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US Sanctions Grinex Crypto Exchange

Arete Analysis

Cybersecurity Trends

On August 14, 2025, the US Treasury Department announced sanctions against the spiritual successor to Garantex, the Grinex crypto exchange. Following law enforcement action against Garantex in March 2025, Grinex was created by Garantex employees to support sanctions evasion efforts. Subsequently, Grinex has become a hot spot for illicitly obtained funds from ransomware, extortion, and other fraudulent activities.

Multi-Step Process

The disruptions of Grinex and Garantex took years to execute and occurred over multiple phases of sanctions and law enforcement actions.

Phase 1 – Initial Sanctions against Garantex
In April 2022, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Estonia-based crypto exchange Garantex. This came after Estonia revoked Garantex’s license in February 2022 due to a lack of anti-money laundering/know-your-customer (AML/KYC) policies. At the time of the sanctions announcement, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) assessed Garantex to have facilitated more than $100 million USD in illicit transactions. Interestingly, these sanctions did not inhibit Garantex from continuing their operations in providing cover for criminals and sanctioned customers of the exchange.

However, the sanctions did impact the ransomware landscape. Previously used by big-name ransomware groups such as Conti, LockBit, and Ryuk, the exchange was largely no longer a viable option for groups hoping to stay in business and evade additional law enforcement scrutiny. Groups that continued to utilize the sanctioned exchange or decided to use it later often earned themselves a one-way ticket to organizations’ no-pay lists and became a target for future law enforcement takedowns. Notably, 8Base ransomware was added to Arete’s internal no-pay list in September 2023 following an identified transaction to Garantex. 8Base was then taken down by a law enforcement action in February of 2025.

Phase 2 – Law Enforcement Attempts to Dismantle Garantex
Fast-forward to March 2025, when law enforcement agencies led by the US Secret Service attempted to disrupt the sanctioned crypto exchange by seizing Garantex’s primary domain and over $26 million in cryptocurrency assets. Unfortunately, the operation didn’t entirely disrupt the exchange and led to the unveiling of Grinex, often referred to as Garantex 2.0, later that month. Grinex began serving as the nefarious new arm of Garantex, and operators almost immediately began routing illicit funds through the new exchange.

Phase 3 – US Treasury Sanctions Grinex
This brings us to August 14th, when the US Treasury announced sanctions against the newly formed Grinex crypto exchange, three Garantex executives, and the A7A5 stablecoin, which is discussed in the next section. Currently, Grinex remains operational, and Arete is monitoring for use of the exchange as part of ransomware groups money laundering efforts.

But Wait, There’s More

The A7A5 stablecoin cryptocurrency is designed to track 1:1 with the Russian Ruble and appeared to be transferring funds from Garantex in January 2025, indicating the desire to create a sanction-resistant asset even before the disruption. The A7A5 coin, launched behind a veil of shell companies based in Kyrgyzstan, was adopted as an efficient sanctions evasion tool for individuals looking to cash out their illicitly obtained funds.

Analyst Comments

The identification and subsequent sanctions of Grinex and the A7A5 stablecoin significantly impinge upon cybercriminals’ ability to launder funds. Sanctions announcements especially impact ransomware groups, as many incident response firms, especially ones registered as money services businesses (MSBs), will not facilitate payments to groups using sanctioned infrastructure. The unsealing of indictments against the Garantex leadership and increased spotlight on the use of the A7A5 stable coin as a sanctions evasion tool allow organizations additional opportunities to monitor sanctions exposure and prohibit funds from moving to sanctioned entities. Arete cautions that new money laundering techniques designed to evade sanctions are likely to emerge in the future as cybercriminals continuously evolve their tactics in this space.

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Article

Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: July 2026

INC Ransom was the most active threat group in July, while activity remained relatively distributed among multiple threat groups, with 19 unique groups observed throughout the month. Alongside INC Ransom, Qilin, Global Secret Group, Anubis, and DragonForce rounded out the five most active threat groups observed in July. Several emerging threat actors were also observed during the month, including Booba Team, Settra, and Global Secret Group.

Figure 1. Activity from the top 3 threat groups in July 2026

 Throughout the month, analysts at Arete identified several trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:

  • In July 2026, Global Secret Group emerged as a new threat actor, leveraging the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) source code. Although the group began operations in June 2026, it quickly accumulated a substantial number of victims on its data leak site (DLS). The group operates through TOR-based negotiation portals and qTox communications. Notably, its DLS provides step-by-step guidance on purchasing Bitcoin, including references to Coinbase and Binance, demonstrating a streamlined, victim-focused extortion process designed to simplify ransom payments.

