Article
Ransomware Realities: Additional Risks During the Crisis
Arete Analysis
Cybersecurity Trends

Upon identification of a ransomware incident, many individuals may experience some level of stress or panic. However, while minimizing business interruption by restoring data from backups or other means, other post-incident factors must be considered so organizations can take proper precautions and avoid further security compromises.
Three’s a Crowd – Having Multiple Actors in Your Environment
In rare cases, continued use of initial access brokers (IABs) by ransomware groups can lead to multiple threat actors within an environment simultaneously. IABs sometimes sell the same access to multiple actors to increase profits, leading to re-encryption of the environment or, in some cases, multi-encryption events from multiple ransomware executables. Unsurprisingly, recovery in these scenarios is extremely difficult.
Malvertising is another way multiple actors can inadvertently end up within a victim’s environment. Malvertising is a malicious attack that involves injecting code into a legitimate advertising site. Various threat actors operate campaigns where they distribute backdoored or otherwise malicious versions of commonly used information security tools like Putty and WinSCP. When a victim downloads these tools, they may give the threat actors access to the environment, leading to threats as serious as ransomware. However, some threat actors also use simple Google searches to find and download legitimate tools they abuse to facilitate their operations. In some cases, threat actors may accidentally download an application backdoored by a different threat actor, meaning two threat actors are now operational within the victim environment.
The threat of having multiple actors within any given network demonstrates the importance of proper forensic analysis and top-tier endpoint detection and response (EDR) deployment following a security incident. Whether an organization chooses to recover from backups or pay for decryption, it is imperative that incident response companies can acquire adequate logs surrounding the time of the incident to conduct their analysis. Failure to do so can lead to increased costs associated with analysis, gaps in the timeline, and in the worst-case scenario, threat actors maintaining persistence in the victim environment, leading to events such as re-encryption.
Non-Reputable Companies and Software
In the critical moments following the identification of a ransomware incident, an overwhelming number of choices must be made. Ideally, the victim organization has a detailed incident response plan, practiced it several times in mock engagements, and printed out the plan in several physical locations which can be enacted with calm and purpose during the incident to decrease frenzy surrounding decision making. Of the many decisions to be made during the incident response process, one of the most important is choosing which organizations to partner with in the legal and recovery efforts. Pre-selection of data privacy counsel specializing in these events and a digital forensic incident response company are ideal, but not typically the case.
In cases where a ransom payment is required, most organizations will enlist a third-party organization registered as a money service business (MSB) to facilitate the ransom payment. The use of an unregistered third-party leads to higher organizational risks surrounding ransom payments, including potential regulatory action and the possibility of losing the ransom fund itself to a scam or otherwise, necessitating a second payment sum.
Additionally, when receiving a decryptor, whether from a third-party resource or a threat actor, the decryptor should be validated to ensure there are no hidden malicious functions. If a commercial decryptor is not properly vetted prior to being used to decrypt the victim’s more valuable files, it could lead to the inability to recover the files.
Conclusion
The best precaution against ancillary threats following a ransomware incident is an existing and tested incident response plan and immediate implementation of the remediation instructions provided by reputable vendors retained to respond to the incident. From increased security to financial risks, an organization’s choices following an incident can have a lasting impact on their ability to recover successfully.
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What’s Notable and Unique
Rather than targeting the end user first, this campaign is unique in its initial exploitation of the system, followed by social engineering attempts. This hybrid attack style is likely being leveraged to bypass traditional defenses.
This recent campaign also highlights how trusted web properties can be weaponized at scale and coupled with unpatched CMS vulnerabilities. Rather than using the CMS compromise to perpetrate a single attack, threat actors turned it into a supply-chain attack that ultimately affected over 700 trusted websites.
Analyst Comments
As network defenders and their tools enhance threat detection capabilities, adversaries increasingly seek methods to bypass these defenses. By combining vulnerability exploitation, social engineering techniques, and staging for ancillary attacks, this campaign successfully bypassed traditional defenses and inflicted significant impact. Defending against hybrid cyberattacks requires comprehensive security controls beyond simply patching vulnerabilities. Organizations should focus on limiting movement within the environment, detecting abuse of trusted applications, and preventing end-user manipulation.
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Threat Actors Leverage Fake JPEG Files for Initial Access
In a recent campaign, researchers observed threat actors using fake JPEG image files as a delivery mechanism to initiate the deployment of additional malicious components. The false JPEG files are typically distributed via phishing emails or other social engineering-based lures, and are actually PowerShell-based malware that deploys a trojanized version of ConnectWise ScreenConnect to establish and maintain persistence in the compromised environment.
What’s Notable and Unique
This campaign leverages JPEG images as the initial lure, where the images are not merely decoys but part of the infection workflow. Victims are typically led to download or open an image that triggers hidden execution logic or redirects them to a payload-delivery sequence that initiates later stages of the intrusion chain.
The attack chain is designed to blend into legitimate environments, making detection more difficult. Execution typically relies on scripted or native Windows components, often including PowerShell or other living-off-the-land binaries, enabling fileless or near-fileless execution and reducing forensic artifacts on disk.
The multistage design ensures that the initial JPEG does not directly contain the full payload but instead triggers retrieval or decryption steps that progressively assemble the final malicious components in memory.
Analyst Comments
This campaign illustrates how threat actors continue to blur the line between legitimate file handling and malicious execution chains, indicating potential overlap with remote management or administrative tooling. The use of JPEG-based staging combined with script-based execution reflects a broader evolution toward a stealth-first intrusion design, in which file formats serve as triggers rather than payload containers.
Sources
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