Malware Spotlight: Akira Ransomware

Report

Malware Spotlight: Akira Ransomware

Nov 13, 2024

Arete Analysis

Cyber Threats

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Executive Summary

Since April 2023, Arete’s Incident Response (IR) team has responded to more than one hundred incidents attributed to the Akira ransomware group. Akira is a prolific threat and quickly established itself as one of the most active ransomware groups alongside ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit in 2023. In 2024, Akira benefited from law enforcement actions that disrupted LockBit and ALPHV/BlackCat’s operations and has continued to be one of the most active threat actor groups.

This spotlight explores the ransomware group’s observed behavior, background information on the threat actor, and statistics from Incident Response engagements, along with a technical analysis of Akira’s ransomware executable. Finally, we discuss security recommendations to better defend against this evolving cyber threat and mitigate the risk of financial and reputational losses.

Incident Response Data on the Akira Ransomware Group

The information below is based on engagements involving Akira ransomware 
investigated by Arete since April 2023. Our IR, Threat Intelligence, and 
Data Analytics teams work together to analyze key data points during every 
ransomware engagement and form real-time threat actor (TA) insights.
 
- Targeted sectors include healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, public and 
  financial services, and professional services.

- The median initial demand is $500,000.

- The median ransom payment facilitated is $150,000.

- Tools observed during investigations include SystemBC, Cobalt Strike, Rclone,
  Filezilla, WinSCP, AnyDesk, PuTTY, SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan), 
  Advanced IP Scanner, and Angry IP Scanner.

- Over the last six months, 43% of engagements involved data exfiltration.

- Depending on the variant, Akira encrypts and appends an “.akira”, “.powerranges”, 
  or “.akiranew” extension to encrypted files.

- The ransom note file name is commonly “akira_readme.txt” or “powerranges.txt” and 
  includes a password-protected Tor site for negotiations and communication with 
  victims.

- The group operates a data leak site (DLS) self-proclaimed as “AKIRA” and commonly 
  threatens victims with releasing stolen data as a pressure tactic if a payment is 
  not made.

- Akira will delete Windows Shadow Volume Copies using Powershell and utilize 
  Windows’ Restart Manager to exit processes and services that could potentially 
  prevent encryption

The information below is based on engagements involving Akira ransomware 
investigated by Arete since April 2023. Our IR, Threat Intelligence, and 
Data Analytics teams work together to analyze key data points during every 
ransomware engagement and form real-time threat actor (TA) insights.
 
- Targeted sectors include healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, public and 
  financial services, and professional services.

- The median initial demand is $500,000.

- The median ransom payment facilitated is $150,000.

- Tools observed during investigations include SystemBC, Cobalt Strike, Rclone,
  Filezilla, WinSCP, AnyDesk, PuTTY, SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan), 
  Advanced IP Scanner, and Angry IP Scanner.

- Over the last six months, 43% of engagements involved data exfiltration.

- Depending on the variant, Akira encrypts and appends an “.akira”, “.powerranges”, 
  or “.akiranew” extension to encrypted files.

- The ransom note file name is commonly “akira_readme.txt” or “powerranges.txt” and 
  includes a password-protected Tor site for negotiations and communication with 
  victims.

- The group operates a data leak site (DLS) self-proclaimed as “AKIRA” and commonly 
  threatens victims with releasing stolen data as a pressure tactic if a payment is 
  not made.

- Akira will delete Windows Shadow Volume Copies using Powershell and utilize 
  Windows’ Restart Manager to exit processes and services that could potentially 
  prevent encryption

The information below is based on engagements involving Akira ransomware 
investigated by Arete since April 2023. Our IR, Threat Intelligence, and 
Data Analytics teams work together to analyze key data points during every 
ransomware engagement and form real-time threat actor (TA) insights.
 
- Targeted sectors include healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, public and 
  financial services, and professional services.

- The median initial demand is $500,000.

- The median ransom payment facilitated is $150,000.

- Tools observed during investigations include SystemBC, Cobalt Strike, Rclone,
  Filezilla, WinSCP, AnyDesk, PuTTY, SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan), 
  Advanced IP Scanner, and Angry IP Scanner.

- Over the last six months, 43% of engagements involved data exfiltration.

- Depending on the variant, Akira encrypts and appends an “.akira”, “.powerranges”, 
  or “.akiranew” extension to encrypted files.

