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The Hidden Costs of Cybercrime

Arete Analysis

By Kevin Baker, Director of Cyber Strategy and Defense

This year, the global cost of cybercrime is expected to hit $6 trillion.[i] Up from $3 trillion in 2015, it’s nothing short of a big, flourishing business whose operators are relentless innovators.

Since COVID, the FBI recorded a 300% increase in cybercrime[ii], with pandemic-related scams baiting people to click on malicious links or attachments. Even ransomware attacks have recently soared — in fact, one is said to be occurring every 11 seconds.[iii] And why not? It’s a lucrative business model!

In the past, kidnappers were always caught at the money-transfer point. But digital currency changed all that, facilitating anonymous handoffs. With Bitcoin, for example, organizations can no longer trace ransoms back to individuals and threat actors can sit in Russia, Eastern Europe, China, Brazil, the United States, often where they may be protected from extradition.

The Evolution of Ransomeware

Ransomware began as a game of keep away. The bad guys didn’t have to steal anything; they simply denied companies or individuals access to their data. This tactic worked well until companies caught on and started to move their backups offline, so they could restore their critical systems without having to pay the ransom.

Like legitimate businesses, cybercriminals looked to pivot, innovate, and find new revenue streams. When encryption alone began to fail, they concocted the double extortion scheme, whereby they opted to encrypt and exfiltrate data. First, they demanded payment for decrypting the stolen data. Next, they asked for a second payment to prevent its public release.

Depending on the sensitivity of the data stolen, companies had to weigh the potential reputational damage related to its exposure along with the broken client trust of not protecting it in the first place.

A Case Study in Costs

In a 2019 Radware survey[i], 43% of participants said they’d experienced negative customer trust and reputational loss because of a successful cyberattack.

Let’s examine the SolarWinds attack. Dubbed the Pearl Harbor of American IT, the SolarWinds hack impacted 18,000 government and private networks. That’s a lot of customers to have mad at you.

SolarWinds had been a reputable, long-time provider of IT monitoring services. But immediately after the hack, its stock price tanked, presumably due to the potential for reputational damage, material loss of customers, a slowdown in business performance, and high remediation and legal costs.

It’s easy to think that only big companies are targets — Microsoft was also recently hacked — but cybercriminals are often emboldened by such successful hacks. While advanced persistent threat actors may not hit smaller targets themselves, they have no qualms about selling their proven exploit methods to other players in the threat actor marketplace. Often, the smaller, less sophisticated players are willing to take smaller pay days.

Thus, no matter an organization’s size and scope of activities, it will be targeted, baited, and attacked.

So, Let's Count the Costs

The direct cost of exploitation includes remediation, repair, restoration of data and IT infrastructure, ransom payment, and legal counsel to help navigate through these complex problems. And if a breach notification to customers is required, those costs can quickly skyrocket, especially depending on how much personally identifiable information (PII) may have been lost.

Not to be forgotten is the cost of business downtime. While production ceases, organizations must continue to pay salaries, rent, the electric bill, the telephone bill, all the normal operating expenses. None of these go away while organizations are trying to restore operations.

Next, there are the indirect costs of reputation damage and lost customer trust, which impacts the ability to gain future customers. There’s also the potential for litigation defense costs should customers decide to sue for what they believe was a failure to protect information that a company had pledged to protect. On top of all that, multiple state attorneys general, the Federal Trade Commission, the Security Exchange Commission, and other regulators may fine the “hacked” company.

And lastly, insurance rates go up. It’s a bit different than with car insurance. For cyber carriers, there’s less actuarial science available and thus, increases go up faster than they would in any other form of insurance right now.

In a worst-case scenario, if the sum proves too high, a company could confront the greatest cost of all: going out of business.

[i] Radware Report Shows That Respondents Claim Average Cost of Cyberattack Now Exceeds $1 Million

[i] Cybercrime to Cost the World $10.5 Trillion Annually By 2025 (cybersecurityventures.com)

[ii] COVID-19 News: FBI Reports 300% Increase in Reported Cybercrimes – IMC Grupo

[iii] Ransomware Attacks Predicted to Occur Every 11 Seconds in 2021 with a Cost of $20 Billion | Robinson+Cole Data Privacy + Security Insider – JDSupra

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Article

FortiBleed Campaign Linked to INC and Lynx Ransomware Operations

Researchers have linked the FortiBleed credential-harvesting campaign to the INC and Lynx ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operations, establishing a direct connection between large-scale FortiGate credential theft and subsequent ransomware deployment. The attribution is based on a variety of factors, including an operator observed managing negotiation panels for both ransomware groups, notable overlap between FortiBleed victim data and subsequent ransomware targets, and internal infrastructure exposing attack workflows. The campaign is estimated to have targeted more than 430,000 internet-facing FortiGate devices, resulting in administrative access to hundreds of organizations. 