  • Similar to Fulcrumsec, the recently emerged Settra ransomware group appears to leverage AI-driven analysis of stolen data, publishing detailed and highly structured victim reports on its DLS. Additionally, a potential EDR-disabling tool, edr_blind.exe, was identified in multiple cases, suggesting a focus on defense-evasion capabilities.

  • With the continuation of the FortiBleed campaign, researchers have now identified compromised FortiGate credentials being leveraged by both the INC and Lynx ransomware operations. Analysis revealed direct operational links between the groups, including shared ransomware infrastructure and overlap between FortiBleed victims and ransomware targets. The operators are also incorporating AI to enhance various stages of the attack lifecycle and increase operational efficiency and scale. Notably, Arete also observed an INC ransomware intrusion leveraging FortiBleed-derived access in July, reinforcing the campaign's role as a precursor to ransomware deployment.

Sources

  • Arete Internal

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Cyber Campfire: June Threat Trends & Insights

In this episode of Arete’s Cyber Campfire podcast, our Threat Intelligence Team discusses trends, statistics, and emerging threat actors from June 2026. Tune in for firsthand insights on today’s threat landscape that can enhance your approach to cyber risk.

Article

Current: Misconfigured Server Reveals Multiple Phishing Campaigns

Researchers uncovered three Microsoft 365 phishing campaigns after discovering a misconfigured HTTP server that exposed a threat actor’s phishing tools, configurations, victim logs, and operational infrastructure. The investigation revealed two operators using custom Evilginx-based adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing frameworks to steal authentication sessions and bypass MFA protections. A third operator abused Microsoft’s OAuth Device Code flow by tricking victims into completing authentication through Microsoft’s legitimate login process, allowing attackers to obtain valid access and refresh tokens without stealing passwords. The largest campaign compromised at least 218 victims across 12 countries, primarily targeting corporate Microsoft 365 accounts, with refresh tokens enabling persistent access. Researchers also identified the use of remote management tools for maintaining access, AI-assisted development of phishing tooling, and links to broader Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) ecosystems, highlighting how commodity frameworks and automation are lowering the barrier for sophisticated identity-based attacks.

What’s Notable and Unique

  • The campaigns demonstrate the continued shift from traditional credential theft to identity- and token-based compromise, in which attackers target authentication sessions, cookies, and OAuth tokens rather than relying solely on password theft. By obtaining valid authentication artifacts, attackers can access Microsoft 365 environments while bypassing conventional MFA protections.


  • The use of Evilginx-based AiTM frameworks highlights how publicly available phishing tools have evolved into effective MFA-bypass platforms. These frameworks proxy legitimate login pages, capture authenticated sessions, and allow attackers to reuse valid sessions without requiring victims’ credentials again.


  • The OAuth Device Code flow abuse represents a different attack method, in which attackers leverage a legitimate Microsoft authentication mechanism to obtain tokens after victims approve the request. This approach bypasses password theft entirely by abusing trusted authentication workflows.


  • The exposed infrastructure provided insight into attacker operations, including phishing configurations, victim tracking data, remote administration tools, and evidence of AI-assisted development. The findings demonstrate how phishing ecosystems now provide reusable tooling and automation that reduce the technical expertise required to conduct large-scale identity attacks.

Analyst Comments

These Microsoft 365 phishing campaigns demonstrate the ongoing evolution of identity-focused attacks, as adversaries increasingly target authentication sessions, tokens, and legitimate cloud authorization mechanisms to bypass traditional security controls. The combination of AiTM phishing, OAuth abuse, remote management tools, and PhaaS infrastructure enables threat actors to maintain persistent access while blending into legitimate cloud activity.

The growing availability of phishing frameworks and AI-assisted attack development highlights the need for continuous identity security improvements beyond traditional phishing defenses. Arete recommends that organizations strengthen identity monitoring, adopt phishing-resistant MFA where possible, review OAuth application permissions, monitor token activity, and implement conditional access policies to detect and restrict suspicious Microsoft 365 authentication behavior. Security teams should also monitor post-compromise indicators such as abnormal mailbox access, suspicious application consent, unauthorized remote tools, and unusual sign-in activity.

Sources

  • One Misconfigured Server, Three Active Campaigns: Full exposure of three AiTM Phishing Operators

  • Misconfigured Server Reveals Three Evilginx Phishing Operations Targeting Microsoft 365

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Digital Forensics Meets the Courtroom: Insights on Expert Witness and Cyber-Related Litigation

In this episode of Bytes of Insight, host Vinny Sakore and special guest Dr. Bruce Hartley, Managing Director and Co-Founder of Advisory Services at Arete, discuss the evolving role of digital forensics and expert witness work in cybersecurity litigation. Tune in for firsthand insights on how Arete conducts post-breach investigations, what it takes to undergo cross-examination on the stand, and how emerging threats like AI-driven social engineering and third-party breaches are reshaping the advisory landscape.