Article
Scattered Spider Adapts to Evolving Threat Landscaped
Arete Analysis

As Arete reported in last week’s article, RansomHub emerged as a new Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation in early 2024 and has already targeted several high-profile victims, including telecom giant Frontier Communications and Christie’s auction house. According to a recent analysis, at least one affiliate of RansomHub is a present or former member of the Scattered Spider threat group and previously worked with ALPHV/BlackCat prior to its shutdown. According to the report, the RansomHub affiliate was observed using the same tools, tactics, and techniques previously used by a Scattered Spider threat actor.
These tools include ngrok for remote access, remote desktop client Remmina, and Tailscale virtual private network (VPN) service.
Similar tactics included the use of social engineering by individuals with American accents to manipulate victims into resetting account passwords.
Scattered Spider: #OpenToWork
Scattered Spider—also known by several other names, including Octo Tempest, Oktapus, Scattered Swine, and UNC3944—is a sophisticated threat group that has been active since at least May 2022. The group is known to conduct solo exfiltration-based extortion attacks and work within the affiliate structure of the now-defunct ALPHV RaaS. As an affiliate of ALPHV, Scattered Spider gained notoriety after its alleged attack on Caesars Entertainment and MGM Resorts in late 2023.
Law enforcement operations against ALPHV in December 2023 eventually led to the RaaS group shutting down its operations in March 2024. RansomHub was one of the emerging RaaS groups that took advantage of the pool of ex-ALPHV affiliates and began posting recruiting advertisements on Dark Web forums that referenced ALPHV’s struggles and offered a generous 90/10 payment split for new affiliates.
Evolving Tactics – Scattered Spider Getting SaaSy
In addition to Scattered Spider reportedly aligning with RansomHub, separate reporting indicated that the group has been focusing on data theft extortion without using ransomware, expanding tactics to include data theft from software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications. In the past, Scattered Spider was known to leverage compromised credentials and social engineering attacks via phishing and SIM swapping to gain access to victim networks. However, Scattered Spider threat actors recently shifted to using stolen credentials to access SaaS applications, including vCenter, CyberArk, SalesForce, Azure, CrowdStrike, Amazon Web Service (AWS), and Google Cloud Platform (GCP). After gaining access to a victim’s environment, they use legitimate cloud syncing tools to move victim data to services like AWS and GCP.
Analyst Comments
Law enforcement operations against large RaaS groups like ALPHV and LockBit in 2024 created a fractured ransomware landscape, but groups like Scattered Spider are finding ways to adapt their operations and tactics. Although recent reports seem to portray conflicting tactics of data theft and ransomware, both are aligned with previous Scattered Spider operations. The group remains opportunistic, operating independently in data theft-only attacks, as well as aligning with RaaS groups. Given RansomHub’s focus on recruiting ex-APLHV affiliates, it makes sense that Scattered Spider would pivot between affiliate structures and work with the emerging RaaS, particularly given the lucrative affiliate terms promised on RansomHub’s recruitment posts. Although its tactics or affiliations may shift, Scattered Spider will likely remain a dynamic threat group and pivot to the opportunities that meet its evolving needs.
Sources
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Article
Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: July 2026
INC Ransom was the most active threat group in July, while activity remained relatively distributed among multiple threat groups, with 19 unique groups observed throughout the month. Alongside INC Ransom, Qilin, Global Secret Group, Anubis, and DragonForce rounded out the five most active threat groups observed in July. Several emerging threat actors were also observed during the month, including Booba Team, Settra, and Global Secret Group.

Figure 1. Activity from the top 3 threat groups in July 2026
Throughout the month, analysts at Arete identified several trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:
In July 2026, Global Secret Group emerged as a new threat actor, leveraging the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) source code. Although the group began operations in June 2026, it quickly accumulated a substantial number of victims on its data leak site (DLS). The group operates through TOR-based negotiation portals and qTox communications. Notably, its DLS provides step-by-step guidance on purchasing Bitcoin, including references to Coinbase and Binance, demonstrating a streamlined, victim-focused extortion process designed to simplify ransom payments.
Similar to Fulcrumsec, the recently emerged Settra ransomware group appears to leverage AI-driven analysis of stolen data, publishing detailed and highly structured victim reports on its DLS. Additionally, a potential EDR-disabling tool, edr_blind.exe, was identified in multiple cases, suggesting a focus on defense-evasion capabilities.