What’s Notable and Unique

  • Researchers identified a shared operator actively managing negotiation panels for both the INC and Lynx ransomware groups, providing rare operational evidence linking the two RaaS operations beyond infrastructure or malware similarities. 


  • Analysis of the exposed infrastructure revealed a structured ransomware operation with dedicated roles for access acquisition, victim management, negotiations, and technical support, reflecting an organized ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model rather than an ad hoc criminal group. 


  • The operation reportedly integrates artificial intelligence into multiple stages of the attack lifecycle, including vulnerability research, penetration testing, attack automation, and ransomware development, demonstrating the increasing adoption of AI to enhance offensive capabilities.

Mitigations

Organizations should assume that exposed or previously compromised FortiGate credentials may be leveraged for ransomware deployment and immediately reset administrative and VPN credentials while enforcing multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all privileged access. Security teams should ensure that FortiGate appliances are fully patched, restrict management interfaces to trusted networks, and audit administrative accounts and firewall configurations for unauthorized changes. Organizations should also monitor for anomalous authentication activity, hunt for published indicators of compromise (IOCs), and review VPN and firewall logs for signs of unauthorized access. Maintaining centralized logging and a well-practiced incident response process can help detect and contain attacks before they progress to lateral movement or ransomware deployment.

Analyst Comments

The attribution of FortiBleed to the INC and Lynx ransomware operations reinforces the growing convergence between credential-harvesting campaigns and ransomware deployment, highlighting the role of initial access operations in modern RaaS ecosystems. The relationship between INC and Lynx also aligns with Arete's previous research, which identified a shared malware lineage. INC Ransom, first observed in 2023, was later leaked or sold, enabling code reuse by other threat actors. Lynx, which emerged in 2024, is widely regarded as an evolution of the INC codebase. Sinobi ransomware, identified in 2025, shares near-identical binaries and infrastructure, and approximately 99% code similarity with Lynx. Further details on the code correlation between INC, Lynx, and Sinobi are available in Arete's 2025 Annual Report.

Sources

  • Is FortiBleed Linked to INC and Lynx Ransomware?   

  • FortiBleed credential-theft campaign linked to Lynx ransomware   

  • FortiBleed Unmasked: A Joint Operation by Lynx and INC Ransomware Groups   

  • FortiBleed Credential Theft Campaign Attributed to INC and Lynx Ransomware Groups  

Article

Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: June 2026

Although Akira was once again the most active ransomware threat in June, activity remained relatively distributed among multiple threat groups, with 17 unique threat groups observed throughout the month. Along with Akira, Qilin and INC Ransom remained active and were among the top five most active threat groups observed in June. Several new threat actors also emerged during the month, including KryBit, Settra, and Icarus.

Figure 1. Activity from the top 5 threat groups in June 2026

Throughout the month, analysts at Arete identified several trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:

  • In June, a threat actor calling themselves Icarus compromised and exfiltrated data from customers of the market intelligence platform Klue. Klue later confirmed the security incident, which involved attackers stealing OAuth tokens used to connect to customers' Salesforce environments, and reported that the threat actor was deleting the data stolen from affected Klue customers. In an odd twist, reports emerged of a second threat actor claiming to have compromised Icarus's infrastructure and attempting to re-extort Klue's customers. Regardless, the Klue breach highlights the growing threat of software-as-a-service (SaaS) supply chain compromises, particularly those exploiting OAuth tokens and trusted integrations to bypass traditional security controls.

  • In mid-June, security researchers identified a large-scale credential-harvesting and valid account abuse campaign dubbed “FortiBleed” that systematically targets internet-facing Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL-VPN gateways, relying heavily on automated password spraying and configuration exfiltration rather than vulnerability exploitation. The scale of exposure and attack activity has been significant and globally distributed, with attackers collecting the login credentials of over 86,000 FortiGate devices across 194 countries. There is no singular ‘fix’ to mitigate the database exposure, and it is important that organizations work with their security teams, incident response providers, and other stakeholders to review environments holistically and monitor for signs of potentially unauthorized activity.