- The ransom note file name is commonly “akira_readme.txt” or “powerranges.txt” and 
  includes a password-protected Tor site for negotiations and communication with 
  victims.

- The group operates a data leak site (DLS) self-proclaimed as “AKIRA” and commonly 
  threatens victims with releasing stolen data as a pressure tactic if a payment is 
  not made.

- Akira will delete Windows Shadow Volume Copies using Powershell and utilize 
  Windows’ Restart Manager to exit processes and services that could potentially 
  prevent encryption

Background

Akira has evolved into a notable ransomware operation and was among the top variants observed by Arete in the first half of 2024.

Source: Arete's H1 2024 Crimeware Report

Akira targets a broad range of organizations throughout North America, including Canada, and swiftly lists victims on its data leak site. Targeted sectors include healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, public and financial services, and professional services. The group maintains Windows and Linux versions of its ransomware and uses virtual private network (VPN) appliances as an initial access vector in 50% of attacks.

Megazord, a variant of Akira, demonstrates the evolution of the group’s ransomware. Introduced around August 2023, this variant is unique due to its Rust-based code, which is a departure from the C++ code of the original Akira ransomware. The Megazord variant also includes different command line arguments and encrypts files with a “.powerranges” extension, which are differentiating attributes.

Technical Analysis

Malware analysis of one of the Windows-based variants revealed that Akira ransomware:

Supports multiple command-line arguments.
Encrypts files on the system and mounted shares.
Adds the following extension to encrypted files (variant dependent): .akira (e.g., file.docx.akira).
Creates a ransom note with the following filename (variant dependent): akira_readme.txt.
References a data leak site in the ransom note that, when accessed, self-identifies the group as AKIRA.
Kills a list of processes and services.
Maintains a list of whitelisted files and directories to ensure it will not render the system unusable, preventing recovery when running a decryptor.
Attempts to prevent system recovery by deleting the system’s volume shadow copies.
Creates a log file with a name based on the date and time: Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S (e.g., Log-19-09-2024-09-21-20.txt).

Execution Pattern/Arguments

Akira ransomware does not need a command line argument to execute and encrypt files in the system. However, Akira supports the following command line arguments:

Command line argument	Description
-p / –encryption_path	Specify a target directory to encrypt. If not provided, the payload will encrypt the local and mounted shared drives by default.
-s / –share_file	Encrypt shared volumes/directory files.
-n / –encryption_percent	Number that represents the percentage of the file that will be encrypted.
-localonly	Encrypt only local volumes.
-e/ –exclude	Meant to exclude directories but does not seem to be fully functional.

Megazord variant:

Command line argument	Description
–path	Path to encrypt. If not provided, the payload will encrypt the local and mounted shared drives by default.
–id	Unique token to execute the ransomware.
–threads	Number of threads (1-1000).
–h (–help)	Displays help options.
-log	Logging options with multiple logs supported (info, error, debug). Not displayed by default.

Examples of how the supported arguments are used:

Akira.exe -p=C:\Users\%USERNAME%\Desktop\MyFiles

Akira.exe –encryption_percent=10

Figure 1. Code in the ransomware written to read command line arguments

Stop Services and Processes

Before file encryption, the ransomware terminates a pre-determined list of processes and services to encrypt as many files as possible. Akira ransomware contains a list of processes it will exclude during process termination, listed below:

Process names:

explorer.exe, sihost.exe, spoolsv.exe, dwm.exe, LogonUI.exe, fontdrvhost.exe, cmd.exe, csrss.exe, smss.exe, SearchUI.exe, lsass.exe, conhost.exe, System, winlogon.exe, services.exe, wininit.exe, Registry, Memory Compression, System Idle Process, Secure System

File and Directory Exclusions

The ransomware excludes system-related files and folders, ransomware-related files, and whitelisted extensions during encryption.

Excluded file extensions:

.exe, .dll, .sys, .msi, .lnk, .akira, akira_readme.txt

Excluded directories:

tmp, temp, winnt, $Recycle.Bin, thumb, System Volume Information, $RECYCLE.BIN, Windows, ProgramData, Trend Micro, ProgramData, Boot

Inhibit System Recovery

Windows operating systems contain features that can help fix corrupted system files, including shadow copies, which are backups of files created by the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS). By deleting shadow copies, the ransomware can prevent victims from restoring files from backups, making it more difficult for them to recover their data without paying the ransom.

