Article
Maze Ransomware: Is Posting Data Counterproductive?
Combating Ransomware

Summary
In 2020, Maze Ransomware began utilizing both encryption and data exfiltration in an attempt to maximize ransom payments, but these tactics may backfire by adding additional incident response costs for victims.
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Ransomware incidents dominated INFOSEC news in 2019. Penetration methods continued to evolve, attacks became more targeted and ransom demands continued to rise. A major shift in attacker tactics happened in early December when the group behind the Maze ransomware variant started to exfiltrate their victim’s data along with encrypting their files. It was disclosed during active ransom negotiations with the Maze actors that the data that is being exfiltrated from victim networks is being analyzed by Maze actors to determine the price for the ransom demand. The Maze group also created a web page and began to publish data of the victims who refused to pay the ransom.
Maze victims could now be extorted in two different ways, forcing clients to deal with a double-pronged issue – data loss on the one hand and data leakage on the other. This makes restoration from backups a lot less appealing as attackers now are leveraging the data extortion component to apply pressure to victims to pay the ransom demands (even if they have valid backups) to stop further data leakage.
It didn’t take long for a few other ransomware variants, like REvil/Sodinokibi, DopplePaymer, Pysa/Mespinoza, Ako, Clop, Lockbit, Nefilm, Nemty, Netwalker, Ragnar, Sekhmet, Snatch, and Zeppelin, to follow Maze off the bridge and start accessing and exfiltrating their victim’s data as well. All groups believed that having their victim’s data may increase their chances of the ransom being paid but, in reality, this strategy will most likely do quite the opposite.
For every organization that is experiencing a ransomware event, the overall incident response price tag consists of several components:
Initial triage and containment efforts to ensure that the attackers no longer have access to systems and networks Legal assessment to identify all applicable obligations under state and federal laws and regulations Forensic evidence collection and preservation Recovery of data and systems (note: this can occur either by paying the ransom, restoring from backups, or rebuilding systems and data from scratch) Digital forensics investigation
And, if the results of the forensics investigation do not rule out data access or exfiltration by the attacker:
Collection and data mining of compromised data to identify all PII/PCI/PHI records (eDiscovery)
Legal review of results
Notifications of individuals and organizations whose data was compromised;
DarkWeb search and monitoring services to proactively detect if compromised data would get posted on hacker forums or under ground markets.
Prior to December 2019, data access and/or exfiltration for the majority of ransomware incidents were ruled out based upon the results of digital forensics investigations. Because of that, the chances of victims being required to pay hefty fees for eDiscovery and notification services were fairly low. Currently, since more and more ransomware groups have been adopting the tactic of stealing sensitive data, victims have to assume that, as a part of incident response costs, they’ll have to pay for eDiscovery and notification services as well.
At the end of the day, whether to pay or not to pay a ransom is a business decision for every company. By stealing sensitive data, ransomware groups automatically trigger additional mandatory expenses for their victims. This money will be going to companies that specialize in eDiscovery / breach notifications and not the ransomware groups. Even if victims of ransomware attacks have cyber insurance policies, a large portion of their coverage limits will be eaten away by those additional expenses, leaving less money on the table for potential ransom payments.
It might be a good time for ransomware groups to reconsider their strategy and climb back up on that bridge.
Some screen shots of sites where ransomware groups publish victims’ data:

Figure 1 - maze

Figure 2 - Dopplepaymer

Figure 3 - Sodinokibi

Figure 4 - Mespinoza
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Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: February 2026
After a slight lull in January, Akira and Qilin returned to dominating ransomware activity in February, collectively accounting for almost half of all engagements that month. The rest of the threat landscape remained relatively diverse, with a mix of persistent threats like INC and PLAY, older groups like Cl0p and LockBit, and newer groups like BravoX and Payouts King. Given current trends, the first quarter of 2026 will likely remain relatively predictable, with the top groups from the second half of 2025 continuing to operate at fairly consistent levels month to month.

