ways to adapt and evolve their operations.

Figure 1. Language from two separate BlackSuit TOR chats (Source: Arete)

Figure 2. Identical language from two separate Royal TOR chats (Source: Arete)
Technical Analysis
Malware analysis revealed that BlackSuit ransomware:
Supports multiple command-line arguments.
Encrypts files on the system and mounted shares.
Adds the following extension to encrypted files: .blacksuit (e.g., file.docx.blacksuit).
Creates a ransom note with the following filename: readme.blacksuit.txt.
Self-identifies the group as BlackSuit in the ransom note.
References a data leak site in the ransom note that, when accessed, self-identifies the group as BlackSuit.
Kills a list of processes and services.
Maintains a list of whitelisted files and directories to make sure it will not render the system unusable, preventing recovery when running a decryptor.
Attempts to prevent system recovery by deleting the system’s volume shadow copies.
Creates the following mutex during execution: WLm87eV1oNRx6P3E4Cy9.
Execution Pattern/Arguments
BlackSuit ransomware needs command line arguments to execute and encrypt files in the system. Command line arguments supported:
Command line argument | Description |
|---|---|
-id [32-byte characters] | Ransomware ID |
-size | Invoked with drag and drop |
-ep | Number that represents the percentage of the file that will be encrypted |
-path [target_directory_path] | Used to specify a target directory to encrypt |
-localonly | Encrypt only the local system |
-networkonly | Encrypt only shared volumes/directory |
-aavm | Encrypt all files |
The ransomware will not execute in the system without the “–id” argument followed by a 32-character value that is unique in each engagement and present in the ransom note TOR URL. Portion of the data in the ransom note that contains the ID:
All your files will be decrypted, your data will be reset, your systems will stay in safe. Contact us through TOR browser using the link: http://c7jpc6h2ccrdwmhofuij7kz6sr2fg2ndtbvvqy4fse23cf7m2e5hvqid[.]onion/?id=[32-characters] | ||
|---|---|---|
Execution of ransomware to encrypt files:
blacksuit.exe -id [32-characters] | ||
|---|---|---|
The ransomware developer coded the logic to allow configuration of the 32-character value in the command line during execution. This same victim-specific 32-character string value is then added to the ransom note URL used for negotiations. Due to this implementation in the ransomware code, threat researchers can execute the ransomware without knowing the 32-character string value, as any value of this type can be used to execute the malicious code. In analyzing Royal ransomware samples, Arete found a similarity in that any 32-character value can be supplied to execute the ransomware, and the value is also added to the ransom note TOR chat URL.
Example of how the ransom note content looks with a randomly supplied string (e.g., blacksuit.exe -id 7777777777777777777777777777777):
All your files will be decrypted, your data will be reset, your systems will stay in safe. Contact us through TOR browser using the link: http://c7jpc6h2ccrdwmhofuij7kz6sr2fg2ndtbvvqy4fse23cf7m2e5hvqid[.]onion/?id=77777777777777777777777777777777777777 | ||
|---|---|---|
Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing
Most of the strings in the ransomware are encoded. The encoded strings are hardcoded and decoded at runtime. Every encoded string has its own decoding loop:

Figure 3. Encoded strings hardcoded

Figure 4. String decoding loop
Some relevant strings decoded in memory:
Global\\\WLm87eV1oNRx6P3E4Cy9 | -ep |
Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution
To avoid static or other defensive analysis, the ransomware uses dynamic API resolution to conceal malware characteristics and functionality. The ransomware initially decrypts DLL names, then loads the APIs. Hardcoded encoded DLL names are shown below:

Figure 5. Encoded DLL names

Figure 6. DLL name decoding loop
DLL names decoded at runtime:
shell32.dll | rstrtmgr.dll |
Stop Services and Processes
Before file encryption, the ransomware terminates a list of known running processes and services to encrypt as many files as possible. BlackSuit ransomware utilizes the Windows Restart Manager to terminate any process using files other than explorer.exe or a critical process.
Sequence of Windows Restart Manager APIs used by the ransomware:
RmStartSession | Starts the Restart Manager session. |
RmRegisterResources | Registers resources, in this case the targeted filename |
RmGetList | Determine which processes or services are using the registered resource (file) |
RmShutdown | Shuts down any identified process or service using the registered resource |
RmEndSession | Closes the Restart Manager session. |
The ransomware also uses Windows native CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, Process32FirstW, and Process32NextW APIs to enumerate processes in the system.
File and Directory Exclusions
The ransomware excludes system-related files and folders, ransomware-related files, and whitelisted extensions during encryption.
Excluded file extensions:
.com .ani .scr .drv .hta .rom .bin .msc .ps1 .shs .adv .msu .prf .bat .idx .mpa .cmd .msi .mod .ocx .ics .386 .sys .rtp .wpx .msp .cab .ldf .lnk .cur .nls .hlp .key .ico .exe .icns .lock .theme .diagpkg .diagcab .nomedia .diagcfg .msstyles .themepack .blacksuit .deskthemepack | ||
|---|---|---|
Excluded files and directories:
“msocache”, “intel”, “$recycle.bin”, “windows”, “windows.old”, “mozilla firefox”, “$WinREAgent”, “boot”, “google”, “perflogs”, “system volume information”, “appdata”, “tor browser”, “$windows.~ws”, “application data”, “$windows.~bt”, “mozilla”, “readme.blacksuit.txt” | ||
|---|---|---|
Inhibit System Recovery
Windows operating systems contain features that can help fix corrupted system files, including shadow copies, which are backups of files created by the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS). By deleting shadow copies, the ransomware can prevent victims from restoring files from backups, making it more difficult for them to recover their data without paying the ransom.
With the CreateProcessW function, the ransomware deletes volume shadow copies before file encryption by executing the following command:
cmd.exe /c vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet | ||
|---|---|---|
Code in the ransomware showing this operation (the EAX register contains the kernel32.CreateProcessW address):

Figure 7. Create process call to delete volume shadow copies
System Network Connections Discovery
BlackSuit ransomware can enumerate network-mounted shares by scanning the network interfaces.
Data Encrypted for Impact
The ransomware initially finds available drives and loads the files one by one using the Windows API FindFirstFileW and FindNextFileW. It then uses OpenSSL AES keys to encrypt the files and adds the extension .blacksuit to the encrypted file name.

Figure 8. Windows native CryptEncrypt API call to encrypt the data
Public key:
—–BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY—– 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 —–END RSA PUBLIC KEY—– | ||
|---|---|---|
The ransomware encrypts files, adds the .blacksuit extension at the end of the encrypted files, and adds the following bytes at the end of the file (“??” represents variable bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ?? 00 00 00 ?? 00 00 00 | ||
|---|---|---|

Figure 9. “.blacksuit” extension added to the encrypted files

Figure 10. Padding bytes in encrypted files
Upon successful execution, the ransomware creates ransom notes with the file name readme.blacksuit.txt.

Figure 11. Screenshot of BlackSuit ransom note
Modify Registry
The ransomware did not perform any registry key modification.
Mutex
The mutex is the fundamental tool for managing shared resources between multiple threads or processes. Typically, ransomware uses a mutex to avoid reinfecting the victim system and causing multiple layers of encryption. The ransomware creates the following mutex value: “WLm87eV1oNRx6P3E4Cy9”.

Figure 12. Screenshot of the mutex value created while debugging the ransomware
Network Activity
The ransomware did not try to communicate with a remote server other than encrypting data from mounted shares.
Indicators of Compromise
Indicator | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
f1684fb118d4d8fc56653fcc49e12a659b64c4459ba037fa94f21783235cc6ba | SHA256 hash | BlackSuit ransomware |
C:\readme.blacksuit.txt | File path | BlackSuit ransom note |
.blacksuit | Extension | Encrypted files extension |
vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet | Process | Volume Shadow Copy deletion |
WLm87eV1oNRx6P3E4Cy9 | Mutex | Mutex value object created by the BlackSuit ransomware |
Any 32-character string | Password | Command line argument needed to properly execute the ransomware. The ransomware developer doesn’t validate it |
c7jpc6h2ccrdwmhofuij7kz6sr2fg2ndtbvvqy4fse23cf7m2e5hvqid [.]onion | URL | TA data leak site (DLS) |
Data Leak Site
The ransom note contains a data leak site (DLS) that displayed the following page, self-identifying the group as BlackSuit:

Figure 13. TOR DLS: c7jpc6h2ccrdwmhofuij7kz6sr2fg2ndtbvvqy4fse23cf7m2e5hvqid[.]onion

Figure 14. TOR DLS: weg7sdx54bevnvulapqu6bpzwztryeflq3s23tegbmnhkbpqz637f2yd[.]onion
Detection Mechanisms
Custom Detections and Blocking with Arete’s Arsinal