The ransomware deletes volume shadow copies before file encryption by starting the following Powershell process and executing the command:

powershell.exe -Command “Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | Remove-WmiObject”

Network Share Discovery

Akira ransomware can enumerate network-mounted shares by scanning the network interfaces. If any are found, it will attempt to encrypt them, as shown below.

Figure 2. Share drive encrypted

Data Encrypted for Impact

The ransomware initially finds available drives and then loads the files one by one using the Windows API FindFirstFileW and FindNextFileW. The ransomware generates random AES keys to encrypt the files, and after encrypting them, the keys are encrypted using a public RSA key. The resulting key is again encrypted and placed at the end of the file.

Figure 3. Data encryption code

Figure 4. Extension added to the encrypted files

Figure 5. Encrypted files

During execution, the ransomware creates a log file in the working directory where the file is executed from. The log file is named based on the date and time of execution using the following string format: Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S. For example, during execution, the following log file with the name was created: Log-19-09-2024-09-21-20.txt.

Figure 6. Log file created by Akira

Figure 7. Portion of the log file

Figure 8. Log file name string format in the code

Upon successful execution, the ransomware creates ransom notes with the file name akira_readme.txt. The Megazord variant creates ransom notes with the same content, but the file name is powerranges.txt.

Figure 9. Akira ransom note

Ransom note content:

Hi friends,

Whatever who you are and what your title is if you’re reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups – virtual, physical – everything that we managed to reach – are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption.

Well, for now let’s keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We’re fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know:

Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal.
Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them – in this case we won’t be able to help.
The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we’ve managed to detect and used in order to get into, identify backup solutions and upload your data.
As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes – generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket – to multiple threat actors at ones. Then all of this will be published in our blog – https://akiraI2iz6a7qgd3ayp3I6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kolIpj5z3z636bad[.]onion
We’re more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us.

If you’re indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:

Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room – https://www.torproject.org/download/.
Paste this link – <ONION_LINK>
Use this code – <UNIQUE_CODE> – to log into our chat.

Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.

Modify Registry

The Windows registry is a database that stores configuration settings and values for the Windows operating system. It manages user preferences, installed software, system configurations, and more. Malware abuses the Windows registry to maintain persistence, hide its presence, disable security settings, and launch malicious scripts. Akira did not perform any registry key modification.

Mutex

The mutex is the fundamental tool for managing shared resources between multiple threads or processes. Typically, ransomware uses a mutex to avoid reinfecting the victim system and causing multiple layers of encryption. The ransomware did not create a mutex during execution.

Network Activity

The ransomware did not try to communicate with a remote server other than encrypting data from mounted shares.

Indicators of Compromise

Indicator	Type	Context
9f873c29a38dd265decb6517a2a1f3b5d4f90ccd42e-b61039086ea0b5e74827e	SHA256 hash	Akira ransomware
2b00a02196b87445633cabde506b4387979504cf60955f0b-40cf2e4da4f0fd23	SHA256 hash	Akira ransomware
237d3c744fd5fc5d7e7a55e4385dff51045a1c6d8ee-7346a270a688ab3791d49	SHA256 hash	Akira ransomware
akira_readme.txt, powerranges.txt	File name	Akiraransom notes
.akira, .powerranges, .akiranew	Extension	Encrypted files extension
powershell.exe -Command “Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy \| Remove-WmiObject”	Process	Volume Shadow Copy deletion
Log-19-09-2024-09-21-20.txt	File name	Example log file name created by Akira
https://akirai2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kolIpj5z3z636bad[.]onion	URL	TA data leak site (DLS)

Data Leak Site

The ransom note contains a data leak site (DLS) that, when accessed, displayed the following page, self-identifying the group as Akira:

Figure 10. Tor DLS

Tor Chat Site

The ransom note contains a Tor chat site and a unique code used to log into the chat. The Tor chat site displayed the following page:

Figure 11. Tor chat site

Detection Mechanisms

Custom Detections and Blocking with Arete’s Arsenal

SentinelOne S1QL 1.0 query syntax (STAR rule):
Volume Shadow Copy Deletion

Akira Ransomware

EndpointOS = "windows" AND ((ObjectType = "process" AND CmdLine In Contains Anycase (
".\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", ":\programdata\lck.exe", 
":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe")) 
OR (ObjectType = "file" AND (EventType In ("File Creation", "File Scan") AND 
(TgtFilePath In Contains Anycase (":\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", 
":\programdata\lck.exe", ":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe", 
":\akira_readme.txt", ":\powerranges.txt", "akiranew.txt") OR TgtFilePath RegExp 
"\\Log-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-20[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}\.