Figure 1. Activity from the top 5 threat groups in February 2026
Throughout the month of February, analysts at Arete identified several trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:
In February, Arete observed Qilin actively targeting WatchGuard Firebox devices, especially those vulnerable to CVE-2025-14733, to gain initial access to victim environments. CVE-2025-14733 is a critical vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS that allows a remote, unauthenticated threat actor to execute arbitrary code. In addition to upgrading WatchGuard devices to the latest Firebox OS version, which patches the bug, administrators are urged to rotate all shared secrets on affected devices that may have been compromised and may be used in future campaigns.
Reports from February suggest that threat actors are increasingly exploring AI-enabled tools and services to scale malicious activities, demonstrating how generative AI is being integrated into both espionage and financially motivated threat operations. The Google Threat Intelligence Group indicated that state-backed threat actors are leveraging Google’s Gemini AI as a force multiplier to support all stages of the cyberattack lifecycle, from reconnaissance to post-compromise operations. Separate reporting from Amazon Threat Intelligence identified a threat actor leveraging commercially available generative AI services to conduct a large-scale campaign against FortiGate firewalls, gaining access through weak or reused credentials protected only by single-factor authentication.
The Interlock ransomware group recently introduced a custom process-termination utility called “Hotta Killer,” designed to disable endpoint detection and response solutions during active intrusions. This tool exploits a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-61155) in a gaming anti-cheat driver, marking a significant adaptation in the group’s operations against security tools like FortiEDR. Arete is actively monitoring this activity, which highlights the growing trend of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks, in which threat actors exploit legitimate, signed drivers to bypass and disable endpoint security controls.
Sources
Arete Internal
Article
ClickFix Campaign Delivers Custom RAT
Security researchers identified a sophisticated evolution of the ClickFix campaign that aims to compromise legitimate websites before delivering a five-stage malware chain, culminating in the deployment of MIMICRAT. MIMICRAT is a custom remote access trojan (RAT) written in the C/C++ programming language that offers various capabilities early in the attack lifecycle. The attack begins with victims visiting compromised websites, where JavaScript plugins load a fake Cloudflare verification that tricks users into executing a malicious PowerShell script, further displaying the prominence and effectiveness of ClickFix and its user interaction techniques.
Not Your Average RAT
MIMICRAT displays above-average defense evasion and sophistication, including:
A five-stage PowerShell sequence beginning with Event Tracing for Windows and Anti-Malware Scan Interface bypasses, which are commonly used in red teaming for evading detection by EDR and AV toolsets.
The malware later uses a lightweight scripting language that is scripted into memory, allowing malicious actions without files that could easily be detected by an EDR tool.
MIMICRAT uses malleable Command and Control profiles, allowing for a constantly changing communication infrastructure.
The campaign uses legitimate compromised infrastructure, rather than attacker-owned tools, and is prepped to use 17 different languages, which increases global reach and defense evasion.
Analyst Comments
The ClickFix social engineering technique remains an effective means for threat actors to obtain compromised credentials and initial access to victim environments, enabling them to deploy first-stage malware. Coupled with the sophisticated MIMICRAT RAT, the effectiveness of this campaign could increase. Arete will continue monitoring for changes to the ClickFix techniques, the deployment of MIMICRAT in other campaigns, and other pertinent information relating to the ongoing campaign.
Sources
MIMICRAT: ClickFix Campaign Delivers Custom RAT via Compromised Legitimate Websites
Article
Threat Actors Leveraging Gemini AI for All Attack Stages
State-backed threat actors are leveraging Google’s Gemini AI as a force multiplier to support all stages of the cyberattack lifecycle, from reconnaissance to post-compromise operations. According to the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), threat actors linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, North Korea, and other unattributed groups have misused Gemini to accelerate target profiling, synthesize open-source intelligence, identify official email addresses, map organizational structures, generate tailored phishing lures, translate content, conduct vulnerability testing, support coding tasks, and troubleshoot malware development. Cybercriminals are increasingly exploring AI-enabled tools and services to scale malicious activities, including social engineering campaigns such as ClickFix, demonstrating how generative AI is being integrated into both espionage and financially motivated threat operations.