Yara

Recommended Mitigations
Utilize an endpoint detection and response (EDR) solution with the capability to halt detected processes and isolate systems on the network based on identified conditions.
Block any known attacker C2s in the firewall.
Implement multi-factor authentication on RDP and VPN to restrict access to critical network resources.
Eliminate unnecessary RDP ports exposed to the internet.
Block a high number of SMB connection attempts from one system to others in the network over a short period of time.
Perform periodic dark web monitoring to verify if data is available for sale on the black market.
Perform penetration tests.
Periodically patch systems and update tools.
Monitor connections to the network from suspicious locations.
Monitor downloads and uploads of files to file-sharing services outside standard work hours.
Monitor file uploads from domain controllers to the internet.
Monitor network scans from uncommon servers (e.g., RDP server).
Organizations can find the full list of US government recommended ransomware prevention and mitigation guidance here: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide.
Arete provides data-driven cybersecurity solutions to transform your response to emerging cyber threats. Learn more.
References
Back to Blog Posts
Article
Feb 20, 2026
Threat Actors Leveraging Gemini AI for All Attack Stages
State-backed threat actors are leveraging Google’s Gemini AI as a force multiplier to support all stages of the cyberattack lifecycle, from reconnaissance to post-compromise operations. According to the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), threat actors linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, North Korea, and other unattributed groups have misused Gemini to accelerate target profiling, synthesize open-source intelligence, identify official email addresses, map organizational structures, generate tailored phishing lures, translate content, conduct vulnerability testing, support coding tasks, and troubleshoot malware development. Cybercriminals are increasingly exploring AI-enabled tools and services to scale malicious activities, including social engineering campaigns such as ClickFix, demonstrating how generative AI is being integrated into both espionage and financially motivated threat operations.
What’s Notable and Unique
Threat actors are leveraging Gemini beyond basic reconnaissance, using it to generate polished, culturally nuanced phishing lures and sustain convincing multi-turn social engineering conversations that minimize traditional red flags.
In addition, threat actors rely on Gemini for vulnerability research, malware debugging, code generation, command-and-control development, and technical troubleshooting, with PRC groups emphasizing automation and vulnerability analysis, Iranian actors focusing on social engineering and malware development, and North Korean actors prioritizing high-fidelity target profiling.
Beyond direct operational support, adversaries have abused public generative AI platforms to host deceptive ClickFix instructions, tricking users into pasting malicious commands that deliver macOS variants of ATOMIC Stealer.
AI is also being integrated directly into malware development workflows, as seen with CoinBait’s AI-assisted phishing kit capabilities and HonestCue’s use of the Gemini API to dynamically generate and execute in-memory C# payloads.
Underground forums show strong demand for AI-powered offensive tools, with offerings like Xanthorox falsely marketed as custom AI but actually built on third-party commercial models integrated through open-source frameworks such as Crush, Hexstrike AI, LibreChat-AI, and Open WebUI, including Gemini.
Analyst Comments
The increasing misuse of generative AI platforms like Gemini highlights a rapidly evolving threat landscape in which state-backed and financially motivated actors leverage AI as a force multiplier for reconnaissance, phishing, malware development, and post-compromise operations. At the same time, large-scale model extraction attempts and API abuse demonstrate emerging risks to AI service integrity, intellectual property, and the broader AI-as-a-Service ecosystem. While these developments underscore the scalability and sophistication of AI-enabled threats, continued enforcement actions, strengthened safeguards, and proactive security testing by providers reflect ongoing efforts to mitigate abuse and adapt defenses in response to increasingly AI-driven adversaries.
Sources
GTIG AI Threat Tracker: Distillation, Experimentation, and (Continued) Integration of AI for Adversarial Use
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Article
Feb 12, 2026
2025 VMware ESXi Vulnerability Exploited by Ransomware Groups
Ransomware groups are actively exploiting CVE‑2025‑22225, a VMware ESXi arbitrary write vulnerability that allows attackers to escape the VMX sandbox and gain kernel‑level access to the hypervisor. Although VMware (Broadcom) patched this flaw in March 2025, threat actors had already exploited it in the wild, and CISA recently confirmed that threat actors are exploiting CVE‑2025‑22225 in active campaigns.
What’s Notable and Unique
Chinese‑speaking threat actors abused this vulnerability at least a year before disclosure, via a compromised SonicWall VPN chain.
Threat researchers have observed sophisticated exploit toolkits, possibly developed well before public disclosure, that chain this bug with others to achieve full VM escape. Evidence points to targeted activity, including exploitation via compromised VPN appliances and automated orchestrators.
Attackers with VMX level privileges can trigger a kernel write, break out of the sandbox, and compromise the ESXi host. Intrusions observed in December 2025 showed lateral movement, domain admin abuse, firewall rule manipulation, and staging of data for exfiltration.
CISA has now added CVE-2025-22225 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, underscoring ongoing use by ransomware attackers.
Analyst Comments
Compromise of ESXi hypervisors significantly amplifies operational impact, allowing access to and potential encryption of dozens of VMs simultaneously. Organizations running ESXi 7.x and 8.x remain at high risk if patches and mitigations have not been applied. Therefore, clients are recommended to apply VMware patches from VMSA‑2025‑0004 across all ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion deployments. Enterprises are advised to assess their setups in order to reduce risk, as protecting publicly accessible management interfaces is a fundamental security best practice.
Sources
CVE-2025-22225 in VMware ESXi now used in active ransomware attacks
The Great VM Escape: ESXi Exploitation in the Wild
VMSA-205-004: VMware ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion updates address multiple vulnerabilities (CVE-205-22224, CVE-2025-22225, CVE-2025-22226)
Read More
Article
Feb 5, 2026
Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: January 2026
Although Akira was once again the most active ransomware group in January, the threat landscape was more evenly distributed than it was throughout most of 2025. In December 2025, the three most active threat groups accounted for 57% of all ransomware and extortion activity; in January, the top three accounted for just 34%. Akira’s dominance also decreased to levels more consistent with early 2025, as the group was responsible for almost a third of all attacks in December but just 17% in January.
The number of unique ransomware and extortion groups observed in January increased slightly, to 17, up from 14 in December. It is too early to assess whether this trend will be the new normal for 2026. It is also worth noting that overall activity in January was lower than in previous months, consistent with what Arete typically observes at the beginning of a new year.