EndpointOS = "windows" AND ((ObjectType = "process" AND CmdLine In Contains Anycase (
".\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", ":\programdata\lck.exe", 
":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe")) 
OR (ObjectType = "file" AND (EventType In ("File Creation", "File Scan") AND 
(TgtFilePath In Contains Anycase (":\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", 
":\programdata\lck.exe", ":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe", 
":\akira_readme.txt", ":\powerranges.txt", "akiranew.txt") OR TgtFilePath RegExp 
"\\Log-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-20[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}\.

EndpointOS = "windows" AND ((ObjectType = "process" AND CmdLine In Contains Anycase (
".\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", ":\programdata\lck.exe", 
":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe")) 
OR (ObjectType = "file" AND (EventType In ("File Creation", "File Scan") AND 
(TgtFilePath In Contains Anycase (":\ProgramData\w.exe", ":\w.exe", ":\ProgramData\win.exe", 
":\programdata\lck.exe", ":\ProgramData\dllhost32.exe", ":\ProgramData\hpupdate.exe", 
":\akira_readme.txt", ":\powerranges.txt", "akiranew.txt") OR TgtFilePath RegExp 
"\\Log-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-20[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}\.

Note: These threat hunting queries may need to be tuned for your specific network environment.

Yara

rule Akira_ransomware_executable
{
    meta:
        author = "areteir.com"
        description = "Detects the Akira ransomware executable"
        target = "Windows systems"
        file_type = "exe"
        copyright = "Copyright © 2024 by Arete Advisors, LLC."
        distribution = "No re-distribution without Arete Advisors, LLC consent."

    strings:
        $ns1 = "Shadowcopy" ascii wide nocase
        $ns2 = "Remove-WmiObject" ascii wide nocase
        $ns3 = "write_encrypt_info" ascii wide nocase
        $ns4 = "Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S" ascii wide nocase
        $as1 = "--encryption_path" ascii wide nocase
        $as2 = "--share_file" ascii wide nocase
        $as3 = "--encryption_percent" ascii wide nocase
        $as4 = "-localonly" ascii wide nocase
        $ms1 = "megazord\\src\\main.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms2 = "megazord::windowsmegazord\\src\\windows.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms3 = "megazord::path_findermegazord\\src\\path_finder.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms4 = "megazord\\src\\lock.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb1 = ":\\rust\\megazord" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb2 = "\\release\\deps\\megazord.pdb" ascii wide nocase
        $dls = "akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad" ascii wide nocase

condition:
((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550)) and
( ( (2 of ($ns*)) and (3 of ($as*)) ) or ( all of ($ms*) ) or ( all of ($pdb*) ) or ($dls) )
}

rule Akira_ransomware_executable
{
    meta:
        author = "areteir.com"
        description = "Detects the Akira ransomware executable"
        target = "Windows systems"
        file_type = "exe"
        copyright = "Copyright © 2024 by Arete Advisors, LLC."
        distribution = "No re-distribution without Arete Advisors, LLC consent."

    strings:
        $ns1 = "Shadowcopy" ascii wide nocase
        $ns2 = "Remove-WmiObject" ascii wide nocase
        $ns3 = "write_encrypt_info" ascii wide nocase
        $ns4 = "Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S" ascii wide nocase
        $as1 = "--encryption_path" ascii wide nocase
        $as2 = "--share_file" ascii wide nocase
        $as3 = "--encryption_percent" ascii wide nocase
        $as4 = "-localonly" ascii wide nocase
        $ms1 = "megazord\\src\\main.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms2 = "megazord::windowsmegazord\\src\\windows.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms3 = "megazord::path_findermegazord\\src\\path_finder.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms4 = "megazord\\src\\lock.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb1 = ":\\rust\\megazord" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb2 = "\\release\\deps\\megazord.pdb" ascii wide nocase
        $dls = "akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad" ascii wide nocase

condition:
((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550)) and
( ( (2 of ($ns*)) and (3 of ($as*)) ) or ( all of ($ms*) ) or ( all of ($pdb*) ) or ($dls) )
}

rule Akira_ransomware_executable
{
    meta:
        author = "areteir.com"
        description = "Detects the Akira ransomware executable"
        target = "Windows systems"
        file_type = "exe"
        copyright = "Copyright © 2024 by Arete Advisors, LLC."
        distribution = "No re-distribution without Arete Advisors, LLC consent."