With the continuation of the FortiBleed campaign, researchers have now identified compromised FortiGate credentials being leveraged by both the INC and Lynx ransomware operations. Analysis revealed direct operational links between the groups, including shared ransomware infrastructure and overlap between FortiBleed victims and ransomware targets. The operators are also incorporating AI to enhance various stages of the attack lifecycle and increase operational efficiency and scale. Notably, Arete also observed an INC ransomware intrusion leveraging FortiBleed-derived access in July, reinforcing the campaign's role as a precursor to ransomware deployment.
Sources
Arete Internal
Podcast
Cyber Campfire: June Threat Trends & Insights
In this episode of Arete’s Cyber Campfire podcast, our Threat Intelligence Team discusses trends, statistics, and emerging threat actors from June 2026. Tune in for firsthand insights on today’s threat landscape that can enhance your approach to cyber risk.
Article
Current: Misconfigured Server Reveals Multiple Phishing Campaigns
Researchers uncovered three Microsoft 365 phishing campaigns after discovering a misconfigured HTTP server that exposed a threat actor’s phishing tools, configurations, victim logs, and operational infrastructure. The investigation revealed two operators using custom Evilginx-based adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing frameworks to steal authentication sessions and bypass MFA protections. A third operator abused Microsoft’s OAuth Device Code flow by tricking victims into completing authentication through Microsoft’s legitimate login process, allowing attackers to obtain valid access and refresh tokens without stealing passwords. The largest campaign compromised at least 218 victims across 12 countries, primarily targeting corporate Microsoft 365 accounts, with refresh tokens enabling persistent access. Researchers also identified the use of remote management tools for maintaining access, AI-assisted development of phishing tooling, and links to broader Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) ecosystems, highlighting how commodity frameworks and automation are lowering the barrier for sophisticated identity-based attacks.
What’s Notable and Unique
The campaigns demonstrate the continued shift from traditional credential theft to identity- and token-based compromise, in which attackers target authentication sessions, cookies, and OAuth tokens rather than relying solely on password theft. By obtaining valid authentication artifacts, attackers can access Microsoft 365 environments while bypassing conventional MFA protections.
The use of Evilginx-based AiTM frameworks highlights how publicly available phishing tools have evolved into effective MFA-bypass platforms. These frameworks proxy legitimate login pages, capture authenticated sessions, and allow attackers to reuse valid sessions without requiring victims’ credentials again.
The OAuth Device Code flow abuse represents a different attack method, in which attackers leverage a legitimate Microsoft authentication mechanism to obtain tokens after victims approve the request. This approach bypasses password theft entirely by abusing trusted authentication workflows.
The exposed infrastructure provided insight into attacker operations, including phishing configurations, victim tracking data, remote administration tools, and evidence of AI-assisted development. The findings demonstrate how phishing ecosystems now provide reusable tooling and automation that reduce the technical expertise required to conduct large-scale identity attacks.
Analyst Comments
These Microsoft 365 phishing campaigns demonstrate the ongoing evolution of identity-focused attacks, as adversaries increasingly target authentication sessions, tokens, and legitimate cloud authorization mechanisms to bypass traditional security controls. The combination of AiTM phishing, OAuth abuse, remote management tools, and PhaaS infrastructure enables threat actors to maintain persistent access while blending into legitimate cloud activity.
The growing availability of phishing frameworks and AI-assisted attack development highlights the need for continuous identity security improvements beyond traditional phishing defenses. Arete recommends that organizations strengthen identity monitoring, adopt phishing-resistant MFA where possible, review OAuth application permissions, monitor token activity, and implement conditional access policies to detect and restrict suspicious Microsoft 365 authentication behavior. Security teams should also monitor post-compromise indicators such as abnormal mailbox access, suspicious application consent, unauthorized remote tools, and unusual sign-in activity.
Sources
One Misconfigured Server, Three Active Campaigns: Full exposure of three AiTM Phishing Operators
Misconfigured Server Reveals Three Evilginx Phishing Operations Targeting Microsoft 365
Podcast
Digital Forensics Meets the Courtroom: Insights on Expert Witness and Cyber-Related Litigation
In this episode of Bytes of Insight, host Vinny Sakore and special guest Dr. Bruce Hartley, Managing Director and Co-Founder of Advisory Services at Arete, discuss the evolving role of digital forensics and expert witness work in cybersecurity litigation. Tune in for firsthand insights on how Arete conducts post-breach investigations, what it takes to undergo cross-examination on the stand, and how emerging threats like AI-driven social engineering and third-party breaches are reshaping the advisory landscape.