What’s Notable and Unique
Threat actors are leveraging Gemini beyond basic reconnaissance, using it to generate polished, culturally nuanced phishing lures and sustain convincing multi-turn social engineering conversations that minimize traditional red flags.
In addition, threat actors rely on Gemini for vulnerability research, malware debugging, code generation, command-and-control development, and technical troubleshooting, with PRC groups emphasizing automation and vulnerability analysis, Iranian actors focusing on social engineering and malware development, and North Korean actors prioritizing high-fidelity target profiling.
Beyond direct operational support, adversaries have abused public generative AI platforms to host deceptive ClickFix instructions, tricking users into pasting malicious commands that deliver macOS variants of ATOMIC Stealer.
AI is also being integrated directly into malware development workflows, as seen with CoinBait’s AI-assisted phishing kit capabilities and HonestCue’s use of the Gemini API to dynamically generate and execute in-memory C# payloads.
Underground forums show strong demand for AI-powered offensive tools, with offerings like Xanthorox falsely marketed as custom AI but actually built on third-party commercial models integrated through open-source frameworks such as Crush, Hexstrike AI, LibreChat-AI, and Open WebUI, including Gemini.
Analyst Comments
The increasing misuse of generative AI platforms like Gemini highlights a rapidly evolving threat landscape in which state-backed and financially motivated actors leverage AI as a force multiplier for reconnaissance, phishing, malware development, and post-compromise operations. At the same time, large-scale model extraction attempts and API abuse demonstrate emerging risks to AI service integrity, intellectual property, and the broader AI-as-a-Service ecosystem. While these developments underscore the scalability and sophistication of AI-enabled threats, continued enforcement actions, strengthened safeguards, and proactive security testing by providers reflect ongoing efforts to mitigate abuse and adapt defenses in response to increasingly AI-driven adversaries.
Sources
GTIG AI Threat Tracker: Distillation, Experimentation, and (Continued) Integration of AI for Adversarial Use
Article
2025 VMware ESXi Vulnerability Exploited by Ransomware Groups
Ransomware groups are actively exploiting CVE‑2025‑22225, a VMware ESXi arbitrary write vulnerability that allows attackers to escape the VMX sandbox and gain kernel‑level access to the hypervisor. Although VMware (Broadcom) patched this flaw in March 2025, threat actors had already exploited it in the wild, and CISA recently confirmed that threat actors are exploiting CVE‑2025‑22225 in active campaigns.
What’s Notable and Unique
Chinese‑speaking threat actors abused this vulnerability at least a year before disclosure, via a compromised SonicWall VPN chain.
Threat researchers have observed sophisticated exploit toolkits, possibly developed well before public disclosure, that chain this bug with others to achieve full VM escape. Evidence points to targeted activity, including exploitation via compromised VPN appliances and automated orchestrators.
Attackers with VMX level privileges can trigger a kernel write, break out of the sandbox, and compromise the ESXi host. Intrusions observed in December 2025 showed lateral movement, domain admin abuse, firewall rule manipulation, and staging of data for exfiltration.
CISA has now added CVE-2025-22225 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, underscoring ongoing use by ransomware attackers.
Analyst Comments
Compromise of ESXi hypervisors significantly amplifies operational impact, allowing access to and potential encryption of dozens of VMs simultaneously. Organizations running ESXi 7.x and 8.x remain at high risk if patches and mitigations have not been applied. Therefore, clients are recommended to apply VMware patches from VMSA‑2025‑0004 across all ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion deployments. Enterprises are advised to assess their setups in order to reduce risk, as protecting publicly accessible management interfaces is a fundamental security best practice.
Sources
CVE-2025-22225 in VMware ESXi now used in active ransomware attacks
The Great VM Escape: ESXi Exploitation in the Wild
VMSA-205-004: VMware ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion updates address multiple vulnerabilities (CVE-205-22224, CVE-2025-22225, CVE-2025-22226)