    strings:
        $ns1 = "Shadowcopy" ascii wide nocase
        $ns2 = "Remove-WmiObject" ascii wide nocase
        $ns3 = "write_encrypt_info" ascii wide nocase
        $ns4 = "Log-%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S" ascii wide nocase
        $as1 = "--encryption_path" ascii wide nocase
        $as2 = "--share_file" ascii wide nocase
        $as3 = "--encryption_percent" ascii wide nocase
        $as4 = "-localonly" ascii wide nocase
        $ms1 = "megazord\\src\\main.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms2 = "megazord::windowsmegazord\\src\\windows.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms3 = "megazord::path_findermegazord\\src\\path_finder.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $ms4 = "megazord\\src\\lock.rs" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb1 = ":\\rust\\megazord" ascii wide nocase
        $pdb2 = "\\release\\deps\\megazord.pdb" ascii wide nocase
        $dls = "akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad" ascii wide nocase

condition:
((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550)) and
( ( (2 of ($ns*)) and (3 of ($as*)) ) or ( all of ($ms*) ) or ( all of ($pdb*) ) or ($dls) )
}

Recommended Mitigations

Utilize an endpoint detection and response (EDR) solution with the capability to halt detected processes and isolate systems on the network based on identified conditions.
Block any known attacker C2s in the firewall.
Implement multi-factor authentication on RDP and VPN to restrict access to critical network resources.
Eliminate unnecessary RDP ports exposed to the internet.
Block a high number of SMB connection attempts from one system to others in the network over a short period of time.
Perform periodic dark web monitoring to verify if data is available for sale on the black market.
Perform penetration tests.
Periodically patch systems and update tools.
Monitor connections to the network from suspicious locations.
Monitor downloads and uploads of files to file-sharing services outside standard work hours.
Monitor file uploads from domain controllers to the internet.
Monitor network scans from uncommon servers (e.g., RDP server).

Organizations can find the full list of US government-recommended ransomware prevention and mitigation
guidance here: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide.

Arete provides data-driven cybersecurity solutions to transform your response to emerging cyber threats.
Click here to learn more.

References

At Arete, we envision a world without cyber extortion, where people, businesses, and governments can thrive. We are taking all that we know from over 9,000 engagements to inform our solutions and strengthen powerful tools to better prevent, detect, and respond to the cyber extortion threats of tomorrow. Our elite team of experts provides unparalleled capabilities to address the entire cyber threat lifecycle, from incident response and restoration to advisory and managed security services. To learn more about our solutions, visit www.areteir.com.

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Arete's 2025 Annual Crimeware Report

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A recent security report indicates that threat actors are actively exploiting FortiGate Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) appliances as initial access vectors to compromise enterprise networks. The activity leverages recently disclosed vulnerabilities or weak credentials to gain unauthorized access and extract configuration files, which often contain sensitive information, including service account credentials and detailed network topology data.

Analysis of these incidents shows significant variation in attacker dwell time, ranging from immediate lateral movement to delays of up to two months post-compromise. Since these appliances often integrate with authentication systems such as Active Directory and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), their compromise can grant attackers extensive access, substantially increasing the risk of widespread network intrusion and data exposure.

What’s Notable and Unique

The activity involves the exploitation of recently disclosed security vulnerabilities, including CVE-2025-59718, CVE-2025-59719, and CVE-2026-24858, or weak credentials, allowing attackers to gain administrative access, extract configuration files, and obtain service account credentials and network topology information.
In one observed incident, attackers created a FortiGate admin account with unrestricted firewall rules and maintained access over time, consistent with initial access broker activity. After a couple of months, threat actors extracted and decrypted LDAP credentials to compromise Active Directory.

In another case, attackers moved from FortiGate access to deploying remote access tools, including Pulseway and MeshAgent, while also utilizing cloud infrastructure such as Google Cloud Storage and Amazon Web Services (AWS).