Figure 1. Activity from all threat groups in January 2026
Throughout the month of January, analysts at Arete identified several distinct trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:
In January, Arete observed the reemergence of the LockBit Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group, which deployed an updated “LockBit 5.0” variant of its ransomware. LockBit first announced the 5.0 version on the RAMP dark web forum in early September 2025, coinciding with the group’s six-year anniversary. The latest LockBit 5.0 variant has both Windows and Linux versions, with notable improvements, including anti-analysis features and unique 16-character extensions added to each encrypted file. However, it remains to be seen whether LockBit will return to consistent activity levels in 2026.
The ClickFix social engineering technique, which leverages fake error dialog boxes to deceive users into manually executing malicious PowerShell commands, continued to evolve in unique ways in January. One campaign reported in January involved fake Blue Screen of Death (BSOD) messages manipulating users into pasting attacker-controlled code. During the month, researchers also documented a separate campaign, dubbed “CrashFix,” that uses a malicious Chrome browser extension-based attack vector. It crashes the web browser, displays a message stating the browser had "stopped abnormally," and then prompts the victim to click a button that executes malicious commands.
Also in January, Fortinet confirmed that a new critical authentication vulnerability affecting its FortiGate devices is being actively exploited. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-24858, allows attackers with a FortiCloud account to log in to devices registered to other account owners due to an authentication bypass flaw in devices using FortiCloud single sign-on (SSO). This recent activity follows the exploitation of two other Fortinet SSO authentication flaws, CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719, which were disclosed in December 2025.
Source
Arete Internal
Read More
Article
Feb 2, 2026
New FortiCloud SSO Vulnerability Exploited
Fortinet recently confirmed that its FortiGate devices are affected by a new critical authentication vulnerability that is being actively exploited. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-24858, allows attackers with a FortiCloud account to log in to devices registered to other account owners due to an authentication bypass flaw in devices using FortiCloud single sign-on (SSO). CISA added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue and gave federal agencies just three days to patch, which requires users to upgrade all devices running FortiOS, FortiManager, FortiAnalyzer, FortiProxy, and FortiWeb to fixed versions. This recent activity follows the exploitation of two other SSO authentication flaws, CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719, which were disclosed last month.
What’s Notable and Unique
There are strong indications that much of the recent exploitation activity was automated, with attackers moving from initial access to account creation within seconds.
As observed in December 2025, the attackers’ primary target appears to be firewall configuration files, which contain a trove of information that can be leveraged in future operations.
The threat actors in this campaign favor innocuous, IT-themed email and account names, with malicious login activity originating from cloud-init@mail[.]io and cloud-noc@mail[.]io, while account names such as ‘secadmin’, ‘itadmin’, ‘audit’, and others are created for persistence and subsequent activity.
Analyst Comments
This is an active campaign, and the investigation into these attacks is ongoing. Organizations relying on FortiGate devices should remain extremely vigilant, even after following patching guidance. With threat actors circumventing authentication, it’s crucial to monitor for and alert on anomalous behavior within your environment, such as the unauthorized creation of admin accounts, the creation or modification of access policies, logins outside normal working hours, and anything that deviates from your security baseline.
Sources
Administrative FortiCloud SSO authentication bypass
Multiple Fortinet Products’ FortiCloud SSO Login Authentication Bypass
Arctic Wolf Observes Malicious Configuration Changes On Fortinet FortiGate Devices via SSO Accounts
Arctic Wolf Observes Malicious SSO Logins on FortiGate Devices Following Disclosure of CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719
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