  • Multiple threat groups continue to leverage vulnerable drivers to bypass endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions in a technique known as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD). Arete has observed Akira and DragonForce using the technique in multiple engagements, and The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) has also been observed using what researchers are calling "GentleKiller", a framework consisting of multiple variants that leverage vulnerable drivers and EDR-disabling utilities to target a wide range of endpoint security products.  

Sources

  • Arete Internal

Article

Update on FortiBleed Credential Exposure

Last week, security researchers identified a large-scale credential-harvesting and valid account abuse campaign dubbed “FortiBleed” that systematically targets internet-facing Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL-VPN gateways. The campaign relies heavily on automated password spraying and configuration exfiltration rather than vulnerability exploitation.

  • Attackers first scan for exposed FortiGate devices and rank targets based on revenue. SSH brute-force attacks are used against admin accounts to gain initial access.

  • Following initial access, operators deploy stealthy packet-sniffing capabilities and establish external listening posts to receive harvested credentials and session data in near real time.

  • Observed post-exploitation activity strongly indicates pre-positioning for broader enterprise compromise, including lateral movement and potential ransomware deployment.

  • The scale of exposure and attack activity has been significant and globally distributed. The campaign has been ongoing since at least February 2026, with attackers collecting the login credentials of over 86,000 FortiGate devices across 194 nations.

How Arete Can Help

Arete continues to monitor this campaign, utilizing our extensive experience in detection, threat hunting, and attack surface review to look for indications of unauthorized activity related to this database exposure. Additional information regarding important considerations, containment and credential compromise mitigation actions, and additional hardening recommendations can be found in Arete’s FortiBleed Advisory.

Sources

  • FortiBleed: SOCRadar’s Investigation into 86,644 Compromised Fortinet Firewalls

  • FortiBleed Attackers Turn Firewalls Into Credential Stealers as Heists Persist

  • FortiBleed: The Most Detailed Breakdown Yet of an Active Russian Credential-Harvesting Operation

  • Hackers Using FortigateSniffer Tool That Turns Compromised Firewalls Into Password Collectors  

Article

Europol Disrupts AudiA6 Crypto Laundering Service

European authorities have dismantled AudiA6, a major cryptocurrency laundering service linked to ransomware groups and broader cybercriminal networks. Between 2022 and 2025, the platform is believed to have processed over €336 million in illicit funds, enabling threat actors to obscure financial trails and monetize cybercrime proceeds. Its operators are also suspected of running Dark2Web, a dark web forum that facilitated collaboration, services, and connections among cybercriminals globally. This development underscores the expanding role of sophisticated, large-scale cryptocurrency laundering services in sustaining the cybercrime economy, enabling threat actors to obscure illicit funds and evade regulatory controls.

What’s Notable and Unique 

  • Following law enforcement disruption of Cryptex and Garantex, AudiA6 emerged as another platform involved in financial activities linked to ransomware groups. Investigators believe that AudiA6 became a central hub for cybercriminals seeking to launder stolen digital assets while obscuring the transaction trail from authorities.

  • On June 10, 2026, a coordinated operation resulted in two arrests in Georgia, the dismantling of key infrastructure (30+ servers, 25 domains), the freezing or seizure of over €778,000 in crypto, and the takedown of the AudiA6 and Dark2Web platforms. 

Analyst Comments

Ransomware groups and cybercriminal networks are increasingly leveraging sophisticated techniques, including chain-hopping, decentralized exchanges, and mixer-as-a-service platforms, to rapidly move illicit cryptocurrency across multiple blockchains, effectively obscuring transaction trails. Concurrently, the widespread use of fraudulent exchange accounts, mule wallets, and privacy-enhancing tools has elevated cryptocurrency laundering to a core enabler of the cybercrime ecosystem, allowing actors to bypass anti-money-laundering controls at scale. This investigation identified over 6,000 KYC records linked to money-mule accounts, many of which were tied to Russian-speaking intermediaries specifically recruited to facilitate the movement of illicit proceeds. These threat actors systematically used both commercial and domain-controlled email services to establish mule accounts across multiple cryptocurrency platforms. Collectively, these findings underscore the growing scale, coordination, and professionalization of cryptocurrency-enabled crime, highlighting the critical need for sustained, intelligence-led, and internationally coordinated efforts to disrupt these evolving financial ecosystems.

Sources

  • Ransomware gangs cut off from EUR 336 million ‘AudiA6’ crypto laundering pipeline