Analyst Comments

Arete has identified multiple instances of Fortinet device exploitation for initial access, involving various threat actors, with the Qilin ransomware group notably leveraging Fortinet device exploits. Given their integration with systems like Active Directory, NGFW appliances remain high-value targets for both state-aligned and financially motivated actors. In parallel, Arete has observed recent dark web activity involving leaked FortiGate VPN access, further highlighting the expanding risk landscape. This aligns with the recent reporting from Amazon Threat Intelligence, which identified large-scale compromises of FortiGate devices driven by exposed management ports and weak authentication, rather than vulnerability exploitation. Overall, these developments underscore the increasing focus on network edge devices as entry points, reinforcing the need for organizations to strengthen authentication, restrict external exposure, and address fundamental security gaps to mitigate the risk of widespread compromise.

Sources

FortiGate Edge Intrusions | Stolen Service Accounts Lead to Rogue Workstations and Deep AD Compromise

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What’s Notable and Unique

The configuration files .claude/settings.json and .mcp.json were repurposed to execute malicious commands. Because the configurations could be applied immediately upon starting Claude Code, the commands ran before the user could deny permissions via a dialogue prompt, or they bypassed the authentication prompt altogether.
.claude/settings.json also defines the endpoint for all Claude Code API communications. By replacing the default localhost URL with a URL they own, an attacker could redirect traffic to infrastructure they control. Critically, the authentication traffic generated upon starting Claude Code included the user's full Anthropic API key in plain text and was sent before the user could interact with the trust dialogue.
Restrictive permissions on sensitive files could be bypassed by simply prompting Claude Code to create a copy of the file's contents, which did not inherit the original file's permissions. A threat actor using a stolen API key could gain complete read and write access to all files within a workspace.

Analyst Comments

The vulnerabilities and attack paths detailed in the research illustrate the double-edged nature of AI tools. The speed, scale, and convenience characteristics that make AI tools attractive to developer teams also benefit threat actors who use them for nefarious purposes. Defenders should expect adversaries to continue seeking ways to exploit configurations and orchestration logic to increase the impact of their attacks. Organizations planning to implement AI development tools should prioritize AI supply-chain hygiene and CI/CD hardening practices.

Sources

Caught in the Hook: RCE and API Token Exfiltration Through Claude Code Project Files | CVE-2025-59536 | CVE-2026-21852

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Mar 9, 2026

Ransomware Trends & Data Insights: February 2026

After a slight lull in January, Akira and Qilin returned to dominating ransomware activity in February, collectively accounting for almost half of all engagements that month. The rest of the threat landscape remained relatively diverse, with a mix of persistent threats like INC and PLAY, older groups like Cl0p and LockBit, and newer groups like BravoX and Payouts King. Given current trends, the first quarter of 2026 will likely remain relatively predictable, with the top groups from the second half of 2025 continuing to operate at fairly consistent levels month to month.

Figure 1. Activity from the top 5 threat groups in February 2026

Throughout the month of February, analysts at Arete identified several trends behind the threat actors perpetrating cybercrime activities:

In February, Arete observed Qilin actively targeting WatchGuard Firebox devices, especially those vulnerable to CVE-2025-14733, to gain initial access to victim environments. CVE-2025-14733 is a critical vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS that allows a remote, unauthenticated threat actor to execute arbitrary code. In addition to upgrading WatchGuard devices to the latest Firebox OS version, which patches the bug, administrators are urged to rotate all shared secrets on affected devices that may have been compromised and may be used in future campaigns.
Reports from February suggest that threat actors are increasingly exploring AI-enabled tools and services to scale malicious activities, demonstrating how generative AI is being integrated into both espionage and financially motivated threat operations. The Google Threat Intelligence Group indicated that state-backed threat actors are leveraging Google’s Gemini AI as a force multiplier to support all stages of the cyberattack lifecycle, from reconnaissance to post-compromise operations. Separate reporting from Amazon Threat Intelligence identified a threat actor leveraging commercially available generative AI services to conduct a large-scale campaign against FortiGate firewalls, gaining access through weak or reused credentials protected only by single-factor authentication.
The Interlock ransomware group recently introduced a custom process-termination utility called “Hotta Killer,” designed to disable endpoint detection and response solutions during active intrusions. This tool exploits a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-61155) in a gaming anti-cheat driver, marking a significant adaptation in the group’s operations against security tools like FortiEDR. Arete is actively monitoring this activity, which highlights the growing trend of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks, in which threat actors exploit legitimate, signed drivers to bypass and disable endpoint security controls.

Sources

Arete Internal